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Hurting others can lead to several undesirable consequences, including an increase in offenders’ 
negative emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) and damage to their social relationships. Because 
negative emotions and strained social relationships may confer risk for cardiovascular disease, I 
reasoned that hurting others—especially if done repeatedly—might affect behavioral and 
biological correlates of cardiovascular health. Importantly, offenders can apologize to their 
victim to attenuate the negative consequences of their actions. Consequently, apologies may 
decrease negative emotions and repair one’s relationship with the victim. On this basis, I tested 
whether offering an apology might influence offenders’ behavioral and biological correlates of 
cardiovascular health. I focused on offenders’ health behaviors and cardiovascular stress 
reactivity and recovery and tested whether apologizing (compared to ruminating and control) 
influenced these outcomes directly as well as indirectly through negative emotions and perceived 
forgiveness from their victim. Three studies (N = 1,046) yielded limited support for my 
predictions. Specifically, while Study 1 found that apologizing (vs. the comparison conditions) 
indirectly improved offenders’ intended health behaviors by decreasing their feelings of shame, 
Studies 2 and 3 did not replicate this effect for intended or actual health behaviors. Regarding 
cardiovascular reactivity and recovery, Study 3 showed that while apologizing sometimes led to 
presumably beneficial patterns of autonomic activity compared to rumination (e.g., significantly 
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better heart rate recovery), it did not lead to any presumably beneficial patterns of autonomic 
activity compared to self-distraction and sometimes even led to worse such patterns compared to 
self-distraction (e.g., marginally poorer systolic blood pressure recovery). Implications for 
studying apologies’ potential influence on offenders’ behavioral and biological correlates of 
cardiovascular risk are discussed, as are potential limitations in the current methodology and 
plausible boundary conditions that might moderate the potential effect of apologizing on these 
outcomes. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Whether intentionally or not, we sometimes hurt people we love and care about. A person might, 
for example, lie to a spouse, forget to wish a parent a happy birthday, or refuse to help a friend 
during a difficult time. Such interpersonal offenses—instances in which we hurt or cause 
problems for another person—are among the top ten things that we tend to regret most at the end 
of life (Newall, Chipperfield, Daniels, Hladkyj, & Perry, 2009). Yet, we also appear to commit 
offenses frequently, with participants in previous research reporting hurting others at an average 
rate of nearly once a day (Schumann & Ross, 2010; also see Schumann & Dweck, 2014). 
Hurting others and not resolving these offenses might have important consequences for 
offenders’ health outcomes, including their cardiovascular risk. As previous research has shown, 
most people exhibit increases in blood pressure and heart rate during and after negative social 
interactions (Brondolo et al., 1999; 2003; Nealey-Moore, Smith, Uchino, Hawkins, & Olson-
Cerny, 2007; Robles & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2003; Smith et al., 2009) and recurring or unresolved 
negative interactions including interpersonal offenses predict greater risk for premature 
hypertension via behavioral and biological pathways (Schoenthaler, Schwartz, Cassells, Tobin, 
& Brondolo, 2010; Sneed & Cohen, 2014).  
Hurting others and not resolving these offenses might increase cardiovascular risk 
because doing so may increase two prospective risk factors for cardiovascular disease (CVD): 
the persistent experience of negative emotions (DeSteno, Gross, & Kubzansky, 2013; Krantz & 
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McCeney, 2002; Matthews, 2005) and reductions in diverse, supportive social relationships 
(Angerer et al., 2000; Hemingway & Marmot, 1999; Kawachi et al., 1996; Kop et al., 2005; 
Kreibig, Whooley, & Ross, 2014; Orth-Gomér et al., 1993; Reed et al., 1987; Sneed & Cohen, 
2014; Wang et al., 2005). Indeed, hurting others can lead offenders to experience negative 
emotions about themselves and their actions (Fisher & Exline, 2010; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 
2013a). It can also damage their social relationships and undermine the strength and structure of 
their broader social networks by reducing feelings of closeness with their victim, increasing 
victims’ feelings of distrust and resentment toward them (Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; 
Gottman & Levenson, 1992; Johnson et al., 2004; Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Kaye, 1991; 
Sias, Heath, Perry, Silva, & Fix, 2004), and leading people other than the victim to disapprove of 
them and their actions (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Fehr et al., 2010; Shnabel & 
Nadler, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013b).  
Although the mechanisms underlying these associations between negative emotions, 
damaged social relationships, and cardiovascular risk are not completely understood, it is 
possible that experiencing negative emotions about one’s actions and one’s damaged social 
relationships might undermine offenders’ motivation to care for themselves by engaging in 
healthful behaviors and might instead lead them to engage in risky health behaviors as a way to 
regulate their emotions—thus increasing their cardiovascular risk indirectly—as well as lead to 
adverse changes in intermediate cardiovascular physiology—thus increasing their cardiovascular 
risk directly. This suggests that reducing offenders’ negative emotions and restoring their social 
relationships might decrease some of their correlates for CVD risk by leading to intermediate 
changes in behavior and physiology. 
Following interpersonal offenses, then, how do individuals reduce their negative 
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emotions and repair their relationships? Further, what impact might this reduction and repair 
have on their cardiovascular risk? In the present research, I focused on the impact of apologies 
because previous research has consistently shown that offering an apology is one of the most 
effective ways in which offenders can reduce their negative emotions and repair their 
relationships (Exline et al., 2011; Fisher & Exline, 2007; Obhuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). 
Although a growing amount of research has tested the impact of apologies on victims’ 
cardiovascular risk correlates (e.g., Anderson et al., 2006; Whited et al., 2010), little attention has 
been devoted to such correlates for offenders. As such, the present research is among the first to 
test whether apologizing can affect some of offenders’ behavioral and biological correlates of 
cardiovascular risk and the first to test psychological pathways through which it may exert these 
effects. 
1.1 THE POWER OF APOLOGIES: NEGATIVE EMOTION REDUCTION AND 
RELATIONSHIP REPAIR 
Hurting others is associated with and leads to the experience of several negative emotions and, 
especially, guilt and shame (Hall & Fincham, 2008; McGraw, 1987; Smith, Webster, Parrott & 
Eyre, 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Witvliet, Bauer, & Ludwig, 2002). 
Whereas guilt arises from the belief that one’s behavior was flawed, shame arises from the belief 
that one is a flawed person (Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2003; Tangney & Tracy, 2011). 
Offering an apology is one of the most effective ways in which offenders can decrease guilt and 
shame (Carpenter, Carlisle, & Tsang, 2014; Meek, Albright, & McMinn, 1995; Witvliet et al., 
2002; Witvliet, Hinman, Exline, & Brandt, 2011), likely because it allows offenders to repair 
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their actions—thus decreasing guilt—and reaffirms offenders’ commitment to the values they 
broke and reestablishes their moral character—thus decreasing shame (Barkan & Karn, 2006; 
Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). 
Apologizing also facilitates reconciliation between offenders and their victim (Exline et 
al., 2007; Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010; Obhuchi et al., 1989; Schumann, 2012) and increases the 
likelihood that offenders will receive forgiveness (Baumeister et al., 1995; Darby & Schlenker, 
1982; Dobash & Dobash, 1984; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Ohbuchi et al., 
1989; Schumann, 2012; Takaku, Weiner, & Ohbuchi, 2001; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). This 
is likely because apologizing increases victims’ empathy for their offender (Barkat, 2002; 
McCullough et al., 1997) and leads them to view their offender more positively (Darby & 
Schlenker, 1989; Hareli & Eisikovits, 2006; Hodgins & Liebeskind, 2003), since presumably 
only sincere offenders would be willing to suffer the personal consequences of apologizing (e.g., 
admitting that they are the kind of person who has inflicted pain upon others; Ohtsubo et al., 
2012; Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). Receiving forgiveness is beneficial (Holmes & Murray, 
1996), as it is associated with restored feelings of closeness (Tsang, McCullough, & Fincham, 
2006) and relationship-facilitating behaviors, including cooperation and willingness to prioritize 
the needs of the relationship over one’s personal needs (Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Weiner, 
Graham, Peter, & Zmuidinas, 1991). Importantly, receiving forgiveness decreases offenders’ 
guilt and shame above and beyond offering an apology (Witvliet et al., 2002). 
Because an apology can attenuate two correlates of CVD vulnerability―negative 
emotions and damaged social relationships―it might also relate to behavioral and biological 
aspects of offenders’ cardiovascular risk status, namely their health behaviors and their 
cardiovascular stress reactivity and recovery. Across three experiments, I tested the potential 
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effects of a brief apology intervention on these variables, as health behaviors and cardiovascular 
reactivity and recovery have all reliably been associated with future cardiovascular risk (Chida & 
Steptoe, 2010; Pearson et al., 2002). Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical model I tested in these 
experiments. In short, I predicted that apologizing would decrease offenders’ negative emotions 
directly and also indirectly by increasing their perceived forgiveness from their victim. The 
experience of negative emotions about one’s actions may undermine people’s engagement in 
healthful behaviors (Webb, Hirsch, Visser, & Brewer, 2013) and lead to adverse changes in 
cardiovascular physiology (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). I therefore predicted that apologizing, by 
decreasing offenders’ negative emotions, would increase their motivation to engage in self-care 
and thus positively influence their health behaviors, as well as decrease their cardiovascular 
reactivity and recovery. 
It should be acknowledged that instead of apologizing, offenders may also choose to 
respond defensively by justifying their behavior, minimizing responsibility, and/or downplaying 
the harm they caused (Fisher & Exline, 2010; Schumann, 2014). It is possible that such defensive 
responses might temporarily reduce offenders’ guilt and shame about their actions by deflecting 
responsibility, suggesting that an apology might not offer socio-emotional benefits that extend 
beyond a defensive response. Yet, available evidence suggests otherwise, with prospective 
studies finding that defensiveness can negatively impact offenders’ relationships by increasing 
negative affect and hostility over time (Gottman & Krokoff, 1989; Gottman & Silver, 1999; 
Jacobson & Margolin, 1994) and reducing feelings of empathy toward one’s victim (Woodyatt & 
Wenzel, 2013a; 2013b). These findings imply that defensiveness may harm offenders’ 
relationships in important ways. For example, feeling empathetic is essential for building and 
maintaining close relationships, because it facilitates several prosocial and relationship-
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maintaining behaviors, including helping and forgiving (McCullough et al., 1997). Importantly, 
engaging in defensive responses and withholding an apology reduces the likelihood of 
reconciliation between victim and offender (Obhuchi et al., 1989). Because of these differential 
consequences associated with defensiveness versus apology, it seems unlikely that the outcomes 
proposed in this paper, that is improved health behaviors and cardiovascular function, would also 
apply to offenders who respond defensively. 
1.2 THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF APOLOGIES ON OFFENDERS’ 
CARDIOVASCULAR HEALTH 
A major cause of CVD is atherosclerosis, a progressive inflammatory syndrome that changes the 
endothelial lining of major arteries by promoting accumulation of low-density lipoprotein-
cholesterol, foam cells, and cellular waste products, which may become encased by calcium later 
in the disease process (Demer & Tinut, 2008; Libby, 2002; Ross, 1995). This gradually restricts 
blood flow due to vessel blockage and can result in acute occlusion of blood flow because of the 
vulnerability of atherosclerotic plaques to rupture or to becoming emboli (Libby, 2001). The 
process of atherogenesis happens over many years and progresses from silent, preclinical 
changes in arterial morphology and function that lead to clinical CVD outcomes, such as 
ischemia, infarction, or stroke (Libby, 2001; 2002).  
However, the speed at which preclinical atherosclerosis progresses to clinical outcomes is 
associated with several risk factors. For instance, epidemiological studies have identified the 
experience of negative emotions and problems in people’s relationships as important sources of 
risk, showing that people who face problems with regulating negative emotions (Haines, Imeson, 
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& Meade, 1987; Kawachi et al., 1994; Krantz & McCeney, 2002) and who have fewer and/or 
less supportive relationships (Angerer, Siebert, Kothny, Mühlbauer, Mudra, & von Schacky, 
2000; Berkman, Leo-Summers, & Horwitz, 1992; Berkman & Syme, 1979; Hemingway & 
Marmot, 1999; Kawachi et al., 1996; Kreibig et al., 2014; Seeman and Syme, 1987; Orth-Gomer 
et al., 1993; Wang, Mittleman, & Orth-Gomer, 2005) are at greater risk for accelerated 
progression of preclinical atherosclerosis and development of future clinical CVD outcomes.  
While the exact mechanisms remain unclear, it is possible that negative emotions and 
damaged social relationships might increase some of the known risk factors for the development 
and progression of atherosclerosis. First, they might lead to changes in people’s health behaviors 
by increasing engagement in lifestyles and diets known to contribute to atherogenesis (see 
Chambless et al., 1997; D’Agostino et al., 2008; Libby, 2015; Kronmal et al., 2007), including 
cigarette smoking and consumption of highly palatable foods with high levels of cholesterol and 
saturated fat.  
Second, they might lead to changes in offenders’ cardiovascular function. Challenging 
situations (e.g., situations that can result in negative personal consequences and that require 
resolution, which can include interpersonal offenses) tend to stimulate the sympathetic-adrenal-
medullary axis through brain activation of autonomic responses (Steptoe, Wardle, & Marmot, 
2005). Among others, this stimulation results in increased hemodynamic activity during and 
shortly after the challenging situation compared to a resting state, respectively referred to as 
increased cardiovascular reactivity and delayed cardiovascular recovery in response to the 
challenging situation (Chida & Steptoe, 2010; Gianaros & Sheu, 2009; Jennings et al., 2004; 
Kamarck & Lovallo, 2003). Otherwise healthy individuals who tend to express exaggerated 
cardiovascular reactivity (especially blood pressure reactivity) and poorer cardiovascular 
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recovery are at greater prospective risk for hypertension and early atherosclerosis (Jennings et 
al., 2004; Matthews, Zhu, Tucker, & Whooley, 2006; Chida & Steptoe, 2010; Treiber et al., 
2003), potentially because repeated and sustained increases in blood pressure may lead to 
endothelial damage and vascular remodeling (e.g., arterial stiffness; Gianaros & Sheu, 2009; 
Ross, 1995).  
When offenders have not yet apologized, it is thus possible that the consequences of their 
unresolved offense, including negative emotions, might increase their sympathetic responses in 
ways that increase risk, with the physiological changes that occur with frequent negative 
affective states possibly inducing arterial pathophysiology. Added to this speculation is that 
offenders tend to ruminate about their unresolved negative actions (Barber et al., 2005; Dixon et 
al., 2014; Terzino, 2010), which might further contribute to frequent or prolonged large 
magnitude cardiovascular stress reactions.  
1.3 THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF APOLOGIES ON OFFENDERS’ HEALTH 
BEHAVIORS 
Experiencing negative emotions about an offense is associated with less favorable health 
behaviors (Webb et al., 2013), including disordered eating (Peterson et al., 2016; Watson et al., 
2011) and alcohol abuse (Davis et al., 2015; Webb, Robinson, Brower, & Zucker, 2006). Guilt 
and shame, in particular, appear to be associated with greater disordered eating (Bybee et al., 
1996; Sanftner et al., 1995) and substance use (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Ianni, Hart, 
Hibbard, & Carroll, 2010), and targeting guilt and shame through an intervention among 
recovering alcoholics increased their self-reported ability to abstain from drinking three weeks 
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later (Scherer, Worthington, Hook, & Campana, 2011).  
Guilt and shame might lead offenders to adopt less favorable health behaviors in part 
because of their potential to promote self-punishment, which is something offenders may opt for 
especially when they perceive no alternative ways to compensate their victim (see Inbar, Pizarro, 
Gilovich, & Ariely, 2013; Mauger, Perry, Freeman, & Grove, 1992; Mosher, O’Grady, & Katz, 
1980; Nelissen, 2012; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Tanaka, Yagi, Komiya, Mifune, & Ohtsubo, 
2015). While guilt can increase self-punishment in an attempt to repair one’s relationship with 
the victim by showing remorse, shame can do so in an attempt to repair one’s self-concept by 
showing that one cares about the social norms that were violated (Tanaka et al., 2015). The 
above studies found that offenders’ tendency to self-punish manifested in several ways (e.g., as 
willingness to undergo physical pain, relinquish one’s possessions, or forgo a pleasurable 
activity), which raises the possibility that guilty and ashamed offenders might also seek to self-
punish by engaging in risky health behaviors. Apologizing, then, might decrease guilt and shame 
and consequently improve offenders’ health behaviors.  
Apologizing might also influence offenders’ health behaviors by restoring their 
relationship with their victim. As ample research has found, having fewer and/or less supportive 
relationships is associated with less favorable health behaviors (Cohen & Lemay, 2007; 
DiMatteo, 2004; Harvey & Alexander, 2012; Lewis and Rook, 1999; Reblin & Uchino, 2008; 
Uchino, 2006; Umberson, 1987). While social relationships are thought to increase people’s 
motivation to care for themselves by increasing their positive and decreasing their negative 
emotions (Cohen, 2004; Cohen et al., 2001; Uchino, 2006), relationships can also become 
stressors, as in the case of social conflict and negative social interactions (Cohen, 2004). Such 
negative social interactions can then undermine people’s health behaviors by increasing their 
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experience of negative emotions (Uchino et al., 2001; Uchino, 2006; Walen & Lachman, 2000). 
In this sense, apologizing might decrease offenders’ negative emotions and their likely 
consequences, including self-punishment, by facilitating relationship repair between victim and 
offender.  
1.4 THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF APOLOGIES ON OFFENDERS’ 
CARDIOVASCULAR REACTIVITY AND RECOVERY 
Da Silva, Witvliet, and Riek (2016) recently tested the effects of apologies on cardiovascular 
stress reactivity.1 In this study, participants were asked to ruminate about an offense they 
committed and then to imagine apologizing to their victim. Adjusting for baseline levels, 
participants’ heart rate decreased and high frequency heart rate variability increased while 
apologizing compared to ruminating, suggesting that apologizing might lead to parasympathetic 
activation and potentially sympathetic withdrawal. 
Although not tested in their study, this effect might have emerged through a decrease in 
guilt and shame. As previous research has shown, both of these emotions elicit greater 
cardiovascular reactivity and poorer recovery. Concerning guilt, Gambaro and Rabin (1969) 
gave participants an opportunity to aggress against a person who had previously frustrated them. 
Participants who felt guilty (vs. not) for aggressing showed increased blood pressure while 
aggressing compared to baseline, suggesting an association between guilt and increased 
cardiovascular reactivity. They also showed a slower decrease in blood pressure after aggressing 
compared to baseline, suggesting an association between guilt and decreased cardiovascular 
recovery (see also, Schill, 1972). Concerning shame, Herrald and Tomaka (2002) led participants 
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to feel ashamed, angry, proud, or neutral. During the emotion-inducing episode, ashamed 
participants showed as much heart rate reactivity compared to baseline as angry participants and 
substantially more reactivity than proud and control participants. After the emotion-inducing 
episode, ashamed participants showed as much delayed recovery as angry participants in heart 
rate and pre-ejection period, and poorer recovery than proud and control participants, suggesting 
that feeling ashamed might lead to sympathetic activation and potentially parasympathetic 
withdrawal. Based on this evidence, it is possible that apologizing might decrease guilt and 
shame and consequently decrease cardiovascular reactivity and/or accelerate cardiovascular 
recovery.   
Apologizing might also influence offenders’ cardiovascular reactivity and recovery by 
restoring offenders’ relationship with their victim. As previous research has shown, both 
imagined and actual interactions with other people can lead to immediate changes in 
cardiovascular function, most likely by leading to changes in their emotional state (Cacioppo et 
al., 2002; Cohen, 2004; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). Relevant to the present 
research, past work has found associations between ambivalent and/or negative social 
interactions and increased ambulatory blood pressure and heart rate compared to neutral or 
positive interactions (Brondolo et al., 1993; 2003; Grewen, Girdler, Amico, & Light, 2005; Holt-
Lunstad, Birmingham, & Light, 2008; Holt-Lunstad, Uchino, Smith, Olson-Cerny, & Nealy-
Moore, 2003; Nealey-Moore et al., 2007; Robles & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2003; Smith et al., 2009). It 
is possible that apologizing might decrease these effects on offenders’ cardiovascular function by 
decreasing the experience of negative emotions through facilitating relationship repair between 
victim and offender. 
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1.5 THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
Three experiments tested the effects of a brief apology intervention among people who had hurt 
another person, regretted doing so, and had not yet apologized on their health behaviors and 
cardiovascular reactivity and recovery. I chose the regret criterion to ensure that participants 
experienced at least some negative emotions about their offense, whereas I chose the no-apology 
criterion to avoid sampling participants who had already successfully apologized and for whom 
apologizing may therefore no longer be important in terms of their negative emotion reduction 
and/or relationship repair. 
I randomly assigned participants to write an apology to their victim compared to two 
other conditions and measured their intended and actual health behaviors and their 
cardiovascular reactivity and recovery, as well as a number of plausible mediators (e.g., negative 
emotions). Specifically, Study 1 tested the effects of an apology intervention on offenders’ 
intentions to engage in healthful behaviors. Study 2 was similar, but also tested the effects of an 
apology intervention on offenders’ actual health behaviors and their real-world apology behavior 
at a follow-up session. Finally, Study 3 assessed their cardiovascular reactivity while apologizing 
and recovery after apologizing during an in-lab session. To measure reactivity and recovery, I 
collected data on blood pressure and heart rate because previous research using animal models 
has implicated the role of prolonged and/or exaggerated sympathetic activation in atherogenesis 
(Manuck, Kaplan, Muldoon, Adams, & Clarkson, 1991) and both blood pressure and heart rate 
increase in response to sympathetic activation (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 2007). Like 
Study 2, Study 3 also tested the effects of an apology intervention on offenders’ real-world 
apology behavior at a follow-up session. 
In these experiments, I compared the effects of offering an apology to two other 
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responses that offenders commonly engage in: rumination and self-distraction (see Witvliet et al., 
2011). Offenders tend to ruminate about their negative actions, especially when they have not yet 
been able to resolve them (Barber, Maltby, & Macaskill, 2005; Dixon, Earl, Lutz-Zois, 
Goodnight, & Peatee, 2014; Terzino, 2010). Unlike apologizing, ruminating tends to prolong the 
experience of negative emotions (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), 
prolong adverse changes in cardiovascular physiology to acute stressors, and delay their recovery 
(Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002). Instead of ruminating about their negative actions, 
offenders sometimes distract themselves from them by, for example, focusing on details from 
their daily lives (Witvliet et al., 2011). While self-distraction does not help offenders resolve 
their negative actions, it also does not prolong or exacerbate negative emotions (see Witvliet et 
al., 2011), suggesting that self-distraction represents an appropriate control condition to 
apologizing and ruminating.  
Regarding health behaviors, I predicted that apologizing would positively influence 
offenders’ intentions to engage in behaviors comprising a healthy lifestyle compared to the other 
conditions by leading to a decrease in their negative emotions about the offense directly, but also 
indirectly by increasing their perceived forgiveness from their victim. I expected that this 
decrease in negative emotions would, in turn, be associated with a decreased tendency to self-
punish, which would be associated with better intended and actual health behaviors. 
Regarding cardiovascular function, I predicted that apologizing and rumination would 
similarly increase cardiovascular reactivity compared to distraction, but that apologizing would 
lead to faster cardiovascular recovery compared to the other conditions. These predictions were 
based on research showing that offenders tend to experience apologizing as stressful (Leunissen, 
De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Folmer, 2014). According to this research, offenders believe that 
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admitting fault will further harm their self-concept and will not be especially effective in 
repairing their relationship with their victim, thus leading them to experience stress and increased 
negative emotions before, compared to after, offering an apology. As such, they might 
experience heightened cardiovascular reactivity while apologizing compared to baseline. 
Apologies, however, are effective in repairing offenders’ self-concept and (perceived) 
relationship with the victim (Exline et al., 2007; Witvliet et al., 2002; 2011) and offenders tend to 
feel relief and positive emotional states after, compared to before, apologizing (Leunissen et al., 
2014), suggesting that apologizing might improve cardiovascular recovery compared to both 
rumination and distraction.  
Intended sample sizes for each study (300 in Study 1; 600 in Study 2; 150 in Study 3) 
were determined based on power analyses and considerations about the cost and efficiency of 
data collection. Specifically, analyses using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) 
suggested that approximately 159 participants would be needed to detect two of the main effects 
of interest at a power greater than .80, namely the effects of intervention condition on health 
behaviors and cardiovascular function. Even though no study to my knowledge has tested the 
link between apologies and health behaviors, studies on some of the tested mediators and health 
behaviors— including on the link between negative emotions and health behaviors (Davis et al., 
2015; Webb et al., 2013)—suggested a medium effect size. Moreover, the study by Da Silva and 
colleagues (2016) that tested the effect of apologizing on cardiovascular function found a 
medium effect size of apologizing on heart rate reactivity. To allow for additional power to test 
several indirect pathways (e.g., from intervention condition to intended health behaviors through 
negative emotions), I more than doubled this sample size in Studies 1 and 2. For Study 3, I aimed 
to recruit a sample of 150 participants, which meets current guidelines recommending at least 50 
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participants per experimental condition (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2017). 
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2.0  STUDY 1: APOLOGIES AND INTENTIONS TO ENGAGE IN FAVORABLE 
HEALTH BEHAVIORS 
Study 1 tested whether apologizing for an interpersonal offense improved offenders’ intentions 
to engage in favorable health behaviors. I therefore recruited people who had recently committed 
an offense and either asked them to write an apology to their victim, ruminate about their 
offense, or distract themselves by writing about something neutral. As potential mediators of the 
expected effect of apologies, I measured participants’ levels of guilt, shame, and self-punishment 
as well as their perceived forgiveness from their victim. 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Three hundred and eight participants (162 males, 143 females, 2 participants who identified with 
a different gender, 1 missing) from the United States completed the study through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk for $2. Studies have indicated that participants from Mechanical Turk are more 
demographically diverse than participants from other convenience samples (e.g., college 
students), and that data collected through Mechanical Turk are at least as reliable than data 
collected through more traditional methods (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, 
Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). Participants were between 18 and 68 years 
old (M = 32.45, SD = 9.04) and came from 45 different states. The majority of participants were 
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born in the United States (n = 304), while the remaining were born in China (n = 2), Brazil (n = 
1), and Haiti (n = 1). Most participants were Caucasian (n = 255), followed by African American 
(n = 22), Asian (n = 20), American Indian or Alaskan Native (n = 7), and Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander (n = 3). Finally, most participants identified as Christian (n = 138), followed by 
agnostic (n = 72), atheist (n = 65), something else, with an option to clarify in an open-ended 
question (n = 19), Buddhist (n = 6), Jewish (n = 5), Muslim (n = 1), and Hindu (n = 1).  
Participants were eligible if they (a) had done something hurtful and/or regrettable to 
another person within the past 7 days; (b) had not yet apologized to this person; and (c) regretted 
what they did. Participants answered questions about these eligibility criteria at the beginning of 
the study and were directed to the end of the study if they did not meet all of these criteria.  
2.2 MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES 
Participants first answered background questions about their offense (e.g., an open-ended 
question asking them to describe the offense).2 They then completed measures of their baseline 
levels of guilt, shame, self-punishment, and perceived victim forgiveness and were randomly 
assigned to an intervention condition (apology vs. rumination vs. self-distraction). Next, they 
completed the same guilt, shame, self-punishment, and perceived victim forgiveness measures 
for a second time. Finally, they completed a measure of their intended health behaviors and 
answered demographic questions.  
Offense characteristics. Participants provided information about their offense by 
answering four questions. First, they were asked to describe what they did to the person they 
hurt, using three sentences or less. They then rated the severity of their offense, using a Likert 
  18 
scale from 1 (Not severe at all) to 7 (Extremely severe). They next selected one or more 
categories that best described their offense (betrayal of trust; infidelity; fight or argument; insult; 
act of selfishness; physical violence; damage to, or loss of, physical property; failed obligation; 
rejection or exclusion; ending a relationship; other) and selected what type of relationship they 
had with the person they offended (friend; romantic partner; work colleague; family member; 
acquaintance; stranger; other).  
Guilt and shame. To assess their guilt and shame, participants completed the State 
Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994). This self-report measure 
includes ten items, five for each subscale, and was designed to measure state feelings of guilt 
(e.g., “I feel bad about what I did”) and shame (e.g., “I feel like I am a bad person”). I decided to 
exclude one item from the guilt subscale (“I feel like apologizing, confessing”), because having 
apologized may inflate the apparent effect of the apology intervention on participants’ self-
reported guilt by making them more likely to answer this item negatively. Participants were 
asked to indicate how they felt in this moment on a Likert scale from 1 (Not feeling this way at 
all) to 5 (Feeling this way very strongly). I created composite scores by averaging across 
participants’ answers on each subscale (Cronbach’s α Guilt pre-intervention = .82; Cronbach’s α Guilt post-
intervention = .87; Cronbach’s α Shame pre-intervention = .89; Cronbach’s α Shame post-intervention = .92).  
Self-punishment. 3 Next, participants completed the self-punishment subscale from the 
Differentiated Process Scale of Self-Forgiveness (Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013a), which was 
designed to measure offenders’ tendency to condemn and resent themselves. The scale includes 
seven items, including “I want to punish myself for what I have done” and “I deserve to suffer 
for what I have done”. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with these items in this 
moment on a Likert scale from 1 (Do not agree at all) to 7 (Strongly agree). Cronbach’s α pre-
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intervention = .92 and post-intervention = .92. 
Perceived victim forgiveness. Participants responded to three statements assessing the 
extent to which they felt they had been forgiven: “I feel that the person I hurt still blames me for 
what I did to him/her,” “I feel that the person I hurt still holds a grudge about what I did to 
him/her,” and “I feel that the person I hurt has forgiven me for what I did to him/her.” 
Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with these items on a Likert scale from 1 (Do 
not agree at all) to 7 (Strongly agree). Cronbach’s α pre-intervention = .83 and post-intervention = .79.   
Intervention.  Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. 
Participants in the apology condition were asked to: “Please imagine yourself genuinely 
apologizing to the person that you hurt. In your apology, please say what feels most natural and 
right to you.” I chose not to instruct participants on how to apologize, because offenders’ 
apologies can vary considerably in their quality (e.g., Schumann, 2014) and I did not want to 
constrain participants by asking them to apologize in a way that felt unnatural. I later asked 
participants to rate the quality of their own apologies to test if variations in these ratings would, 
for example, be associated with changes in their intended health behaviors (please see Appendix 
A for all methods and results pertaining to apology quality). 
Participants in the rumination condition were asked to: “Please think back to your 
offense. Then, describe what it felt like for you to hurt the other person and what it must have 
felt like for the other person to be hurt. Please also write about the negative consequences the 
offense has, or may have, on your life as well on the life of the person you hurt.” I asked 
participants to focus on these elements, because these are some of the topics that offenders are 
thought to ruminate about, and have been included in other rumination manipulations (Witvliet et 
al., 2011).  
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Participants in the self-distraction condition were asked to: “Please think about your daily 
routine and habits. Then, please describe your daily routine and habits in as much detail as you 
can.” I chose these instructions because offenders are thought to focus on details of their lives to 
distract themselves from their misdeeds (Witvliet et al., 2011). Moreover, similar instructions for 
self-distraction have been used by other researchers (McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006; 
Witvliet et al., 2011). 
Participants in all conditions were given at least three minutes to complete the 
intervention (i.e., they were not able to move on from the page until the three minutes had 
passed), but were encouraged to take as much time as they needed after these three minutes had 
passed.  
Intended health behaviors. Finally, I developed a list of eight items to assess 
participants’ intended health behaviors. Seven of these referred to modifiable (un)healthful 
behaviors that are thought to be relevant for people’s cardiovascular health (Ayas et al., 2003; 
Briasoulis, Agarwal, & Messerli, 2012; Chambless et al., 1997; D’Agostino et al., 2008; Klop, 
De Rego, & Cabezas, 2013; Kronmal et al., 2007; Rehm, Taylor, & Room, 2006) and one 
referred to participants’ general intention to take care of the self. Participants indicated the extent 
to which they intended to engage in these behaviors from now on using a Likert scale from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree): “Eat a balanced diet,” “Get enough sleep,” “Exercise 
enough,” “Limit my intake of unhealthy foods,” “Smoke less or not at all (to be answered only if 
participant smoked regularly or occasionally),” “Take fewer drugs or no drugs at all (to be 
answered only if participant took drugs regularly or occasionally),” “Drink less alcohol or no 
alcohol at all (to be answered only if participant drank alcohol regularly or occasionally),” and 
“Take care of myself.” Cronbach’s α was .81.  
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2.3 RESULTS 
Before performing analyses, I excluded one participant’s answers because she did not follow 
instructions. This participant was in the apology condition and had not answered any of the open 
ended questions seriously (e.g., instead of describing an offense she committed, she typed an 
incomprehensible string of words). Pre-intervention correlations, means, and standard deviations 
are displayed in Table 1, while post-intervention correlations, means, and standard deviations are 
displayed in Table 2. Descriptive statistics of all variables per intervention condition are 
displayed in Table 3. 
2.3.1 Offense Characteristics. 
Participants reported a variety of offenses, including fights or arguments (46.6%), insults 
(37.8%), acts of selfishness (28.3%), betrayal of trust (24.1%), failing an obligation (17.6%), 
rejection or exclusion (13.7%), ending a relationship (5.2%), damage to, or loss of, physical 
property (4.9%), infidelity (3.3%), physical violence (2%), or something else (7%). Offenses 
ranged considerably in severity (M = 4.84, SD = 1.24, range = 2-7; e.g., low severity: declining 
invitations to social events; moderate severity: insulting or purposefully ignoring the victim; high 
severity: being unfaithful or ending a relationship). Most offenses were committed against 
friends (33.9%), followed by romantic partners (30.6%), family members (25.7%), work 
colleagues (5.9%), acquaintances (2.6%), and others (1.3%). 
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2.3.2 Data Analytic Plan 
I tested my predictions using a fully saturated structural equation model with observed variables. 
I dummy-coded participants’ intervention condition into two variables and used the apology 
condition as the comparison condition, resulting in an apology versus rumination and an apology 
versus self-distraction variable. All analyses reported in this paper involving structural equation 
modeling were conducted using EQS, version 6.1 (Bentler, 2006). 
I assessed potential direct and indirect effects of the intervention condition on intended 
health behaviors by testing the two dummy-coded intervention variables as predictors of guilt 
and shame. I tested guilt and shame, in turn, as predictors of self-punishment, which I then tested 
as a predictor of participants’ intended health behaviors. I also tested the two dummy-coded 
intervention variables as predictors of perceived victim forgiveness, which I then tested as a 
predictor of guilt and shame, subsequent self-punishment, and intended health behaviors. 
In these analyses, I controlled for pre-intervention levels of guilt, shame, self-
punishment, and perceived victim forgiveness, as well as for all preceding variables in the model 
(e.g., when testing the association between guilt and self-punishment, I controlled for pre-
intervention guilt, shame, punishment, and perceived victim forgiveness, as well as for apology 
versus rumination, apology versus distraction, and post-intervention perceived victim 
forgiveness). Doing so leads the unstandardized coefficients at post-intervention to represent 
residualized change, that is, the effect of one variable (e.g., intervention condition) on changes in 
an outcome variable (e.g., guilt; Newsom, 2015). I also allowed the two predictor variables 
(apology vs. rumination and apology vs. distraction) and all control variables (pre-intervention 
guilt, shame, self-punishment, and perceived victim forgiveness) to covary (see Kaplan, 2009). 
Finally, I also allowed the residuals of post-intervention guilt and shame to covary, because of 
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their typically high correlation (Tangney et al., 1996). Despite their high correlation (r post-
intervention = .70 in this study), these emotions can lead to differential outcomes (Tangney et al., 
1996), suggesting that shame might be associated with self-punishment to a larger extent than 
guilt, or vice versa. The sample variance-covariance matrix is displayed in Table 4. 
The normalized estimate of Mardia’s coefficient indicated substantial deviations from 
normality (z = 8.43, p < .001). I therefore used scaled maximum likelihood estimators corrected 
for non-normality to interpret the results of the analyses reported below (Satorra & Bentler, 
1988). The results of the tested model are displayed in Figure 2. Supplementary analyses of the 
data are reported in Appendix A. 
2.3.3 The Effect of Intervention Condition on Intended Health Behaviors. 
Apologizing did not have a total effect on intended health behaviors compared to rumination (B 
= −.12, z = -.94, p = .35) or self-distraction (B = .12, z = 1.19, p = .23). However, offering an 
apology could still influence intended health behaviors indirectly (Hayes, 2013), for example, by 
reducing offenders’ negative emotions.  
Indeed, apologizing led to greater guilt reduction compared to rumination (B = .50, z = 
6.39, p < .001) but not compared to self-distraction (B = .12, z = 1.33, p = .18). Apologizing also 
led to greater shame reduction compared to both rumination (B = .52, z = 6.13, p < .001) and 
self-distraction (B = .21, z = 2.57, p = .01). Further, apologizing marginally increased perceived 
victim forgiveness compared to rumination (B = -.20, z = -1.76, p = .08), but did not influence 
perceived victim forgiveness compared to self-distraction (B = .04, z = .37, p = .71). Perceived 
victim forgiveness, in turn, was associated with marginally lower guilt (B = -.10, z = -1.94, p = 
.05), but was not associated with shame (B = -.05, z = -1.19, p = .23). 
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Guilt was associated with marginally greater self-punishment (B = .20, z = 1.93, p = .05) 
and shame was associated with significantly greater self-punishment (B = .47, z = 5.22, p < 
.001). Perceived victim forgiveness was not associated with self-punishment independently from 
guilt and shame (B = -.09, z = -1.49, p = 14), and intervention condition did not have independent 
effects on self-punishment (B Apology versus Rumination = -.06, z = -.60, p = .55; B Apology versus Self-
Distraction = -.04, z = -.41, p = .68) 
Self-punishment was not associated with intended health behaviors (B = -.04, z = -.62, p 
= .54). However, shame was independently associated with poorer intended health behaviors (B 
= -.28, z = -3.36, p = .001), while guilt (B = .09, z = 1.21, p = .23) and perceived victim 
forgiveness (B = .003, z = .05, p = .96) did not have independent associations with intended 
health behaviors.  
The indirect effects from intervention condition to intended health behaviors were each 
assessed through 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 samples and mirrored 
the above findings. Specifically, apologizing indirectly improved offenders’ intended health 
behaviors by decreasing their shame compared to both rumination (indirect effect = -.1438; 95% 
CI [-.2583, -.0477]) and self-distraction (indirect effect = -.0573; 95% CI [-.1288, -.0074]). 
There was no evidence for any other indirect effect from apologizing to intended health 
behaviors; all remaining indirect effects ranged from [.00012] to [.0098] and contained the value 
zero in their confidence intervals. After controlling for all tested mediators, apologizing did not 
influence intended health behaviors compared to rumination (B = -.01, z = -.06, p = .95), but led 
to marginally worse intended health behaviors compared to self-distraction (B = .17, z = 1.84, p 
= .07). 
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2.4 DISCUSSION 
Study 1 tested whether apologizing (vs. ruminating or self-distracting) improved offenders’ 
intentions to engage in healthful behaviors and if it did so by decreasing their negative emotions 
(either directly or through increases in perceived victim forgiveness) and subsequently 
decreasing their tendency to self-punish. The findings were in line with several of my 
predictions, showing that apologizing decreased guilt compared to rumination and decreased 
shame compared to rumination and self-distraction. Importantly, apologizing indirectly improved 
offenders’ intentions to engage in healthful behaviors by decreasing their shame, suggesting that 
offering an apology might have benefits for offenders’ intended, and potentially actual, health 
behaviors. The findings of Study 1 also supplement previous research showing that apologizing 
decreases offenders’ guilt and shame (Carpenter et al., 2014; Meek et al., 1995; Witvliet et al., 
2002; 2011) and that low guilt and shame are associated with a reduced tendency to self-punish 
(Inbar et al., 2013; Mosher et al., 1980; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Tanaka et al., 2015).  
Although I anticipated that reductions in guilt and shame would be associated with better 
intentions to engage in healthful behaviors through a decrease in self-punishment, I found no 
evidence for this prediction. Indeed, the only variable that was associated with changes in 
intended health behaviors was shame. This raises two important questions: first, why it was 
shame, but not guilt, that was associated with changes in intended health behaviors and second, 
why shame was associated with intended health behaviors, if not through self-punishment.  
Regarding the first question, researchers have suggested that shame is more likely to lead 
to maladaptive outcomes than guilt. This is because shame’s focus on a flawed self as opposed to 
a flawed behavior tends to lead people to feel worthless, undeserving, and small, and is therefore 
especially overwhelming and difficult to regulate (Dearing et al., 2005; Lewis, 1971; Tangney & 
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Dearing, 2002). Indeed, while negative emotions in general have been linked to engagement in 
unhealthful behaviors (Kassel, Stroud, & Paronis, 2003; Khantzian, 1997; Scherer et al., 2011; 
Webb et al., 2006), shame in particular has been linked to engagement in such behaviors, 
including disordered eating (Sanfter et al., 1995) and intake of alcohol and drugs (Dearing et al., 
2005; Ianni et al., 2010). 
Regarding the second question, as an especially overwhelming negative emotion, shame 
might interfere with offenders’ intended health behaviors by decreasing their ability to 
constructively regulate this negative emotion (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gross & Thompson, 
2007). Difficulty regulating negative emotions has indeed been linked to several unhealthful 
behaviors, including consumption of highly palatable foods, disordered eating, and drug abuse 
(e.g., Baer, Fischer, & Huss, 2006; Fox, Axelrod, Paliwal, Sleeper, & Sinha, 2007). Shame, in 
particular, might decrease offenders’ ability to control their impulses and lead them to engage in 
pleasurable behaviors in an attempt to down-regulate uncomfortable feelings of shame, despite 
their harmful health-relevant consequences (e.g., increased consumption of alcohol and drugs; 
see Dearing et al., 2005; Ianni et al., 2010). Shame might also consume some of the cognitive 
resources that are necessary to carry out certain health-relevant behaviors, such as planning to 
prepare a meal or scheduling time for physical exercise (see Sabag-Cohen, 2009; Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Indeed, while both guilt and shame lead to decreases in working 
memory (suggesting that their experience uses available cognitive resources), shame’s impact on 
working memory is more severe (Cavalera & Pepe, 2014). Alternatively, shame might decrease 
offenders’ belief that they are deserving of good outcomes, such as proper self-care, by leading 
to decreases in two variables that have previously been associated with favorable health 
behaviors (see Fisher & Exline, 2010): self-esteem and self-forgiveness (e.g., McGee & 
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Williams, 2000; Webb et al., 2006). 
In Study 1, I also found some evidence suggesting that apologies facilitated offenders’ 
perceived relationship with the victim, in that offering an apology marginally increased 
perceived forgiveness from one’s victim compared to ruminating. Contrary to expectations, 
perceived forgiveness was not associated with changes in intended health behaviors, either 
directly or through a reduction in negative emotions. It is possible that imagining receiving 
forgiveness may not matter as much for offenders’ intentions to engage in healthful behaviors as 
actually receiving forgiveness. In fact, this study suffered from an important methodological 
limitation: because offenders did not deliver their apology to their victim, the victim did not have 
an opportunity to actually forgive them. It is also possible that perceived forgiveness was not the 
most suitable mediator to explain the anticipated effect of apologizing on offenders’ intended 
health behaviors. Previous research that found connections between interpersonal relationships 
and health behaviors assessed broader indicators of the health of people’s social networks rather 
than the health of a single relationship, including perceived social support—the expectation that 
one will receive help and support from others in times of need (e.g., Harvey & Alexander, 2012; 
Reblin & Uchino, 2008). Thus, an interpersonal pathway from apologies to (intended) health 
behaviors may still exist, yet this study may not be equipped to detect it because of the 
methodology employed.  
Study 1 had several other limitations, including that it remains unclear whether the 
observed benefits of the apology intervention in this study can be attributed to the psychological 
experience of apologizing. It is also possible, for instance, that these effects can merely be 
attributed to writing about one’s hurtful behavior, without the intent to communicate one’s 
thoughts and feelings about the offense to the victim. As much previous research has shown, 
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such expressive writing about one’s thoughts and feelings about distressing situations, including 
interpersonal offenses one committed, has consequences for variables relevant to the present 
research, including decreased negative emotion and improved physical health outcomes (see 
Pennebaker, 1993; 1997; 2012). It is therefore important to emphasize the interpersonal apology 
component of the intervention and render it more realistic, for example, by asking offenders to 
write an apology that they will actually deliver to their victim. 
Another limitation of this study was that it only measured offenders’ intentions to engage 
in healthful behaviors. Since previous research has found small to moderate correlations between 
intended and actual health behaviors (Adriaanse, Vinkers, De Ridder, Hox, & De Wit, 2011), it 
remains unclear whether apologizing might also influence offenders’ actual health behaviors.  
A final limitation is that the self-distraction condition might not have been truly neutral 
and might thus have impeded my ability to detect significant differences between the apology 
condition and the control condition. As a recent meta-analysis found, self-distraction decreases 
people's negative emotions in response to upsetting events (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). This 
might explain, perhaps, why the apology condition did not significantly decrease guilt compared 
to the self-distraction condition. Additional data analyses indeed revealed that both the apology 
and self-distraction condition decreased participants’ guilt from pre-intervention to post-
intervention. The apology condition, however, still decreased guilt to a larger extent than the 
self-distraction condition.  
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3.0  STUDY 2: APOLOGIES AND ENGAGEMENT IN FAVORABLE HEALTH 
BEHAVIORS 
Study 2 shared the same goals as the preceding study with six changes that addressed the 
limitations of Study 1. First, it removed the mediators that were tested in Study 1 that did not 
explain the link between intervention condition and intended health behaviors (i.e., self-
punishment and perceived victim forgiveness) and replaced them with other plausible mediators: 
two facets of emotion regulation (the ability to control one’s impulses and to engage in goal-
directed behavior despite the presence of negative emotions), state self-esteem, state self-
forgiveness, and perceived social support. Second, it attempted to make the apology experience 
more realistic by having participants in the apology condition falsely believe that they would 
deliver their apology at the end of the study (as in Schumann & Orehek, 2017). Third, it 
measured offenders’ actual health behaviors during a one-week follow-up. Fourth, it replaced the 
self-distraction condition with a neutral, no-task, condition. Fifth, it recruited participants who 
had done something deeply hurtful and/or regrettable to another person anytime in the past to 
attract offenders for whom apologizing may be especially beneficial, given that this study 
attempted to influence people’s actual behaviors over the course of one week and would likely 
require a stronger intervention to accomplish this. 
Finally, it tested whether apologizing influenced offenders’ real-world apology behavior 
during a one-week follow-up. Offering a real apology can have many beneficial outcomes that 
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are unlikely to be attained by writing an apology and not delivering it, including greater 
likelihood of reconciliation between victim and offender (e.g., Fehr et al., 2010). Thus, exploring 
whether completing a brief apology intervention influences the likelihood of offering a real-
world apology may suggest one way to increase offenders’ willingness to apologize to their 
victims. I predicted that the apology condition would increase the likelihood of offering a real 
apology to one’s victim compared to the rumination and control conditions. In support of this 
prediction, research has previously found that reflecting on possible reparative behaviors, 
including apologies, increased offenders’ likelihood of actually apologizing to their victim 
during a two-week follow-up (Exline et al., 2011). Moreover, offenders tend to underestimate 
apologies’ positive consequences, such as their potential to decrease negative emotions, and 
overestimate their negative consequences, such as feeling distressed (Leunissen et al., 2014). 
Experiencing some of an apology’s benefits during the study, such as decreased guilt and shame, 
might decrease these barriers to offering an apology and increase offenders’ willingness to 
apologize.  
3.1 PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Six hundred and seven participants (308 males, 297 females, 2 participants who identified with a 
different gender) from the United States completed the initial part of the study (Part 1) through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for $2. I contacted participants seven days after the 
completion of Part 1 for an opportunity to participate in a follow-up (Part 2). Three hundred and 
ninety-nine participants completed Part 2 later in exchange for an additional $1. Participants 
were between 19 and 88 years old (M = 35.38, SD = 10.78) and came from 43 different states. 
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Most were born in the United States (n = 597), while the remaining were born in China (n = 2), 
India (n = 2), the Philippines (n = 2), Albania (n = 1), Brazil (n = 1), Canada (n = 1), Cuba (n = 
1), the Dominican Republic (n =1), Germany (n = 1), Ghana (n = 1), Guyana (n =1), the United 
Kingdom (n = 1), and Venezuela (n = 1).  Regarding race, most participants were Caucasian (n = 
484), followed by African American (n = 70), Asian (n = 42), American Indian or Alaskan 
Native (n = 9), and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (n = 2). Most participants identified as 
Christian (n = 308), followed by agnostic (n = 117), atheist (n = 112), something else, with an 
option to clarify in an open-ended question (n = 35), Buddhist (n = 16), Jewish (n = 9), Hindu (n 
= 6), Muslim (n = 3), and Sikh (n = 1).  
Participants were eligible if they (a) had done something deeply hurtful and/or regrettable 
to another person; (b) had not yet apologized to this person; and (c) still felt guilt, shame, and 
regret for what they did. Participants answered questions about these criteria at the beginning of 
the study and were directed to the end of the study if they did not meet one or more of them. 
3.2 MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
The procedures of Part 1 were similar to those used in Study 1. Participants first answered 
background questions about their offense. Next, they were randomly assigned to an intervention 
condition (apology vs. rumination vs. control) and completed measures of their current levels of 
guilt, shame, emotion regulation, self-esteem, self-forgiveness, and perceived social support. 
Finally, they completed a measure of their intended health behaviors and answered demographic 
questions.4 
One week after completing Part 1, participants received an email inviting them to 
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complete Part 2 of the study. Participants had a 24-hour timeframe to complete Part 2 and were 
first asked whether they had apologized to the person they hurt since completing Part 1. They 
were then asked a number of follow-up questions about their decision to apologize or not. 
Finally, they completed a number of measures about their health behaviors over the past week. 
3.2.1 Part 1. 
Offense characteristics. Participants answered the same four questions about their offense as in 
Study 1, with the addition of the following questions: “How long ago did the offense happen?” 
(During the past week/During the past month/During the past three months/During the past six 
months/During the past year/Longer than a year ago) and “How close did you feel to the person 
you hurt at the time that the offense happened?”. 
Intervention. Participants in the apology condition read the following: “We would now 
like you to write an email to the person that you hurt. Please use this email to address the offense 
that you committed against them and to genuinely apologize to them. Please say what feels most 
natural and right to you, saying whatever it is that you would like to say to them about this event. 
At the end of the study, we will ask you to log in to your email account and send the email to this 
person.”  Participants in the rumination condition were asked to: “Please describe the ways in 
which your offense harmed the other person and how it may continue to negatively affect him or 
her now.” Participants in the control condition were not asked to do anything and directly moved 
on to answer the questions below. Participants in the apology and rumination conditions were 
given at least three minutes to complete the intervention and were encouraged to take as much 
time as they needed after the three minutes had passed.  
Guilt and shame. To assess levels of guilt and shame, participants completed the same 
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State Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall et al., 1994) used in Study 1 (Cronbach’s α Guilt = .79; 
Cronbach’s α Shame = .90). 
Emotion regulation: impulse control. As one measure of emotion regulation, 
participants completed the Impulse control subscale from the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). This subscale measures people’s ability to refrain from impulsive 
action when experiencing negative emotions. All items were prefaced by “After thinking about 
my offense, I now feel as if…” and example items include “I have difficulty controlling my 
behaviors” and “I am out of control.” 7-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree. Cronbach’s alpha was .89. 
Emotion regulation: difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior. As an additional 
measure of emotion regulation, participants completed the Difficulties engaging in goal-directed 
behavior subscale from the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). 
This subscale measures the ability to concentrate and accomplish tasks when experiencing 
negative emotions. All items were prefaced by “After thinking about my offense, I now feel as 
if…” and example items include “I have difficulty focusing on other things” and “I have 
difficulty getting work done.” 7-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .91. 
State self-esteem. To assess their state self-esteem, participants completed an adapted 
version of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965). The scale includes 10 items 
meant to assess global perceptions of self-esteem. Example items include “I feel that I have a 
number of good qualities” and “I take a positive attitude toward myself”, and all items were 
prefaced by “After thinking about my offense, …” to measure participants’ state (rather than 
global) self-esteem. Participants indicated their agreement with these items on a 7-point Likert 
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scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (Cronbach’s α = .94). 
State self-forgiveness. Participants completed the State Self-Forgiveness Scales (Wohl, 
DeShea, & Wahkinney, 2008), which is a 17-item measure designed to measure self-forgiving 
feelings, actions, and beliefs related to a specific offense (e.g., “As I consider what I did that was 
wrong, I show myself acceptance”) on a 7-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree. Cronbach’s alpha was .96. 
Perceived social support. To assess perceptions of social support, participants 
completed the short form, 12-item Interpersonal Support Evaluation List (Cohen, Mermelstein, 
Kamarck, & Hoberman, 1985). This scale includes three subscales (appraisal, belonging, and 
tangible social support) that can either be analyzed separately or as a total perceived social 
support score by averaging across all twelve items (e.g., Merz et al., 2014). Example items 
include “When I need suggestions on how to deal with a personal problem, I know someone I 
can turn to” (appraisal), “If I wanted to have lunch with someone, I could easily find someone to 
join me” (belonging), and “If I was stranded 10 miles from home, there is someone I could call 
who could come and get me” (tangible). Because I was interested in overall perceptions of social 
support in this study, I used the total score in the analyses reported below (Cronbach’s α = .91).  
Intended health behaviors. Finally, participants answered the same questions about 
their intended health behaviors as in Study 1. Cronbach’s alpha was .82. 
3.2.2 Part 2. 
Apology. Participants were first asked whether they had apologized to the person they hurt since 
completing the first part of the study (Yes/No). If they answered “yes”, they were asked why they 
had apologized. Specifically, they rated their agreement with the following statements using a 
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Likert Scale from 1 (Completely disagree) to 7 (Completely agree): “To repair my relationship 
with the other person,” “To relieve my own guilt about the offense,” “To relieve the pain this 
person feels because of the offense,” “To do the right thing so that I can forgive myself for the 
offense,” and “It just seems like what I should do.”  
If they answered “no”, they were asked why they had not apologized and rated their 
agreement with the following statements using a Likert Scale from 1 (Completely disagree) to 7 
(Completely agree): “Apologizing wouldn’t help repair my relationship with this person,” 
“Apologizing wouldn’t help me feel less guilty about the offense,” “Apologizing wouldn’t help 
relieve the pain this person feels because of the offense,” “Apologizing wouldn’t help me forgive 
myself for the offense,” “I did not have an opportunity to apologize,” and “Too much time has 
passed since the offense.” 
Health behaviors. Participants answered questions about multiple aspects of their health 
behaviors: general health behaviors, dietary choices, physical exercise, and cigarette smoking. 
First, they answered the same general, eight questions that I used to measure their intended 
health behaviors in Part 1 of the study, except they answered them about the past week. For 
example, instead of indicating whether they were intending to “Eat a balanced diet” from now 
on, they were asked whether they “Ate a balanced diet” since they had completed Part 1 of the 
study. As in Part 1, they answered these questions on a Likert scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 
5 (Strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .84. 
Further, I adapted an existing health behavior measure relevant to cardiovascular health 
by Lee and Cubbin (2002). This measure consists of several parts and asks participants about 
their dietary habits, physical exercise, and cigarette smoking behavior. 
To assess dietary habits, participants were asked to indicate how often they consumed 
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specific foods since they had completed Part 1 of the study. The foods were fresh fruits; green 
salad or raw vegetables; cooked vegetables; fast food (e.g., hamburgers, hot dogs, sausage, 
pizza); fried foods (e.g., French fries, potato chips); and sugary foods (e.g., cookies, doughnuts, 
cake, muffins, candy, chocolate). After Lee and Cubin, I scored participants’ responses by 
assigning the first three items a value of “1” if they had been consumed once and a value of “2”  
if they had been consumed more than once. I assigned the last three items a value of “-1” if they 
had been consumed once and a value of “-2” if they had been consumed more than once. I 
assigned items not consumed a value of “0”. Then, I summed these values, resulting in a dietary 
habits score ranging from -6 to 6. 
To assess physical exercise, participants were asked to indicate how many times they had 
participated in any sports or exercise that had made them sweat or breathe harder for at least 20 
minutes at a time since they completed Part 1 of the Study. 
To assess cigarette smoking behavior, participants were asked on how many of the past 
seven days they had smoked at least one cigarette. They were also asked approximately how 
many cigarettes they had smoked during the past seven days. After reviewing participants’ 
responses, I chose to only analyze their responses on the first question, because of a number of 
outliers on the second question that seemed highly implausible (e.g., 900 cigarettes, which would 
amount to approximately 140 cigarettes, or seven packs of cigarettes, per day). To be consistent 
with the other health behavior variables, I recoded participants’ responses so that higher values 
would reflect more desirable health behaviors (i.e., a “0” became a “7” to reflect that the 
participant had not smoked for seven days). 
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3.3 RESULTS 
One participant completed Part 1 of the study twice. She was assigned to the control condition 
both times, wrote about the same offense, and her answers on the questionnaires were very 
similar. I therefore averaged across her answers and included her in the analyses as a single 
participant. Another participant completed Part 2 twice. He answered all scales similarly and I 
therefore averaged across his answers and included him in the analyses as a single participant. 
Two participants completed Part 2 of the study, but I could not match their responses to any 
responses in Part 1. I therefore dropped these two participants from analyses. Finally, I dropped 
the responses of six participants for not following instructions. These participants either did not 
apologize, did not ruminate, or did not describe an offense when asked to do so. Two were in the 
apology condition, three in the rumination condition, and one in the control condition. 
Correlations among and descriptive statistics of all continuous variables are displayed in Tables 
5 and 6. 
3.3.1 Offense Characteristics. 
Participants reported a variety of offenses, including betrayal of trust (48.4%), acts of selfishness 
(25.3%), ending a relationship (23.5%), infidelity (19.5%), insults (16.8%), fights or arguments 
(14%), rejection or exclusion (13%), failed obligations (12.1%), damage to, or loss of, physical 
property (4.5%), physical violence (2%), or something else (2.5%). Offenses ranged in severity 
between 1 (Not severe at all) and 7 (Extremely severe), with a mean of 5.51 (SD = 1.17). 
Offenses were predominantly committed against people that participants felt fairly close to at the 
time of the offense (M = 4.87, SD = 1.76), mainly against friends (36.6%) and romantic partners 
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(36.6%), followed by family members (15.6%), work colleagues (5.7%), acquaintances (3.8%), 
strangers (.5%), and others (1.2%). 
3.3.2 Data Analytic Plan. 
Study 2 had three aims, namely, to test whether the apology intervention (vs. rumination and 
control) influenced offenders’ (1) intended health behaviors immediately after the intervention, 
(2) actual health behaviors at a one-week follow-up, and (3) real apology behavior at a one-week 
follow-up. To test these aims, I analyzed the data of Study 2 in a series of steps, each outlined 
below. Supplementary analyses of the data are reported in Appendix B. 
3.3.3 The Effect of Intervention Condition on Intended Health Behaviors. 
To test the first aim, I used a fully saturated structural equation model whereby I dummy-coded 
participants’ intervention condition into two variables and used the apology condition as the 
comparison condition. I then tested for potential indirect effects from intervention condition to 
intended health behaviors by testing the two dummy-coded intervention variables as predictors 
of guilt and shame. I tested guilt and shame, in turn, as predictors of emotion regulation, self-
esteem, and self-forgiveness, which I then tested as predictors of participants’ intended health 
behaviors. I also tested the two dummy-coded intervention variables as predictors of perceived 
social support, which I then tested as a predictor of guilt and shame, subsequent emotion 
regulation, self-esteem, and self-forgiveness, and then intended health behaviors. 
In these analyses, I allowed the two dummy-coded intervention condition variables to 
covary. I also allowed the residuals between self-esteem and self-forgiveness to covary, as these 
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two variables tend to be positively correlated (Strelan, 2007), and between self-esteem and self-
forgiveness and the two emotion regulation variables, as self-esteem has been associated with 
better emotion regulation (e.g., Gross & John, 2003) and self-forgiveness can be thought of as a 
form of adaptive emotion regulation (e.g., Da Silva et al., 2016; Enright, 1996).  
The normalized estimate of Mardia’s coefficient indicated deviations from normality (z = 
4.70, p < .001) and I therefore used scaled maximum likelihood estimators corrected for non-
normality to interpret all results reported below (Satorra & Bentler, 1988). The results of the 
tested model are displayed in Figure 3 and the variance-covariance matrix is displayed in Table 
7. 
Apologizing did not have a total effect on intended health behaviors compared to the 
rumination condition (B = .10, z = 1.24, p = .22), but led to marginally worse intended health 
behaviors compared to the control condition (B = .16, z = 1.87, p = .06). Apologizing also did not 
influence guilt (B Apology versus Rumination = .07, z = .72, p = .47; B Apology versus Control = .03, z = .36, p = 
.72), shame (B Apology versus Rumination = .03, z = .29, p = .77; B Apology versus Control = .01, z = .11, p = 
.91), or perceived social support (B Apology versus Rumination = -.03, z = -.40, p = .69; B Apology versus 
Control = -.07, z = -1.08, p = .28) compared to the other conditions. Perceived social support also 
was not associated with guilt (B = -.03, z = -.62, p = .54), but was associated with decreased 
shame (B = -.28, z = -3.92, p < .001). 
Guilt was associated with better impulse control (B = .24, z = 3.76, p < .001), was not 
associated with difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior (B = .02, z = .22, p = .83) or self-
esteem (B = .08, z = 1.17, p = .24), and was associated with decreased self-forgiveness (B = -.19, 
z = -2.77, p = .01). Shame was associated with poorer impulse control (B = -.72, z = 12.44, p < 
.001), greater difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior (B = .71, z = 10.31, p < .001), 
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decreased self-esteem (B = -.55, z = -8.81, p < .001), and decreased self-forgiveness (B = -.60, z 
= -10.23, p < .001).  
Perceived social support was also associated with these variables independently of guilt 
and shame, such that it was associated with better impulse control (B = .43, z = 5.96, p < .001), 
less difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior (B = -.43, z = -5.28, p < .001), greater self-
esteem (B = .87, z = 10.99, p < .001), and greater self-forgiveness (B = .71, z = 4.54, p < .001). 
Intervention condition also influenced two of these mediators independently of guilt, shame, and 
perceived social support, such that apologizing led to greater difficulty engaging in goal-directed 
behavior (B = -.42, z = -3.52, p < .001) and greater self-forgiveness (B = -.26, z = -2.35, p = .02) 
compared to the control condition, but not the rumination condition (B = .13, z = 1.11, p = .27; B 
= -.03, z = -.32, p = .75). Intervention condition did not influence impulse control (B Apology versus 
Rumination = .04, z = .39, p = .70; B Apology versus Control = .13, z = 1.26, p = .21) or self-esteem (B 
Apology versus Rumination = .06, z = .56, p = .58; B Apology versus Control = .06, z = .58, p = .56).  
Of the mediators, self-esteem was associated with better intended health behaviors (B = 
.11, z = 3.20, p = .001), while impulse control (B = .03, z = .63, p = .53), difficulty engaging in 
goal-directed behavior (B = .05, z = 1.26, p = .21), and self-forgiveness (B = .05, z = 1.63, p = 
.10) were not associated with intended health behaviors. Guilt, moreover, was independently 
associated with better intended health behaviors (B = .16, z = 3.26, p = .001), while shame (B = -
.01, z = -.31, p = .76) and perceived social support (B = .10, z = 1.86, p = .10) did not have 
independent associations with intended health behaviors.  
Potential indirect effects from intervention condition to intended health behaviors were 
assessed through 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 samples and ranged 
between [.00001] and [.021]. No evidence was found for any indirect effects between 
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intervention condition and intended health behaviors, as all confidence intervals contained the 
value zero. Indeed, intervention condition did not influence guilt, shame, and perceived social 
support, and even though it influenced difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior and self-
forgiveness, these variables were not associated with intended health behaviors. After taking into 
account the tested mediators, there was no effect of apologizing on intended health behaviors 
compared to the rumination condition (B = .10, z = 1.30, p = .19). However, apologizing led to 
worse intended health behaviors compared to the control condition (B = .19, z = 2.57, p = .01). 
3.3.4 Missing Diagnostics for Part 2 of the Study.  
To gain an understanding of the participants who chose to complete Part 2 of the study, I tested 
for potential differences between participants who completed both parts of the study and 
participants who only completed the first part on the following variables: experimental condition, 
participant gender, offense timing, offense severity, and closeness with the victim. I conducted 
chi-square tests for all categorical variables (experimental condition; gender; offense timing) and 
independent sample t-tests for continuous variables (offense severity; closeness with the victim). 
The only variable that (marginally) differed between participants who completed both 
parts versus only the first part was experimental condition, χ2 (2) = 5.42, p = .07. Participants in 
the apology condition (n Complete = 143; n Missing = 54) were 56% more likely to complete Part 2 
compared to participants in the rumination condition (n Complete = 126; n Missing = 74; B = .44, χ2 
(1) = 4.15, p = .04, exp(B) = 1.56, 95% CI exp(B) [1.02, 2.38]) and 54% more likely to complete 
Part 2 compared to participants in the control condition (n Complete = 129; n Missing = 75; B = .43, χ2 
(1) = 4.00, p = .05, exp(B) = 1.54, 95% CI exp(B) [1.01, 2.35). 
No differences between participants who completed both parts versus the first part were 
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found for participant gender (χ2 (1) = 1.31, p = .25), offense timing (χ2 (3) = .53, p = .91), offense 
severity (t(599) = -1.15, p = .25), and closeness with the victim (t(599) = -.0004, p = 1.00).  
3.3.5 The Effect of Intervention Condition on Actual Health Behaviors. 
To test for a potential effect of intervention condition on participants’ actual health behaviors 
during the one-week follow-up, I repeated the above analyses, except that I replaced the outcome 
of intended health behaviors with a latent factor representing participants’ actual health 
behaviors with the four health behavior measures (general health behaviors; diet; physical 
exercise; cigarette smoking) as indicators.5 I chose to create this latent factor because I was 
interested in the potential effect of intervention condition on health behaviors in a general sense 
rather than on specific health behaviors. Because the health behavior factor was endogenous, I 
fixed the factor loading of the first indicator (general health behaviors) to “1” (Kaplan, 2009).  
The normalized estimate of Mardia’s coefficient suggested deviations from normality (z 
= 2.78, p = .01) and I therefore used scaled maximum likelihood estimators corrected for non-
normality to interpret the results reported below (Satorra & Bentler, 1988). There was no 
evidence that the observed and model covariance matrices differed (Satorra-Bentler χ² (29) = 
30.55, p = .39) and fit indices suggested good fit: Comparative Fit Index = .999; Goodness of Fit 
Index = .99; Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation = .01, 90% CI [.00, .04]; Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual = .03. Moreover, the health behavior factor appeared to be well-
identified (β General health behaviors = .97, B = 1.00, R2 = .94; β Diet = .46, B = 1.29, p < .001, R2 = .21; 
β Physical Exercise = .57, B = 1.51, p < .001, R2 = .32; β Cigarette Smoking = .10, B = .35, p = .04, R2 = .01). 
I therefore proceeded with testing the proposed model. The results are displayed in Figure 4 and 
the variance-covariance matrix in Table 8. 
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Apologizing did not have a total effect on participants’ health behaviors compared to the 
rumination condition (B = .10, z = .99, p = .32), but led to marginally worse health behaviors 
compared to the control condition (B = .18, z = 1.68, p = .09). Apologizing did not lead to 
changes in participants’ guilt (B Apology versus Rumination = .08, z = .68, p = .50; B Apology versus Control = -
.01, z = -.12, p = .90), shame (B Apology versus Rumination = .01, z = .10, p = .92; B Apology versus Control = -
.08, z = -.55, p = .58) and perceived social support (B Apology versus Rumination = .03, z = .34, p = .73; 
B Apology versus Control = -.02, z = -.20, p = .84) compared to the other conditions. Perceived social 
support, further, was not associated with guilt (B = .01, z = .11, p = .91), but was associated with 
decreased shame (B = -.25, z = -2.84, p = .01). 
Guilt was associated with better impulse control (B = .21, z = 2.69, p = .01), was not 
associated with difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior (B = .08, z = .74, p = .46) and self-
esteem (B = -.003, z = -.04, p = .97), and was associated with decreased self-forgiveness (B = -
.30, z = -3.39, p < .001). Shame was associated with poorer impulse control (B = -.71, z = 10.22, 
p < .001), greater difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior (B = .69, z = 7.74, p < .001), 
decreased self-esteem (B = -.43, z = -5.67, p < .001), and decreased self-forgiveness (B = -.56, z 
= -7.57, p < .001).  
Perceived social support was also associated with these variables independently of guilt 
and shame. Specifically, it was associated with better impulse control (B = .44, z = 5.50, p < 
.001), less difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior (B = -.42, z = -4.41, p < .001), greater 
self-esteem (B = .89, z = 9.30, p < .001), and greater self-forgiveness (B = .33, z = 3.82, p < 
.001). Intervention condition influenced three of these mediators independently of guilt, shame, 
and perceived social support. First, apologizing led to marginally worse impulse control 
compared to the rumination condition (B = .24, z = 1.90, p = .06) but not compared to the control 
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condition (B = .17, z = 1.36, p = .17). Second, apologizing led to marginally greater difficulty 
engaging in goal-directed behavior compared to the rumination condition (B = -.27, z = -1.89, p 
= .06) and greater difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior compared to the control 
condition (B = -.37, z = -2.54, p = .01). Third, apologizing led to marginally greater self-
forgiveness compared to the control condition (B = -.26, z = -1.96, p = .05), but not compared to 
the rumination condition (B = .06, z = .45, p = .65). Intervention condition did not influence self-
esteem (B Apology versus Rumination = .03, z = .25, p = .80; B Apology versus Control = -.09, z = -.64, p = .52).  
Of the tested mediators, impulse control, self-forgiveness, and self-esteem were 
associated with health behaviors, such that, surprisingly, better impulse control was associated 
with poorer health behaviors (B = -.13, z = -2.27, p = .02). Self-esteem, further, was associated 
with better health behaviors (B = .17, z = 3.52, p < .001), while self-forgiveness was associated 
with marginally better health behaviors (B = .09, z = 1.83, p = .07). Difficulty engaging in goal-
directed behavior was not associated with health behaviors (B = -.06, z = -1.31, p = .19). Finally, 
guilt (B = .04, z = .50, p = .62), shame (B = .09, z = 1.39, p = .17), and perceived social support 
(B = .03, z = .38, p = .70) did not have independent associations with health behaviors. After 
taking into account all tested mediators, there was no effect of apologizing on health behaviors 
compared to the rumination condition (B = .10, z = 1.06, p = .29). However, apologizing led to 
worse health behaviors compared to the control condition (B = .22, z = 2.34, p = .02). 
No evidence was found for any indirect effects from intervention condition to health 
behaviors. Potential indirect effects were assessed through 95% bootstrapped confidence 
intervals based on 1,000 samples, ranged between [.00000004] and [.0312], and all contained the 
value zero in their confidence intervals. Indeed, while impulse control and self-forgiveness were 
influenced by intervention condition and were associated with health behaviors, these effects 
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were only marginally significant, possibly explaining why they were not found to be reliable 
mediators to explain the anticipated effect of intervention condition on health behaviors. 
3.3.6 The Effect of Intervention Condition on Real-World Apologies. 
Of the 398 participants who completed Part 2 of the study, 99 reported that they had apologized 
to their victim (n Apology = 49; n Rumination = 25; n Control = 25) during the one-week follow-up while 
299 reported that they had not apologized to their victim (n Apology = 94; n Rumination = 101; n Control 
= 104). Participants who had apologized indicated they had done so to relieve the pain their 
victim felt because of the offense (M = 5.79, SD = 1.30), to repair their relationship with their 
victim (M = 5.78, SD = 1.27), to do the right thing so that they could forgive themselves (M = 
5.61, SD = 1.49), because it seemed like what they should do (M = 5.51, SD = 1.59), to relieve 
their own guilt about the offense (M = 5.29, SD = 1.55), and, to a lesser extent, to look good to 
others (M = 2.70, SD = 1.88). Participants who had not apologized indicated it was because they 
believed too much time had passed since the offense (M = 5.55, SD = 1.61), they did not have an 
opportunity to apologize (M = 5.12, SD = 2.02), apologizing would not help repair their 
relationship with their victim (M = 5.04, SD = 1.55), apologizing would not help relieve the pain 
their victim experienced because of the offense (M = 4.65, SD = 1.63), apologizing would not 
help them feel less guilty about the offense (M = 4.44, SD = 1.67), and apologizing would not 
help them forgive themselves for the offense (M = 4.39, SD = 1.67). 
To test for the effect of intervention condition on participants’ real-world apology 
behavior at the one-week follow-up, I first calculated the total effect of intervention condition on 
real-world apology behavior using binary logistic regression. Then, I calculated the effects of 
intervention condition on the sequence of tested mediators using ordinary least squares 
  46 
regression (all effects mirrored those found in the structural equation modeling analyses 
involving participants’ actual health behaviors). Finally, I calculated the associations between the 
mediators and apology behavior after controlling for intervention condition using binary logistic 
regression. I tested the significance of potential indirect effects using a z-statistic calculated by 
following the steps outlined by Iacobucci (2012) to combine results from ordinary least squares 
and logistic regression analyses.6 
The likelihood of offering an apology was significantly predicted by intervention 
condition (χ2 (2) = 98.87, p < .001, Negelkerke R2 = .04). Participants in the apology condition 
(% Apologized = 52.13) were twice as likely to offer an apology during the one-week follow-up 
compared to participants in the rumination condition (% Apologized = 24.75; B = .75, χ2 (1) = 6.85, 
p = .01, exp(B) = 2.11, 95% CI exp(B) [1.21, 3.68]) as well as participants in the control 
condition (% Apologized = 24.04; B = .77, χ2 (1) = 7.43, p = .01, exp(B) = 2.17, 95% CI exp(B) 
[1.24, 3.78]). There was no difference in likelihood of apologizing between the rumination and 
control condition (B = -.03, χ2 (1) = .01, p = .93, exp(B) = .97, 95% CI exp(B) [.52, 1.80]).   
Of the mediators, impulse control was associated with likelihood of apologizing, such 
that the likelihood of apologizing doubled with each unit increase in impulse control (B = .70, χ2 
(1) = 15.51, p < .001, exp(B) = 2.04, 95% CI exp(B) [1.42, 2.83]). Moreover, perceived social 
support was independently associated with likelihood of apologizing, such that the likelihood of 
apologizing decreased by 48% for each unit increase in perceived social support (B = -.66, χ2 (1) 
= 7.29, p = .01, exp(B) = .52, 95% CI exp(B) [.32, .83]).  
Guilt (B = .07, χ2 (1) = .09, p = .77, exp(B) = 1.07, 95% CI exp(B) [.68, 1.68]) and shame 
(B = -.21, χ2 (1) = 1.10, p = .29, exp(B) = .81, 95% CI exp(B) [.55, 1.20]) did not have 
independent associations with likelihood of apologizing. Similarly, difficulty engaging in goal-
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directed behavior (B = -.23, χ2 (1) = 2.08, p = .15, exp(B) = .80, 95% CI exp(B) [.59, 1.09]), self-
esteem (B = .07, χ2 (1) = .23, p = .63, exp(B) = 1.07, 95% CI exp(B) [.81, 1.41]), and self-
forgiveness (B = .10, χ2 (1) = .55, p = .46, exp(B) = 1.11, 95% CI exp(B) [.84, 1.46]) were not 
associated with likelihood of apologizing. After controlling for the tested mediators, intervention 
condition still predicted likelihood of apologizing (B Apology versus Rumination = .70, χ2 (1) = 5.27, p = 
.02, exp(B) = 2.01, 95% CI exp(B) [1.11, 3.66]; B Apology versus Control = .82, χ2 (1) = 6.97, p = .01, 
exp(B) = 2.27, 95% CI exp(B) [1.24, 4.16]). Because intervention condition did not significantly 
influence any of the tested mediators, no evidence was found for indirect effects from 
intervention condition to real-world apology behavior. 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
Study 2 tested whether a brief apology intervention (vs. rumination or control) would improve 
offenders’ intended and actual health behaviors and if it would increase offenders’ likelihood of 
offering a real apology to their victim. Most of my predictions were not supported by the 
findings of this study, with no evidence suggesting that the apology intervention influenced 
offenders’ intended or actual health behaviors, either directly or indirectly. Given the results of 
Study 1, it was surprising that this study did not find an indirect effect of apologies on intended 
health behaviors through shame reduction. Indeed, the current findings were inconsistent with 
previous research that found an effect of apologies on guilt and shame reduction (Carpenter et 
al., 2014; Meek et al., 1995; Witvliet et al., 2002; 2011) and with research that found negative 
associations between shame and health behaviors (Dearing et al., 2005; Ianni et al., 2010; Sanfter 
et al., 1995). 
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One factor that might have decreased the effectiveness of the apology intervention is my 
attempt to make participants’ apology experience more realistic by asking them to email their 
apology to their victim after Part 1 of the study. Doing so may have shifted participants’ focus to 
expecting to deliver an apology. As previously noted, Leunissen and colleagues (2014) found 
that expecting to deliver an apology raises feelings of distress by leading people to exaggerate 
the potential negative consequences of apologizing and discount the potential positive 
consequences of apologizing. It is therefore possible that participants focused on expecting to 
deliver their apology later and the possible (predominantly negative) consequences of doing so. 
This may have decreased the benefits participants in Study 1 experienced after writing an 
apology that they did not expect to deliver. 
One finding in this study provides suggestive evidence for this possibility. Compared to 
the control condition, participants in the apology condition self-reported greater “difficulties in 
engaging in goal-directed behavior” (see page 43). This variable included items such as “I have 
difficulty concentrating” and “I have difficulty thinking about anything else” (referring to the 
offense). It is thus possible that this difficulty concentrating in the apology condition reflected a 
preoccupation with the anticipated negative consequences of apologizing. 
Despite the absence of an effect of apologizing on offenders’ intended or actual health 
behaviors, this study did find that writing a brief apology increased participants’ likelihood of 
offering an actual apology to their victims one week after the intervention. Writing a brief 
“practice” apology might later decrease the feelings of distress and humiliation that offenders 
expect to experience while offering an apology to their victim, which may sometimes prevent 
them from apologizing (Leunissen et al., 2014). This finding is promising, as it is well-
established that apologizing is an effective reconciliation strategy. For instance, offering an 
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apology helps victims empathize with their offenders (e.g., Barkat, 2002; McCullough et al., 
1997) and view them more positively (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Hareli & Eisikovits, 2006; 
Hodgins & Liebeskind, 2003). As such, it helps victims forgive their offenders and, as a result, 
makes reconciliation between them more likely (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Exline et al., 2007; 
Fehr et al., 2010; McCullough et al., 1997; Schumann, 2012;). The results of this study suggest 
that one way to increase the likelihood of receiving these benefits is to ask offenders to write a 
brief apology.  
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4.0  STUDY 3: APOLOGIES AND CARDIOVASCULAR REACTIVITY AND 
RECOVERY 
Studies 1 and 2 yielded inconsistent results on the effect of intervention condition on intended 
health behaviors. It is possible that the null findings in Study 2 might have resulted from the 
different instructions in the apology intervention (as discussed above), but it is also possible that 
apologies do not reliably affect offenders’ intended or actual health behaviors. Study 3 therefore 
attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1, using the same apology instructions as Study 1. 
Moreover, Study 3 tested whether apologies also impacted offenders’ cardiovascular reactivity 
while apologizing and cardiovascular recovery after apologizing. Finally, like Study 2, it tested 
the effects of intervention condition on participants’ real-world apology behavior, this time at a 
four-week follow-up to allow them more opportunities to deliver an apology.   
4.1 PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
One hundred and thirteen students (47 males, 84 females, 1 missing) at the University of 
Pittsburgh completed the study in return for course credit.7 Participants were between 17 and 42 
years of age (M = 18.82, SD = 2.36). Most were born in the United States (n = 110), followed by 
China (n = 8), India (n = 5), Germany (n = 2), Brazil (n = 1), Jamaica (n = 1), Japan (n = 1), 
Nigeria (n = 1), the Philippines (n = 1), Sweden (n = 1), and Vietnam (n = 1), and most were 
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Caucasian (n = 94), followed by Asian (n = 70), Asian (n = 34), and African American (n = 3). 
Regarding religion, most participants were Christian (n = 63), followed by atheist (n = 17), 
agnostic (n = 15), something else, with an option to clarify in an open-ended question (n = 11), 
Hindu (n = 9), Jewish (n = 9), and Buddhist (n = 7).  
Participants were eligible to participate if they had hurt or caused a problem for another 
person within the past 14 days; had not apologized to this person; and regretted what they did. 
Because this study measured aspects of cardiovascular function, additional eligibility criteria 
were that participants must not have a history of cardiovascular disease and must not be 
hypertensive (defined as systolic blood pressure at, or above, 150mmHg and/or diastolic blood 
pressure at, or above, 90mmHg). The time frame of 14 days was established based on the results 
of a pilot study (see Appendix C for a description of the study and data analyses).  
4.2 MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
Before visiting the laboratory, all participants completed a number of premeasures online that are 
thought to be relevant for their cardiovascular reactivity and recovery, including their trait anger 
(Buss & Perry, 1992; e.g., “I sometimes feel like a powder keg ready to explode”) and hostility 
(Buss & Perry, 1992; e.g., “I am suspicious of overly friendly strangers”).8 These variables are 
important to measure when assessing cardiovascular function, because they may influence 
participants’ tendency toward cardiovascular reactivity (e.g., Suls & Wan, 1993; Vella & 
Friedman, 2009). Participants also filled out a series of questions about their medical history and 
current medication use. I used participants’ answers on these questions to exclude their data from 
analyses involving cardiovascular reactivity and recovery if they indicated that they had a history 
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of cardiovascular disease and/or were using medications known to alter cardiovascular variables, 
such as beta-blockers. This online portion was set up as a separate study and participants 
received credit for it regardless of whether they chose to sign up for the laboratory portion.  
Laboratory sessions were limited to the afternoon, because previous research has 
suggested the presence of circadian fluctuations in cardiovascular parameters (e.g., Millar-Craig, 
Bishop, & Raftery, 1978). Sessions began on the hour between 12.00 p.m. and 4.00 p.m. and 
lasted up to one hour. Participants were asked to refrain from exercising, drinking alcohol, and 
taking anti-inflammatory medications for at least 24 hours before the study. Participants’ 
adherence to these criteria as well as to the offense-specific criteria (must have committed an 
offense within the past 14 days; not have apologized; and regret what they did) were confirmed 
upon arrival. If participants did not meet one or more of these, their appointment was cancelled 
or rescheduled. Because of the relative difficulty of recruiting eligible participants for this study, 
these criteria were eventually relaxed to not having drunk alcohol for at least 12 hours before the 
study (only if participants had consumed no more than two servings of alcohol) and not having 
exercised for at least 4 hours before the study.  
After giving consent, the experimenter assessed participants’ height and weight in order 
to calculate their body mass index (BMI). Participants were then seated in a quiet room and were 
separated from the experimenter by a room divider. They first answered a number of questions 
about their offense.9 They were asked to answer these and all later questions on paper because 
writing should minimize movement in participants’ non-dominant arm (which is important for 
blood pressure assessment) compared to using both hands to type on a keyboard. Participants 
then completed the apology (vs. rumination or self-distraction) intervention, followed by 
measures of their negative emotions, self-punishment, and perceived forgiveness from the 
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victim. Finally, they answered questions about their intended health behaviors. Because data 
collection for this study started simultaneously with Study 1, the additional mediators that were 
tested in Study 2 (i.e., emotion regulation, self-esteem, self-forgiveness, and perceived social 
support) were not included in this study.  
The physiology protocol consisted of three periods: (a) a resting baseline period, lasting 8 
minutes; (b) the apology (vs. rumination or self-distraction) exercise, lasting 5 minutes; and (c) a 
recovery period, lasting 8 minutes. This protocol started after completion of the offense 
characteristic questions, but before the apology, rumination, or self-distraction exercise. The 
experimenter applied the cuff of an automated blood pressure monitor (a Dinamap oscillometric 
monitor) on participants’ non-dominant arm to measure blood pressure and heart rate, which 
were both measured every 60 seconds through each of the protocol’s periods. During the 
baseline and recovery periods, participants were given the opportunity to look through a picture 
book of non-arousing, positively valenced nature images (e.g., sunsets). After the end of the 
recovery period, they completed the questionnaires about their guilt, shame, self-punishment, 
and intended health behaviors.  
Offense characteristics. Participants answered the same questions about their offense as 
in Study 1 (e.g., an open-ended question asking them to describe their offense).  
Intervention. Participants read the same instructions used in Study 1, except in the 
rumination condition, where they read the same instructions as in Study 2 in order to match the 
length of the instructions within each intervention condition (i.e., “Please describe the ways in 
which your offense harmed the other person and how it may continue to negatively affect him or 
her now.”). Participants were given five minutes to complete the intervention and were asked to 
stop writing once the five minutes were over to standardize the time of the physiology protocol 
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across participants. As in Study 1, participants in the apology condition were asked to rate the 
quality of their own apology (see Appendix D for supplementary analyses regarding apology 
quality). 
Guilt and shame. Participants completed the same State Shame and Guilt Scale 
(Marschall et al., 1994) used in Study 1. Cronbach’s α was .78 for guilt and .83 for shame. 
Self-punishment. Next, they completed the same subscale of the Differentiated Process 
Scale of Self-Forgiveness (Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013a) as in Study 1, measuring offenders’ 
tendency to condemn and punish themselves. Cronbach’s α was .85. 
Perceived victim forgiveness. Participants rated their agreement with the same three 
items as in Study 1 to assess perceived forgiveness from their victim. Cronbach’s α was .81. 
Intended health behaviors. Finally, participants answered the same questions about 
their intended health behaviors as in Study 1. Cronbach’s α was .74. 
Real-world apology at a four-week follow-up. To assess the potential influence of 
intervention condition on real-world apologies, all participants received the following email 
exactly four weeks after their laboratory visit. “Dear participant, four weeks ago, you 
participated in a research study named ‘The Interpersonal Offenses Study’. In this study, we 
asked you to reflect on an offense that you committed against another person. As part of the 
study, you agreed to be contacted through email at this time to answer one brief question. 
Specifically, we would like to learn whether you have apologized to the person that you hurt 
since you left our laboratory. We would appreciate it if you would respond to this email, simply 
stating “yes” or “no” to this question. Thank you in advance.”  
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4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 Offense Characteristics. 
Participants reported committing offenses that involved fights or arguments (28.6%), insults 
(15.9%), betrayal of the victim’s trust (14.3%), acts of selfishness (14.3%), rejection or exclusion 
(4%), physical violence (1.6%), damage to, or loss of physical property (1.6%), ending a 
relationship (1.6%), something else (1.6%), infidelity (.8%), and not following through on an 
obligation (.8%). Offenses were predominantly committed against friends (41.3%), family 
members (20.6%), romantic partners (13.5%), work colleagues (4.8%), acquaintances (3.2%), 
and strangers (1.6%). Finally, offenses ranged in severity between 1 (Not severe at all) and 7 
(Extremely severe), with a mean of 3.55 (SD = 1.24).  
4.3.2 Data Analytic Plan. 
Study 3 had four aims, namely, to test whether the apology (vs. rumination and self-distraction) 
intervention influenced offenders’ (1) intended health behaviors after the intervention, (2) 
cardiovascular reactivity during the intervention (3) cardiovascular recovery after the 
intervention, and (4) real-world apology behavior at a four-week follow-up. To test these aims, I 
analyzed the collected data using a series of analyses, each outlined below. Correlations between, 
and descriptive statistics of, all continuous variables are displayed in Tables 9 and 10 and 
supplementary analyses of the data are reported in Appendix D. 
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4.3.3 The Effect of Intervention Condition on Intended Health Behaviors. 
To test the first aim, I repeated the analyses reported in Study 1 and used a fully saturated 
structural equation model and maximum likelihood estimators to test for direct and indirect 
effects of intervention condition on intended health behaviors. The variance-covariance matrix is 
displayed in Table 11 and results of the tested model are displayed in Figure 5. 
Apologizing did not have a total effect on intended health behaviors compared to 
rumination (B = .01, z = .06, p = .95) or self-distraction (B = .11, z = .62, p = .53). Apologizing 
also did not influence guilt and shame compared to rumination (B Guilt = -.01, z = -.04, p = .97; B 
Shame = .005, z = .02, p = .98) or self-distraction (B Guilt = -.10, z = -.49, p = .62; B Shame = .05, z = 
.29, p = .77). Further, apologizing did not influence perceived victim forgiveness compared to 
rumination (B = .16, z = .41, p = .68), but led to lower perceived victim forgiveness compared to 
self-distraction (B = .86, z = 2.16, p = .03). Perceived victim forgiveness, in turn, was associated 
with decreased guilt (B = -.21, z = 4.55, p < .001) and shame (B = -.19, z = 4.57, p < .001). Both 
guilt (B = .32, z = 3.57, p <. 001) and shame (B = .64, z = 6.75, p < .001) were associated with 
increased self-punishment. Perceived victim forgiveness was not associated with self-punishment 
independently from guilt and shame (B = -.05, z = -1.27, p = 20), and intervention condition did 
not have independent effects on self-punishment (B Apology versus Rumination = .08, z = .59, p = .55; B 
Apology versus Distraction = -.01, z = -.07, p = .94). Self-punishment was not associated with intended 
health behaviors (B = -.11, z = -.97, p = .33). However, guilt was independently associated with 
better intended health behaviors (B = .24, z = 2.07, p = .04), whereas shame (B = -.12, z = -.88, p 
= .38) and perceived victim forgiveness (B = -.01, z = -.24, p = .81) did not have independent 
associations with intended health behaviors.  
Indirect effects from intervention condition to intended health behaviors were each 
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assessed through 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 samples. Based on the 
above findings, it was possible that apologizing might have indirectly improved intended health 
behaviors by decreasing perceived victim forgiveness and subsequently increasing guilt 
compared to the self-distraction condition. This indirect effect, however, was not significantly 
different from zero (indirect effect = -.0426; 95% CI [-.1312, .0055]). There was no evidence for 
any other indirect effects from apologizing to intended health behaviors; all remaining indirect 
effects ranged between [.00028] and [.0115] and contained the value zero in their confidence 
intervals. After controlling for all tested mediators, apologizing still did not influence intended 
health behaviors compared to both rumination (B = .02, z = .97, p = .33) and self-distraction (B = 
.15, z = .82, p = .41). Thus, there was no evidence that the apology intervention influenced 
participants’ intended health behaviors, either directly or indirectly through the tested mediators. 
4.3.4 The Effect of Intervention Condition on Cardiovascular Reactivity and Recovery. 
Prior to analyses, I first excluded the data of six participants. Four of them had indicated that 
they currently suffered, or had suffered, from a heart condition (hypertension, a heart attack, and 
valve problems) and/or had undergone a cardiovascular procedure (heart balloon angioplasty), 
while two of them had unreliable cardiovascular readings during their laboratory visit due to 
persistent coughing and failure to rest their cuffed arm throughout the duration of the recording 
protocol. 
I calculated composite scores for participants’ heart rate (HR)10, systolic blood pressure 
(SBP), and diastolic blood pressure (DBP) by averaging across their minute-by-minute values 
during each period (i.e., baseline, intervention exercise, and recovery). To create cardiovascular 
reactivity indices for each of these variables (HR, SBP, and DBP), I then calculated standardized 
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residuals using linear regression to predict the intervention exercise average from the baseline 
average (after Stewart, Janicki, & Kamarck, 2006). By doing so, these residuals represented the 
change in each cardiovascular variable from baseline to intervention exercise, controlling for 
baseline values. Similarly, to create cardiovascular recovery indices, I calculated standardized 
residuals using linear regression to predict the recovery average from the intervention exercise 
average and the baseline average (after Stewart et al., 2006). 
Each of these reactivity and recovery indices was then tested as an outcome in a separate 
linear regression model. I focused on each of these indices in isolation (rather than conducting 
multivariate analyses or using latent reactivity and recovery factors in a structural equation 
model), because emotionally engaging in psychological tasks such as the present apology 
intervention may influence each of these variables in the same direction, but not necessarily to 
the same degree. On the one hand, a meta-analysis on reactivity effects showed that a range of 
negative emotions that should likely increase in the apology and/or rumination conditions—
including embarrassment, sadness, and anxiety—all led to greater SBP, DBP, and HR (Kreibig, 
2010). On the other hand, however, the intervention condition may be most likely to lead to 
reliable changes in blood pressure and to a lesser extent to changes in HR. This is because HR is 
multiply determined by sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system influences, which can 
be independent, co-active, or reciprocal across the two autonomic branches and depending on the 
particular behavioral state of the individual (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993). Importantly, 
HR itself is ambiguous with respect to these complex autonomic influences. In general, blood 
pressure effects are more sensitive to sympathetic influences on beta- and alpha-adrenergic 
receptors located on the heart and vasculature, respectively (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 
2007; Mohrman & Heller, 2010). Parasympathetic influences on BP are less evident because 
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with only a few exceptions, systemic blood vessels are less sensitive to cholinergic outflow, and 
because the parasympathetic branch does not exert strong effects on cardiac contractility and 
hence blood pressure. Since effortful psychological tasks are thought to engage the sympathetic 
nervous system (Cacioppo et al., 2007), this suggests that changes in blood pressure (and 
especially SBP) may be more plausibly impacted and reliably influenced by the experimental 
manipulations used in the present study. 
In each regression model, I used two dummy-coded intervention condition variables 
(with the apology intervention serving as the reference condition) as predictors, while controlling 
for participants’ age, gender, BMI, race, time of day that the laboratory visit took place, trait 
anger, and trait hostility.11 Prior to analyses, I tested for potential interactions between 
intervention condition and each of the covariates and found no evidence for such interactions. 
Descriptive statistics of, and correlations between, HR, SBP, and DBP per intervention condition 
are shown in Table 13, while the unstandardized beta weights for these analyses are displayed in 
Table 14.  
Across intervention conditions, all cardiovascular parameters increased significantly from 
baseline to intervention exercise (F (1, 106) HR = 181.78, p < .001; F (1, 106) SBP = 16.38, p < 
.001; F (1, 106) DBP = 42.05, p < .001). HR did not remain elevated during the recovery period 
compared to baseline (F (1, 106) HR = .28, p = .60), while SBP (F (1, 106) = 22.23, p < .001) and 
DBP (F (1, 106) = 14.67, p < .001) decreased during the recovery period compared to baseline. 
The effect of intervention condition on cardiovascular reactivity. Apologizing did not 
influence HR reactivity compared to rumination (B = -.26, t(95) = -1.01, p = .32, 95% CI [-.77, 
.25]) or self-distraction (B = .08, t(95) = .29, p = .77, 95% CI [-.44, .59]). Apologizing, however, 
led to marginally higher SBP reactivity compared to rumination (B = -.42, t(95) = -1.76, p = .08, 
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95% CI [-.90, .05]) and self-distraction (B = -.47, t(95) = -1.96, p = .05, 95% CI [-.95, .01]; see 
Figure 6). Intervention condition accounted for 3.1% of the variance in SBP reactivity. Finally, 
apologizing did not influence DBP reactivity compared to rumination (B = -.35, t(95) = -1.40, p 
= .17, 95% CI [-.84, .15]) or self-distraction (B = -.27, t(95) = -1.10, p = .28, 95% CI [-.77, .22]).  
The effect of intervention condition on cardiovascular recovery. Apologizing led to 
better HR recovery compared to rumination (B = .69, t(95) = 2.78, p = .01, 95% CI [.20, 1.19]; 
see Figure 7), but not self-distraction (B = .02, t(95) = .09, p = .93, 95% CI [-.47, .52]). 
Intervention condition accounted for 9.1% of the variance in HR recovery. Apologizing did not 
influence SBP recovery compared to rumination (B = -.18, t(95) = -.69, p = .49, 95% CI [-.68, 
.33]), but led to marginally worse SBP recovery compared to self-distraction (B = -.44, t(95) = -
1.74, p = .09, 95% CI [-.94, .06]; see Figure 8). Intervention condition accounted for 2.9% of the 
variance in SBP recovery. Finally, apologizing did not influence DBP recovery compared to 
rumination (B = -.16, t(95) = -.61, p = .54, 95% CI [-.68, .36]) or self-distraction (B = -.38, t(95) 
= -1.44, p = .15, 95% CI [-.89, .14]).  
4.3.5 The Effect of Intervention Condition on Real-World Apology Behavior. 
Of the 132 participants who visited the laboratory, 87 (65.91%) responded to the email asking 
them about their real-world apology behavior during the four-week follow-up. Forty-nine 
participants reported that they had apologized to their victim (n Apology = 15; n Rumination = 23; n 
Self-Distraction = 11) during the four-week follow-up, while 38 reported that they had not apologized 
to their victim (n Apology = 17; n Rumination = 7; n Self-Distraction = 14). 
To test whether these participants might have differed in important ways from the 
participants who had chosen not to respond to the email, I tested for potential differences 
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between the two groups of participants based on the following variables: experimental condition, 
participant gender, and offense severity. I conducted chi-square tests for the two categorical 
variables (experimental condition and gender) and an independent sample t-test for the 
continuous variable (offense severity). No differences were found between participants with 
complete and missing data in their experimental condition (χ2 (2) = 2.63, p = .27), their gender 
(χ2 (1) = 1.54, p = .22), or the severity of their offense (t(111) = 1.79, p = .59). 
To test for the effect of intervention condition on participants’ real-world apology 
behavior at the four-week follow-up, I conducted a series of ordinary least square and binary 
logistic regression analyses (after Iacobucci, 2012). I first calculated the total effect of 
intervention condition on apology behavior using binary logistic regression. To assess for 
potential indirect effects from intervention condition to real-world apology behavior, I then 
calculated the effects of intervention condition on the tested mediators using ordinary least 
squares regression (all effects were similar to those reported for the analyses on participants’ 
intended health behaviors). Then, I calculated the associations between the tested mediators and 
apology behavior after controlling for intervention condition using binary logistic regression. 
Finally, I tested the significance of potential indirect effects by calculating a z-statistic (see 
Iacobucci, 2012) to combine results from ordinary least squares and logistic regression. 
The likelihood of offering an apology was significantly predicted by intervention 
condition (χ2 (2) = 8.08, p = .02, Negelkerke R2 = .12). Participants in the apology condition (% 
Apologized = 46.88) were 26.9% less likely to offer an apology compared to participants in the 
rumination condition (% Apologized = 76.67%; B = -1.32, χ2 (1) = 5.54, p = .02, exp(B) = .27, 95% 
CI exp(B) [.09, .80]). No differences in likelihood of offering an apology were found between 
the apology and self-distraction conditions (% Apologized = 44%; B = .12, χ2 (1) = .05, p = .83, 
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exp(B) = 1.12, 95% CI exp(B) [.39, 3.20]). A separate analysis, further, showed that participants 
in the rumination condition were 76.1% more likely to offer an apology than participants in the 
self-distraction condition (B = -1.43, χ2 (1) = 5.87, p = .02, exp(B) = .24, 95% CI exp(B) [.08, 
.76]). 
None of the mediators were associated with likelihood of apologizing at follow-up (B Guilt 
= -.41, χ2 (1) = 1.05, p = .31, exp(B) = .67, 95% CI exp(B) [.31, 1.45]; B Shame = -.52, χ2 (1) = 
1.24, p = .27, exp(B) = .59, 95% CI exp(B) [.24, 1.49]; B Perceived Victim Forgiveness = -.17, χ2 (1) = .83, 
p = .36, exp(B) = .84, 95% CI exp(B) [.59, 1.22]; B Self-Punishment = .24, χ2 (1) = .36, p = .55, exp(B) 
= 1.27, 95% CI exp(B) [.58, 2.82]). Moreover, after controlling for the tested mediators, 
participants in the apology condition were still less likely to offer an apology during follow-up 
compared to participants in the rumination condition (B = -2.07, χ2 (1) = 9.60, p = .002, exp(B) = 
.13, 95% CI exp(B) [.03, .47]), but not the self-distraction condition (B = -.18, χ2 (1) = .09, p = 
.77, exp(B) = .83, 95% CI exp(B) [.25, 2.82]). As such, there was no evidence for any indirect 
effects between intervention condition and likelihood of offering an apology at the four-week 
follow-up. 
4.4 DISCUSSION 
Like the previous studies, Study 3 tested whether writing a brief apology (vs. rumination or self-
distraction) would improve offenders’ intended health behaviors. Like Study 2, it also tested 
whether writing a brief apology would increase offenders’ likelihood of offering a real apology 
to their victim. Finally, it tested whether writing a brief apology (vs. rumination or self-
distraction) would influence offenders’ cardiovascular reactivity while writing an apology, as 
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well as their cardiovascular recovery afterward. I had anticipated that apologizing would likely 
lead to greater cardiovascular reactivity compared to self-distraction because offering an apology 
may lead offenders to focus on the potential negative consequences of apologizing (e.g., being 
rejected; Leunissen et al., 2014), but not rumination. I had also anticipated that apologizing 
would lead to better cardiovascular recovery compared to both rumination and self-distraction. 
Most of my predictions were not supported by the findings of this study. Concerning 
intended health behaviors, I found no evidence to suggest that the apology intervention 
influenced offenders’ intended behaviors, either directly or indirectly through negative emotion 
reduction and/or perceived victim forgiveness. This went against the findings of Study 1, but not 
Study 2, which also did not yield evidence for direct or indirect effects of apologizing on 
intended health behaviors. In fact, the current results were inconsistent with ample previous 
research: while this study found no effect of apologizing on guilt and shame and found that 
apologizing decreased perceived victim forgiveness compared to self-distraction, multiple 
studies previously found that apologizing decreased guilt and shame (Carpenter et al., 2014; 
Meek et al., 1995; Witvliet et al., 2002; 2011) and increased perceived victim forgiveness 
(Witvliet et al., 2002).  
Concerning likelihood of offering a real-world apology, this study found that the apology 
intervention decreased participants’ likelihood of offering a real-world apology compared to 
rumination, but not self-distraction. In fact, additional analyses revealed that rumination 
increased the likelihood of offering a real-world apology compared to both the apology and self-
distraction conditions. This goes against the findings of Study 2 in two ways. First, in Study 2 the 
apology intervention increased the likelihood of offering an apology compared to both 
rumination and control. Second, in Study 2 no difference was found between the rumination and 
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the control conditions in likelihood of offering a real-world apology. 
Regarding the first contradictory finding, one possible explanation is the different 
instructions used for the apology intervention across the two studies, with the instructions in 
Study 2 having participants falsely believe that they would be emailing their written apology to 
their victim. Even though participants were informed that they would not actually be asked to 
email their apology after they wrote it, they had already consented to emailing their written 
apology to their victim and it is therefore plausible that they may have been planning on 
following the study’s instructions. As previous research suggests, people tend to remember their 
unfinished tasks in much greater detail than their finished tasks and tend to think about them 
more often (e.g., Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Zeigarnik, 1927). These thoughts about 
their already written but not delivered apology, in turn, might have prompted them to actually 
apologize. 
Regarding the second contradictory finding, a possible explanation is the difference in the 
control conditions used across the two studies, with Study 2 using a truly neutral control 
condition and the present study using a self-distraction task as the control condition. Participants 
in the control condition of Study 2 and in the rumination conditions across both studies might 
have been experiencing negative emotions and/or decreased positive emotions about their 
offense and may therefore have been motivated to find a way to positively influence their 
emotions (e.g., through offering an apology). The same, however, might not have been true for 
participants in the self-distraction condition of the present study, as some evidence exists to 
suggest that self-distraction might decrease one’s negative emotions and/or increase one’s 
positive emotions (see Discussion under Study 1). This might have contributed to the difference 
in likelihood of offering a real-world apology between the rumination and control condition 
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observed in the current study, but not Study 2. 
Concerning cardiovascular function, I found—consistent with my expectations—that 
apologizing led to better recovery compared to rumination (as measured through HR). I also 
found—against my expectations—that apologizing led to marginally greater reactivity compared 
to both rumination and self-distraction (as measured through SBP) and marginally worse 
recovery compared to self-distraction (as measured through SBP). Based on these mixed 
findings, there appears to be no reliable evidence to support my prediction that apologizing 
would lead to patterns of autonomic activity that might be favorable in the long-term (in fact, the 
present findings suggest that the opposite might be as plausible). Moreover, even though 
apologizing positively influenced HR recovery, this was true only when its effects were 
compared to rumination, but not self-distraction. As such, there is no evidence to suggest that 
apologizing may be more beneficial than simply distracting oneself from one’s offense.  
However, it should also be noted that this study was limited in its ability to test the effects 
of apologizing on cardiovascular function, with the most important limitation being that it was 
likely underpowered. As power analyses based on previous research (Da Silva et al., 2016) 
suggested, a minimum of 50 participants per cell were needed to reliably detect the anticipated 
effects of apologizing on cardiovascular parameters, yet this study contained approximately 30 
participants per cell. As such, more research is needed to further our understanding about the 
potential effects of apologizing on cardiovascular function.  
Another limitation is that this study was limited in its ability to distinguish the autonomic 
origins of the observed changes in HR and BP. This is important because more insight into the 
relative contributions of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems might have 
helped to explain the seemingly contradictory effects of apologizing on HR and SBP recovery 
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(i.e., with apologizing leading to better HR recovery compared to rumination, but as much 
delayed SBP recovery as rumination). It is possible, for example, that having apologized might 
not have led to immediate decreases in sympathetic activation, but that it might already have led 
to increases in parasympathetic activation. Since SBP is mostly under the control of 
cardiovascular parameters directly influenced by sympathetic (but not parasympathetic) 
activation, while HR is influenced by both sympathetic and parasympathetic activation, this 
might have simultaneously manifested as improved HR recovery and delayed SBP recovery. 
More comprehensive measures of cardiovascular function that could shed light on underlying 
autonomic processes are represented, for example, by pre-ejection period and high-frequency 
heart rate variability, since these are almost exclusively determined by sympathetic and 
parasympathetic activation, respectively (Cacioppo et al., 2007).  
Finally, this study might have been limited in its ability to detect reliable differences in 
cardiovascular recovery between the three intervention conditions because participants in all 
conditions were presented with positively valenced pictures during the recovery period. Looking 
at these pictures might have served as a positive distraction and, as such, might have reduced 
participants’ negative emotions across all conditions. To the extent that negative emotions about 
one’s offense influenced participants’ cardiovascular recovery, looking at these pictures might 
have positively influenced cardiovascular recovery across conditions and might thus have 
minimized potential differences between intervention conditions. 
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5.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present research tested the effects of an apology intervention on offenders’ (intended) health 
behaviors (Studies 1-3), their cardiovascular reactivity and recovery (Study 3), and their real-
world apology behavior (Studies 2 and 3) compared to rumination and several control conditions. 
Importantly, the current set of studies tested plausible pathways through which apologies were 
expected to exert these effects.  
I predicted that the apology intervention would positively influence offenders’ (intended) 
health behaviors and cardiovascular function by reducing their negative emotions about the 
offense, both directly as well as indirectly by increasing their perceived forgiveness from their 
victim. Moreover, I predicted that the apology intervention would increase the likelihood of 
offering a real-world apology to one’s victim, in part by allowing offenders to experience some 
of the benefits of apologizing during the study, including a decrease in their negative emotions. 
In testing these predictions, the present research had several advantages, such as the 
inclusion of a large number of participants (N Total = 1,046) and multiple replication attempts of 
the effect of apologies on intended health behaviors. It also attempted to infer the potential effect 
of apologizing on offenders’ outcomes putatively linked to cardiovascular health by 
simultaneously considering intended health behaviors, actual health behaviors, and 
cardiovascular stress physiology.  
Three studies provided either inconclusive or no evidence for my predictions. Regarding 
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offenders’ health behaviors, Study 1 found that apologizing indirectly improved offenders’ 
intended health behaviors by decreasing their feelings of shame. However, Studies 2 and 3 found 
no evidence for the predicted benefits of apologizing for offenders’ intended health behaviors or 
actual health behaviors (either directly, through shame, or through other pathways).  
Regarding cardiovascular function, Study 3 provided mixed evidence for the predicted 
benefits of apologizing for offenders’ cardiovascular reactivity and recovery and found that 
apologizing might have both potentially beneficial and potentially detrimental effects on 
cardiovascular reactivity and recovery, depending on the specific cardiovascular parameter under 
consideration (i.e., with potentially beneficial effects on HR recovery, but potentially detrimental 
effects on SBP reactivity and recovery). Importantly, even the potentially beneficial effects of 
apologizing on HR recovery only applied when its effects were compared to those of ruminating. 
Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that apologizing may be more beneficial than simply 
distracting oneself from one’s negative actions.  
Regarding offenders’ likelihood of offering a real-world apology, Studies 2 and 3 yielded 
findings that directly opposed each other. While Study 2 found that the apology intervention 
increased offenders’ likelihood of offering a real apology to their victim (compared to both 
rumination and control, which did not yield differences in likelihood of offering a real apology), 
Study 3 found that the apology intervention decreased offenders’ likelihood of offering a real 
apology to their victim (compared to rumination, but not self-distraction, with rumination also 
increasing the likelihood of offering a real apology compared to self-distraction). As mentioned 
in the Discussion of Study 3, one possible explanation for these contradictory findings might be 
the different instructions used for the apology intervention across these two studies. 
In addition to these contradictory findings, another contradictory association appeared to 
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exist across the three studies. While Study 1 found a negative association between shame and 
intended health behaviors and no association between guilt and intended health behaviors, 
Studies 2 and 3 found no association between shame and intended health behaviors and a 
positive association between guilt and intended health behaviors. The negative association 
between shame and intended health behaviors found in Study 1 is in line with previous research, 
which has consistently demonstrated associations between shame and several unhealthful 
behaviors, in part perhaps because the intensity of discomfort caused by feelings of shame may 
prompt attempts to down-regulate this emotion through increased use of alcohol, cigarettes, and 
drugs (e.g., Dearing et al., 2005; Ianni et al., 2010).  
Guilt, on the other hand, appears to have inconsistent associations with health behaviors, 
with previous studies showing both negative, positive, and no associations between guilt and 
health behaviors (e.g., Bybee et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 2005). Guilt seems especially likely to 
have positive associations with healthful behaviors when measured as a trait tendency, such as 
when individuals tend to experience, or anticipate experiencing, guilt about a specific unhealthy 
behavior (e.g., Eyler & Vest, 2002; Sukhdial & Boush, 2004; Quiles, Kinnunen, & Bybee, 2002). 
For instance, individuals who feel or expect to feel guilty about eating unhealthful foods appear 
especially likely to steer away from such foods. Additionally, it seems that difficulty with down-
regulating guilt, rather than the experience of guilt itself, might be especially predictive of 
unhealthy behaviors (Bybee et al., 1996). It remains unclear, however, why guilt about a specific 
offense might at least sometimes be associated with better intended (but not actual, see Study 2) 
health behaviors. Since guilt involves feelings of discomfort about one’s actions and therefore 
orients people toward self-improvement (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), it is possible, perhaps, that 
guilt about an offense might translate to a general attitude toward self-improvement and may 
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thus positively influence one’s intended self-care and associated intended health behaviors. 
One finding that was fairly consistent across studies, however, was the presence of a 
suppression effect when testing the influence of intervention condition on intended and actual 
health behaviors (see MacKinnon, Krul, & Lockwood, 2000). Specifically, Studies 1 and 2 found 
that the effect of apologizing versus control on these variables increased in magnitude when 
controlling (vs. not) for the tested mediators, with apologizing leading to worse intended and 
actual health behaviors compared to the control condition. This typically occurs when an 
independent variable has both positive and negative effects on a dependent variable through 
different mediators (MacKinnon, Krul, & Lockwood, 2000). When calculating the total effect of 
the independent variable on the dependent variable, these contradictory effects cancel each other 
out, resulting in a small and often non-significant total effect. Yet, when statistically controlling 
for mediators that influence the dependent variable in one direction (e.g., positively), a negative 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is revealed. This suggests that 
apologizing may have both positive and negative effects on health behaviors. This seems 
plausible, because although apologizing has documented benefits for offenders’ self-concept 
restoration (e.g., guilt and shame reduction; Witvliet et al., 2001; 2002), a recent line of work 
suggests that such benefits may also follow for offenders who refuse to apologize. Specifically, 
two studies showed that refusing to apologize increased offenders’ self-esteem, integrity, and 
power as much as offering an apology compared to a control condition (Okimoto, Wenzel, & 
Hedrick, 2013). This suggests that boundary conditions might exist to determine whether 
apologies have a positive, negative, or no effect on offenders’ restoration and potentially 
resulting health behaviors.  
It is possible, for instance, that offering an apology might not have beneficial outcomes, 
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and possibly could have detrimental outcomes when doing so does not feel like the right or most 
appropriate course of action. As available data suggest, offenders tend to regret offering an 
apology when they view their apology as insincere, undeserved, or premature (Exline et al., 
2007). In these cases, choosing not to apologize might be more beneficial for offenders than 
offering an apology, for example by bolstering their feelings of integrity and self-worth. 
Participants might have been particularly likely to experience these attitudes toward apologizing 
given that they were randomly assigned to be instructed to apologize (rather than apologize 
spontaneously). 
It is also possible that the consequences of offering an apology may depend on how well 
the apology is received by the victim. Previous research has found that offenders tend to 
experience regret after offering an apology that was rejected by the victim (Exline et al., 2007). 
Moreover, an experimental study found that imagining offering an apology that was accepted by 
one’s victim led to lower guilt and shame than an apology that was rejected (Witvliet et al., 
2002). These findings suggest that apologies met with forgiveness should be more likely to have 
beneficial consequences for offenders than apologies met with unforgiveness.  
Apologizing, further, might be mainly beneficial for public offenses that one’s victim is 
aware of (e.g., insulting one’s romantic partner during an argument) than for private offenses that 
have happened unbeknownst to the victim (e.g., having a clandestine romantic affair). Even 
though apologizing can be risky and can further damage an offenders’ social image (Ohtsubo et 
al., 2012), individuals are likely to suffer severe social consequences for committing public 
offenses that are unlikely to follow from committing private offenses, including their victim’s 
vengefulness and broader social exclusion (e.g., Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). As such, offering an 
apology for a public offense has the potential to be more beneficial than offering an apology for 
  72 
a private offense. Since the current studies included a mix of public and private offenses, it is 
possible that the potentially beneficial effects of offering an apology for public offenses were 
dampened by the inclusion of private offenses. Even though the public versus private nature of 
offenses seems to be a plausible moderator, I could not test for this in my analyses because it was 
sometimes unclear whether participants’ offenses were known to the victim (e.g., some 
participants described that they cheated on their significant other, but did not comment on 
whether their significant other knew or suspected about the cheating).  
When we specifically consider offenders’ (intended) health behaviors as an outcome of 
apologizing, there is another reason to believe that apologizing for public offenses might be 
especially important. Public offenses tend to primarily increase offenders’ shame rather than 
their guilt by directing their attention to how they may be negatively judged by others (Combs, 
Campbell, Jackson, & Smith, 2010; Smith et al., 2002; Wolf, Cohen, Panter & Insko, 2011). 
Because shame, but not guilt, has consistently been associated with a variety of unhealthful 
behaviors (e.g., Bybee et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 2005; Sanfter et al., 1995), decreasing shame 
by apologizing for public offenses may be most likely to lead to positive changes in health 
behaviors. 
Finally, research has shown that offenses with severe consequences (Hall & Fincham, 
2008) and for which offenders feel personally responsible (Fisher & Exline, 2006; Hall & 
Fincham, 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) are associated with greater guilt and shame. Although 
this suggests that intervention condition might be more likely to benefit offenders’ restoration 
and consequent health behaviors for offenses of higher (vs. lower) severity, supplementary 
analyses that tested offense severity as a potential moderator did not provide evidence for this 
(see Appendices A, B, and D).  
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5.1 CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The present research was the first to test the potential effect of apologizing on offenders’ health 
behaviors, as well as relevant psychological processes that might explain such an effect, and it 
was one of the first to test the potential effects of apologizing on offenders’ cardiovascular 
function (see Da Silva et al., 2016). This scarcity of previous research on offenders’ 
cardiovascular risk is surprising, given the presence of past research suggesting that individuals 
appear to offend others on a regular basis (Schumann, 2014). Such offenses might increase two 
known correlates of CVD risk that might be decreased through an apology, namely the persistent 
experience of negative emotions and damage to social relationships (e.g., Cohen et al., 2001; 
DeSteno et al., 2013; Fisher & Exline, 2010; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013b). Although the current 
studies do not provide clear evidence for the health benefits of apologizing, these studies take an 
important step towards examining these potential benefits and revealing that the health 
consequences of apologizing are likely complex.  
The present research also had a number of shortcomings, with the most important being 
that participants were not asked to directly apologize to their victim. This likely limited my 
ability to find evidence for perceived forgiveness effects of apologizing and may have weakened 
my ability to find consistent evidence for guilt and shame reduction effects of apologizing. In 
hindsight, it appears unlikely that writing an apology without delivering it would meaningfully 
impact one’s perceived reconciliation with the victim. In fact, the vast majority of studies that 
have previously found evidence for the benefits of apologizing asked participants to imagine 
delivering their apology or recall times that they had apologized or not (Carpenter et al., 2014; 
Meek et al., 1995; Witvliet et al., 2002; 2011).  
Another limitation of the present research is that it investigated apologies in an 
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experimental setting, which might not fully reflect real-world conflict and apology situations. For 
at least some of my participants, offering an apology may have felt insincere, undeserved or 
premature. These participants may therefore not have chosen to offer an apology to their victim 
in real life, possibly making the results of the present studies less applicable to real-world 
conflict. In an attempt to address this concern, I chose not to provide participants with specific 
instructions on how to apologize, instead leaving this up to their personal preferences. Future 
research, however, could also ask participants to indicate the extent to which an apology feels 
appropriate at the time of the study and test whether this feeling of appropriateness moderates the 
effect of the apology intervention on the studied outcomes.  
Another limitation of the present research is that it focused on offenders’ negative 
emotions to the potential neglect of positive emotions. I chose to focus on the experience of guilt 
and shame in particular because they are the most commonly studied emotions in the context of 
interpersonal offenses (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; Fisher & Exline, 2010; Leith & Baumeister, 
1990), possibly because of their obvious connection to hurting others. Yet, apologies can also 
increase positive affective states, including hope and gratitude (Witvliet et al., 2002). Positive 
and negative affective states seem to have independent effects when it comes to cardiovascular 
health outcomes (Davidson, Mostofsky, & Whang, 2010; Steptoe et al., 2005), raising the 
possibility that apologies might influence offenders’ health outcomes through a positive affect 
pathway that is independent of the negative affect pathway considered in this research. The 
present research can therefore be broadened by also considering the role of positive emotions in 
offenders’ apology process.  
The present research, finally, was also limited by the way I chose to study the potential 
effect of apologies on correlates of cardiovascular risk. I focused on cardiovascular reactivity and 
  75 
recovery because this allowed me to study the causal effect of apologies on cardiovascular 
function and might therefore offer important preliminary insights about the predictive value of 
apologizing on cardiovascular stress physiology. Yet, although heightened reactivity and slower 
recovery in response to challenges predict poorer cardiovascular health prospectively (e.g., 
preclinical atherosclerosis; Chida & Steptoe, 2010), their explanatory power is small and they 
may not represent the most plausible pathway to disease development and progression. This is 
not surprising given that atherosclerosis stems from multiple risk factors and develops over the 
span of many decades. Reactivity to a single offense is thus unlikely to start or markedly speed 
up this complex process of atherogenesis, although its effects may accumulate over time if a 
person shows exaggerated cardiovascular responses to his or her offenses, and does so often. 
Cardiovascular reactivity to events is indeed a largely trait-like, individual difference variable 
and appears to covary with greater negative emotional reactions to such events (e.g., Feldman et 
al., 1999). The results of this research may therefore be especially relevant for people who have a 
high tendency to show reactivity, offend others often, and do not constructively resolve their 
offenses.  
Future research could therefore explore additional pathways that might exist 
independently of reactivity and recovery and that might link apologies to cardiovascular health. 
For example, the frequent experience of negative emotions is predictive of future atherosclerotic 
CVD (e.g., DeSteno et al., 2013). While the field’s understanding of the exact mechanisms 
linking the experience of negative emotions to CVD is incomplete, it seems plausible that such 
emotions may, for instance, activate the central nervous system and the sympathetic-adrenal-
medullary axis in ways that induce arterial pathophysiology over time. Rather than inducing 
cardiovascular reactivity and impairing cardiovascular recovery, it is possible that persistent 
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feelings of guilt and shame for unresolved offenses might influence biological markers of 
(pre)clinical atherosclerosis at baseline. Future research, for example, could study how chronic 
feelings of guilt and shame about old unresolved offenses may relate to individuals’ blood 
pressure values at baseline, as well as to other such markers, including high density and low 
density lipoprotein cholesterol values. Or, it could study how the trait-like tendency to anticipate 
guilt and shame might relate to such baseline markers. In the present dataset, there was some 
evidence to suggest that the tendency to experience both guilt and shame was associated with 
lower systolic blood pressure at baseline. It is possible that individuals who know they are prone 
to experiencing these emotions may avoid engagement in actions that they anticipate will lead to 
feelings of guilt and shame, including hurting others (see Cohen et al., 2011). Thus, several 
possibilities could be explored in future work regarding the potential health consequences of 
hurting others. 
5.2 CONCLUSION 
The present research tested the potential effects of offering an apology on offenders’ health 
behaviors and cardiovascular function. The findings of three studies were inconclusive, 
suggesting that offering an apology might have both positive and negative consequences for 
offenders’ health outcomes. Despite the inconclusive findings presented here, it is my hope that 
this research will contribute to the growing dialogue on the link between offense resolution and 
offenders’ health. 
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6.0  FOOTNOTES 
1 Other than the study by Da Silva and colleagues (2016), one more study has previously 
attempted to test the effect of apologies on cardiovascular function (Witvliet et al., 2002). I chose 
not to discuss this study in the Introduction, because limitations of the research design make it 
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about the findings. As a measure of cardiovascular 
function, this study assessed offenders’ heart rate during and after offering an apology. No 
differences were found in participants’ heart rate compared to other conditions. The study, 
however, used a within-subjects design, with each imagery condition only lasting 16 seconds and 
each recovery period only lasting 8 seconds. This short time frame may not have been sufficient 
to allow for detailed imagery of delivering an apology. Moreover, cardiovascular effects often 
last substantially longer than a few seconds (e.g., Kamarck et al., 1992), suggesting that 
participants’ heart rate during one condition may not only have been influenced by the imagery 
of that condition, but by that of one or more preceding conditions.  
2 Participants first completed measures of their trait anger (Buss & Perry, 1992), hostility 
(Buss & Perry, 1992), and self-compassion (Neff, 2003) for exploratory purposes as well as to 
control for their potential associations with the variables in the proposed model. I will therefore 
not discuss these further, except to state that these individual difference variables did not 
moderate the associations presented in the main text and that controlling for them did not alter 
the pattern and/or statistical significance of the presented findings in any of my analyses (see 
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Figure 2).  
3 Participants also completed the other two subscales of the Differentiated Process Scale of 
Self-Forgiveness (Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013a): the genuine self-forgiveness subscale 
(measuring participants’ efforts to self-forgive in the past and present, e.g., “I have spent time 
working through my guilt”) and the pseudo self-forgiveness subscale (measuring denial of 
responsibility and victim blaming, e.g., “I feel like the other person was really to blame for what 
I did”). I decided not to use these subscales in the presented analyses, because I did not expect 
them to represent plausible mechanisms linking guilt and shame reduction to intended health 
behaviors.  
4 Before completing any of the measures listed, participants first completed measures about 
their social network characteristics (Cohen, Doyle, Skoner, Rabin, & Gwaltney, 1997), 
loneliness (Peplau & Cutrona, 1980), depressive symptomatology (Radloff, 1977), and tendency 
toward social desirability (Stober, 2001). I included these measures to test them as potential 
moderators in each analysis reported in the main text. Please see Appendix B for the results. 
Controlling for these variables did not change the reported findings on intended health behaviors. 
Controlling for these variables rendered all significant associations in the tested model for actual 
health behaviors non-significant. Finally, controlling for these variables did not change the 
reported findings on real-world apologies. 
5 It is also conceivable that intervention condition might have influenced participants’ health 
behaviors by influencing their intended health behaviors through all proposed mediators. I tested 
this possibility, but found poor model fit because intended health behaviors were correlated with 
the health behavior latent factor. I decided against implementing this model modification, 
because participants’ intended health behaviors were measured a week before their actual health 
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behaviors and would thus not theoretically belong to the same latent factor. 
6 For consistency with the analyses above, I could also have tested my model with structural 
equation modeling using either arbitrary generalized least squares as the estimation method or 
generalized least squares and robust estimators to correct for the non-normal distribution of the 
binary outcome variable (i.e., apology vs. no apology). However, such an analysis would assume 
that the underlying distribution of the binary outcome variable is continuous, as traditional 
structural equation modeling is limited to either continuous outcome variables or categorical 
outcomes with underlying continuous distributions in the population (Bentler, 2006; Kaplan, 
2009). Since this assumption was not met by my data (i.e., participants either did, or did not, 
apologize), I chose to conduct a binary logistic regression.   
7 Data were originally collected from 132 participants. However, due to an unexpected error, 
the raw data of 19 consecutive participants went missing before these could be saved on the 
computer. Six of these participants were in the apology condition, seven were in the rumination 
condition, and six were in the self-distraction condition. All data for these participants is missing, 
except for their real-world apology behavior. 
8 Participants also filled out measures about the following characteristics: trait self-
compassion (Neff, 2003), proclivity to apologize (Howell, Dopko, Turowski, & Buro, 2011), 
trait self-forgiveness (Thompson & Snyder, 2003), relational interdependence (Cross, Bacon, & 
Morris, 2000), guilt and shame proneness (Cohen et al., 2011), physical symptomatology (Cohen 
& Hoberman, 1983), perceived stress (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), and some 
general questions about their health behaviors over the past month. I included these measures for 
exploratory purposes that are not the main focus of the present study. 
9 Participants also filled out a measure about their physical symptomatology (Cohen & 
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Hoberman, 1983) and answered a number of general questions about their health behaviors since 
the occurrence of their offense. These measures were included for exploratory purposes that were 
not the focus of this paper. After the intervention, participants also filled out measures of their 
current levels of empathy for their victim, their current tendency to ruminate about their offense, 
two exploratory measures meant to capture their feelings of lightness as a proxy for self-
forgiveness, the genuine self-forgiveness and pseudo self-forgiveness subscales of the 
Differentiated Process Scale of Self-Forgiveness (Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013a), and the same 
questions about apology comprehensiveness and defensiveness as in Study 1. I included these 
measures to gain further understanding about the effects of the intervention exercises, but these 
measures were not the focus of the current study.   
10 I also repeated the reported analyses using heart period (i.e., the average time in 
milliseconds between heart beats, which is the reciprocal of HR) instead of HR and found similar 
results to the ones with HR as the outcome variable. 
11 In separate analyses, I also controlled for experimenter (myself vs. a trained female 
experimenter) and semester of data collection. Since the results did not qualitatively differ when 
controlling versus not controlling for these variables, I chose to present simplified analyses 
without these variables. In another set of separate analyses, I tested the sensitivity of the findings 
presented below by excluding participants who reported regularly taking medications known to 
affect cardiovascular function (e.g., methylphenidate; n = 4). Excluding these participants did not 
influence the patterns and statistical significance of the findings presented in the main text and I 
therefore retained these participants for added statistical power.  
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES STUDY 1 
A.1 MODERATION BY PRE-INTERVENTION LEVELS OF GUILT, SHAME, AND 
PERCEIVED VICTIM FORGIVENESS 
I conducted supplementary analyses to test whether the effects of the intervention condition on 
guilt, shame, and perceived victim forgiveness would be moderated by participants’ pre-
intervention levels of these variables. I reasoned that apologies may be especially effective in 
decreasing offenders’ negative emotions and restoring their perceived relationship with the 
victim to the extent that the offense gave rise to negative emotions and perceived damage to their 
relationship in the first place. I found limited support for these predictions.  
Specifically, I found that (a) the effect of apology versus rumination on shame was 
moderated by pre-intervention levels of shame (B = .18, z = 2.96, p = .003) and that (b) the 
effect of apology versus self-distraction on perceived victim forgiveness was moderated by pre-
intervention levels of perceived forgiveness (B = .14, z = 2.23, p = .03).  
Regarding shame, apologizing reduced shame compared to ruminating at low (B = .26, z 
= 3.25, p = .001), average (B = .43, z = 6.25, p < .001), and high (B = .61, z = 5.95, p < .001) 
levels of pre-intervention shame. Thus, apologizing decreased shame at all levels of pre-
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intervention shame, but did so especially to the extent that participants already experienced 
much shame.  
Regarding perceived victim forgiveness, I found no differences between apologizing and 
self-distraction on perceived victim forgiveness at low (B = -.12, z = -1.42, p = .16) and average 
(B = .02, z = .31, p = .76) levels of pre-intervention perceived forgiveness. However, at high 
levels of pre-intervention perceived forgiveness, apologizing led to marginally lower perceived 
victim forgiveness compared to self-distraction (B = .16, z = 1.70, p = .09). It is possible that 
when one’s relationship with the victim already feels repaired (as indicated by high levels of 
perceived victim forgiveness), offering an apology may not facilitate repairing the relationship 
any further, but may increase one’s focus on their hurtful actions and thus decrease perceived 
forgiveness. 
Because analyses yielded limited support for moderation, I chose to present simplified 
analyses while controlling for pre-intervention guilt, shame, and perceived victim forgiveness. 
A.2 MODERATION BY OFFENSE SEVERITY 
I also conducted a separate set of analyses to test whether self-rated offense severity moderated 
any of the pathways in the tested model (Figure 2). Moderation by offense severity may be 
plausible, because severe offenses tend to generate stronger negative emotions than less severe 
offenses (Riek, 2010). This suggests that apologies might be especially effective in decreasing 
guilt and shame, and thus in improving intended health behaviors, for offenses of higher rather 
than lower severity.  
Three pathways in the model were moderated by offense severity: the effect of apology 
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versus self-distraction on post-intervention levels of guilt (B = .16, z = 2.00, p = .05), the effect 
of apology versus rumination on post-intervention levels of shame (B = .15, z = 2.04, p = .04), 
and the effect of apology versus self-distraction on post-intervention levels of shame (B = .18, z 
= 2.69, p = .01). 
For offenses of high severity, apologizing led to lower guilt compared to self-distraction 
(B = .30, z = 2.60, p = .01), led to lower shame compared to rumination (B = .60, z = 6.14, p < 
.001), and led to lower shame compared to self-distraction (B = .38, z = 3.86, p < .001). For 
offenses of average severity, apologizing led to marginally lower guilt compared to self-
distraction (B = .14, z = 1.83, p = .07), led to lower shame compared to rumination (B = .45, z = 
6.70, p < .001), and led to lower shame compared to self-distraction (B = .20, z = 2.99, p = .002). 
For offenses of low severity, apologizing did not influence guilt compared to self-distraction (B = 
-.01, z = -12, p = .90), led to lower shame compared to rumination (B = .30, z = 3.05, p = .002), 
and did not influence shame compared to self-distraction (B = .02, z = .23, p = .82). 
These findings suggest that the indirect effect of apologizing versus self-distraction on 
improved intended health behaviors through decreased shame that was reported in the main text 
may only apply to offenses of average and high severity, but not low severity. However, 95% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals of these indirect effects at high, average, and low levels of 
severity based on 1,000 samples all contained the value zero: indirect effect High Severity = -.1523, 
95% CI [-.4656, .0290]; indirect effect Average Severity = -.0852, 95% CI [-.2603, .0188]; indirect 
effect Low Severity = -.0088, 95% CI [-.1356, .0935]. Controlling for offense severity did not alter 
the statistical significance and pattern of the findings presented in the main text.  
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A.3 MODERATION BY GENDER 
Next, I tested whether participants’ gender moderated any of the associations in the model shown 
in Figure 2. When testing for moderation by gender, I excluded the responses of two participants 
who did not identify as either man or woman. Moderation by gender could be plausible, as 
women are more likely to perceive their own behavior as offensive than men (Schumann & Ross, 
2010). This implies that apologies might be more effective in decreasing guilt and shame, and 
thus lead to better intended health behaviors, for women compared to men.  
Two pathways were moderated by participants’ gender: the effect of apologizing versus 
rumination on post-intervention levels of perceived victim forgiveness (B = -.31, z = -2.08, p = 
.04), such that apologizing increased perceived forgiveness for women (B = -.28, z = -2.40, p = 
.02), but not men (B = .01, z = .11, p = .91), and the association between post-intervention guilt 
and self-punishment (B = -.16, z = -2.48, p = .01), such that guilt was associated with increased 
self-punishment for men (B = .23, z = 2.86, p = .004), but not women (B = .05, z = .67, p = .50). 
Controlling for gender did not alter the statistical significance and pattern of the findings 
presented in the main text. 
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A.4 ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN APOLOGY QUALITY AND INTENDED HEALTH 
BEHAVIORS 
 
As a secondary aim, I tested whether the quality or comprehensiveness of offenders’ apologies 
was associated with their intentions to engage in healthful behaviors. In their apology, offenders 
can admit fault, assume responsibility, acknowledging the harm they caused, explain their 
actions, express regret, promise to behave better in the future, offer repair, and/or request 
forgiveness, with apologies containing more of these elements being more comprehensive 
(Schumann, 2014). Although comprehensive apologies are costly to offenders because admitting 
fault can further harm their self-image and social relationships (Ohtsubo et al., 2012; Ohtsubo & 
Watanabe, 2009; Schumann, 2014), such apologies may also benefit their restoration. As 
previous research has found, offering a comprehensive apology is associated with decreased 
negative emotions about the offense (Byrne, Barling, & Dupre, 2013) and leads to increased 
victim forgiveness in experimental settings using imagined offenses (Kirchhoff, Wagner, & 
Strack, 2012; Scher & Darley, 1997; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Forster, & Montada, 2004). If reduced 
negative emotions and (perceived) victim forgiveness are mechanisms through which apologies 
might improve intended health behaviors, this suggests that more comprehensive apologies 
might be associated with better intended health behaviors.  
To test this possibility, I asked participants in the apology condition to rate their 
apology’s comprehensiveness (using 8 items adapted from Schumann, 2014, e.g., “I expressed 
remorse about what happened” and “I accepted responsibility for what happened”; Cronbach’s α 
= .76) and defensiveness (using 4 items adapted from Schumann, 2014, e.g., “I justified my 
behavior” and “I put some of the blame of what happened on the person I hurt”; Cronbach’s α = 
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.75).  
To test the associations between apology comprehensiveness, apology defensiveness, and 
intended health behaviors, I tested the same structural equation model as in my main analyses 
(Figure 2), except that I treated apology comprehensiveness and defensiveness as predictors, 
rather than intervention condition. The data deviated from multivariate normality (z = 2.30, p = 
.02) and I therefore used scaled maximum likelihood estimators corrected for non-normality 
(Satorra & Bentler, 1988) in interpreting the results of the upcoming analyses.  
Neither apology comprehensiveness (B = .07, z = .77, p = .44) nor apology defensiveness 
(B = -.09, z = -1.52, p = .13) had a total effect on offenders’ intended health behaviors. However, 
apology comprehensiveness was associated with marginally decreased guilt (B = -.13, z = -1.98, 
p = .05), was not associated with changes in shame (B = -.10, z = -1.61, p = .11), and was 
associated with marginally greater perceived victim forgiveness (B = .16, z = 1.93, p = .05). 
Apology defensiveness was associated with marginally decreased guilt (B = -.08, z = -1.72, p = 
.09), was not associated with changes in shame (B = -.03, z = -.63, p = .53), and was not 
associated with perceived victim forgiveness (B = -.08, z = -1.39, p = .17). Perceived victim 
forgiveness, further, was associated with marginally decreased guilt (B = -.13, z = -1.87, p = .07), 
but was not associated with shame (B = -.02, z = -.23, p = .82).  
Guilt, in turn, was not associated with self-punishment (B = .18, z = 1.29, p = .20), 
whereas shame was associated with increased self-punishment (B = .53, z = 3.78, p < .001). 
Perceived victim forgiveness and apology quality also had some associations with self-
punishment independently of its associations with guilt, shame, and perceived victim 
forgiveness. While perceived victim forgiveness was associated with marginally decreased self-
punishment (B = -.17, z = -1.75, p = .08), apology comprehensiveness was associated with 
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increased self-punishment (B = .13, z = 2.15, p = .03). Apology defensiveness was not associated 
with self-punishment (B = -.04, z = -.88, p = .38).  
Self-punishment, finally, was not associated with intended health behaviors (B = -.08, z = 
-.69, p = .49) and neither perceived victim forgiveness (B = .01, z = .13, p = .90), guilt (B = .04, z 
= .32, p = .75), nor shame (B = -.16, z = -1.11, p = .27) had independent associations with 
intended health behaviors. Based on these results, there was no evidence for any indirect 
associations between apology quality and intended health behaviors. Moreover, after taking into 
all the tested mediators, apology comprehensiveness (B = .06, z = .77, p = .44) and defensiveness 
(B = -.08, z = -1.60, p = .11) were still not associated with offenders’ intended health behaviors. 
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES STUDY 2 
B.1 MODERATION BY OFFENSE SEVERITY 
As in Study 1, I conducted separate analyses to test whether self-rated offense severity 
moderated any of the pathways in the tested models (i.e., from intervention condition to intended 
health behaviors; actual health behaviors; and real-world apologies). None of the pathways were 
moderated by offense severity Controlling for offense severity and participants’ gender did not 
alter the pattern and statistical significance of the findings presented in the main text. 
B.2 MODERATION BY GENDER 
To test whether gender moderated any of the pathways in the tested models (i.e., from 
intervention condition to intended health behaviors; actual health behaviors; and real-world 
apologies), I removed two participants who had chosen “other” as their gender identity, because 
it was unknown what their preferred identity was and a sample size of two was extremely small.  
Regarding intended health behaviors, two pathways were moderated by participants’ 
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gender: the pathway between apology versus control on perceived social support (B = -.48, z = -
2.06, p = .04) and between self-forgiveness and intended health behaviors (B = -.53, z = -8.12, p 
< .001). For men, there was no effect of apology on perceived social support compared to the 
control condition (B = .11, z = .83, p = .41) and there was no association between self-
forgiveness and intended health behaviors (B = .07, z = .91, p = .36). For women, apologizing led 
to higher perceived social support compared to the control condition (B = -.30, z = -2.13, p = 
.03), but there was no association between self-forgiveness and intended health behaviors (B = -
.06, z = 1.00, p = .32). These findings suggest that two indirect pathways from intervention 
condition and intended health behaviors might exist for women (see Figure 3 and results reported 
under Study 2), namely, from apology versus control to intended health behaviors through the 
sequence of perceived social support, shame, and then self-esteem, as well as from intervention 
condition to intended health behaviors through the sequence of perceived social support and self-
esteem. However, neither of these indirect effects differed significantly from zero: indirect effect 
1 = -.0026, 95% CI [-.0099, .0017); indirect effect 2 = -.0158, 95% CI [-.0566, .0086]. 
Regarding actual health behaviors, the same two pathways as above were moderated by 
participants’ gender, as well as the pathway between participants’ shame and health behaviors (B 
= -.33, Z = -5.36, p < .001). For men, there was no effect of apology on perceived social support 
compared to the control condition (B = .24, z = 1.47, p = .14), there was a positive association 
between self-forgiveness and health behaviors (B = .38, z = 3.55, p < .001), and there was no 
association between shame and health behaviors (B = .16, z = 1.30, p = .19). For women, there 
was no effect of apology on perceived social support compared to the control condition (B = -.24, 
z = -1.43, p = .15), no association between self-forgiveness and health behaviors (B = -.01, z = -
.13, p = .90), and no association between shame and health behaviors (B = .06, z = .54, p = .59).  
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Regarding real-world apologies, only the pathway between apology versus control and 
perceived social support was moderated by participants’ gender (B = -.33, t(387) = -2.04, p = .04, 
95% CI [-.66, -.01]). There was no effect of apology versus control on perceived social support 
for men (B = -.17, t(189) = -1.42, p = .16, 95% CI [-.40, .07]) or women (B = .17, t(195) = 1.44, p 
= .15, 95% CI [-.06, .39]). Controlling for participants’ gender did not alter the pattern and 
statistical significance of the findings presented in the main text for intended health behaviors, 
actual health behaviors, or real-world apologies. 
B.3 MODERATION BY OFFENSE TIMEFRAME 
Against expectations, I found no evidence to suggest that apologizing predicted changes in 
(intended) health behaviors through changes in guilt, shame, perceived social support, and 
subsequent changes in emotion regulation, self-esteem, and self-forgiveness. However, I 
specified no particular timeframe for the offense in an attempt to recruit participants with 
offenses that would be sufficiently severe and, thus, for whom apologizing would be especially 
beneficial. 
The timing of the offense might be important and apologizing might perhaps be more 
beneficial for relatively recent as opposed to distant offenses. For recent offenses, transgressors 
might still be in the process of finding a way to make amends for their offenses. Allowing them 
to apologize might thus be beneficial for decreasing their negative emotions about the offense 
and remove their inhibitions to actually apologize. For offenses that occurred longer ago, 
however, transgressors might have already found closure and accepted their negative actions. It 
is possible that mentally revisiting the offense and asking them to face their victim and apologize 
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might lead to a renewed increase in feelings of guilt and shame and might thus be as distressing 
as, for example, ruminating about the offense.  
To test this possibility, I repeated the analyses on intended and actual health behaviors 
that were reported in the main text by using the timing of the offense as a potential moderator 
between intervention condition and the variables that followed (i.e., guilt, shame, and perceived 
social support for intended health behaviors and guilt, shame, perceived social support, emotion 
regulation, self-esteem, and self-forgiveness for actual health behaviors). Timing of the offense 
was measured by asking participants to choose when the offense had happened from a list of 
timeframes (During the past week/During the past month/During the past three months/During 
the past six months/During the past year/Longer than a year ago). Because relatively few 
participants reported an offense in the three most recent categories (n Past week = 12; n Past month = 
41; n Past three months = 46), I collapsed them into a single category for offenses that had happened 
during the past three months (n Three months = 99; n Six months = 67; n One year = 110; n Longer than a year ago 
= 325). In my analyses, I dummy-coded offense timeframe and used the three-month timeframe 
as the reference condition, because Studies 1 and 2 involved offenses with a recent timeframe. 
Regarding intended health behaviors, one pathway was moderated, such that the effect of 
apology versus control on guilt depended on whether participants’ offense was very recent (< 3 
months) or older (> 1 year), B = - .64, z = -2.23, p = .003. For offenses that had happened within 
the past three months, apologizing led to marginally lower guilt compared to the control 
condition (B = .51, z = 1.93, p = .05). For offenses that had happened longer than a year ago, 
apologizing did not affect guilt compared to the control condition (B = -.13, z = -1.11, p = .27).  
Further, for offenses that had had happened within the past three months, guilt was 
associated with decreased self-esteem (B = -.38, z = -2.18, p = .03) and decreased self-
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forgiveness (B = -.60, z = -3.78, p < 001). Of these two variables, self-esteem was associated 
with better intended health behaviors (B = .31, z = 4.80, p < .001), while self-forgiveness was not 
associated with intended health behaviors (B = .03, z = .52, p = .60). After taking into account 
intervention condition and all tested mediators, however, guilt was also directly associated with 
better intended health behaviors (B = .39, z = 3.26, p = .001). This suggests that apologizing 
might indirectly both improve (through decreasing guilt and subsequently increasing self-esteem) 
and harm (through decreasing guilt) offenders’ intended health behaviors compared to control. 
To test these possibilities, I therefore calculated the following two indirect pathways and tested 
their significance by calculating 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for each effect, based on 
1,000 samples: (1) from apologizing versus control to intended health behaviors through 
decreased guilt and subsequently increased self-esteem; and (2) from apologizing versus control 
to intended health behaviors through decreased guilt. Neither of these indirect effects were 
statistically significant: indirect effect 1 = -.0603 (95% CI [-.1706, .0050]); indirect effect 2 = 
.1973 (95% CI [-.0031, .4692]) Both effects, however, were marginally significant: 90% CI 
indirect effect 1 [-.1444, -.0021]; 90% CI indirect effect 2 [.0335, .4244]. Thus, there was some 
suggestive evidence for both positive and negative effects from intervention condition to 
intended health behaviors for relatively recent offenses (specifically, offenses that happened 
within three months prior to the apology intervention) compared to control. 
Regarding actual health behaviors, three pathways were moderated. First, the effect of 
apology versus control on guilt depended on whether participants’ offense had happened within 
the past three months or the past year, B = -.85, z = -2.10, p = .04. For offenses that had 
happened within the past three months, apologizing led to marginally lower guilt compared to 
the control condition (B = .65, z = 1.96, p = .05). For offenses that had happened within the past 
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year, apologizing did not affect guilt compared to the control condition (B = -.21, z = -.83, p = 
.41). Second, the effect of apology versus control on guilt depended on whether participants’ 
offense had happened within the past three months or longer than a year ago, B = -.76, z = -2.14, 
p = .03. For offenses that had happened within the past three months, apologizing led to 
marginally lower guilt compared to the control condition (B = .65). For offenses that had 
happened longer than a year ago, apologizing did not affect guilt compared to the control 
condition (B = -.23, z = -1.24, p = .22). Third, the effect of apology versus rumination on self-
forgiveness depended on whether participants’ offense had happened within the past three 
months or within the past year, B = 1.29, z = 2.34, p = .02. For offenses that had happened within 
the past three months, apologizing did not affect self-forgiveness compared to rumination (B = -
.09, z = -.19, p = .85). For offenses that had happened within the past year, apologizing led to 
lower self-forgiveness compared to rumination (B = 1.11, z = 2.98, p = .003).   
These findings suggest two possible indirect effects from intervention condition to health 
behaviors; one within the three-month timeframe (through guilt) and one within the one-year 
timeframe (through self-forgiveness). Within the three-month timeframe, guilt was associated 
with better health behaviors (B = .63, z = 2.84, p = .01), while within the one-year timeframe, 
self-forgiveness was not associated with health behaviors (B = .08, z = .77, p = .44). I therefore 
only tested the significance of the indirect effect from apology versus control to health behaviors 
through guilt within the three-month timeframe by calculating a 95% bootstrapped confidence 
interval based on 1,000 samples. The indirect effect (.3808) was not significant, (95% CI [-.0140, 
1.0277]), but was marginally significant (90% CI [.0201, .8854]). Thus, there was some evidence 
to suggest that apologizing might lead to worse health behaviors compared to control for 
offenses that happened recently (specifically, within three months of the apology intervention) 
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by decreasing offenders’ guilt.  
Regarding real-world apologies, the same three pathways were moderated as for actual 
health behaviors (please refer to two paragraphs above for details). As for actual health 
behaviors, this suggests two possible indirect effects from intervention condition to real-world 
apologies; one indirect effect within the three-month timeframe (through guilt) and one indirect 
effect within the one-year timeframe (through self-forgiveness). Within the three-month 
timeframe, guilt was not associated with likelihood of offering an apology (B = -.94, χ2 (1) = 
1.92, p = .17, exp(B) = .39, 95% CI exp(B) [.10, 1.48]), while within the one-year timeframe, 
self-forgiveness was associated with marginally greater likelihood of offering an apology (B = 
.66, χ2 (1) = 2.87, p = .09, exp(B) = 1.94, 95% CI exp(B) [.90, 4.19]). I therefore tested the 
significance of the indirect effect from apology versus rumination to likelihood of offering an 
apology through self-forgiveness. To do so, I used the methods outlined by Iacobucci (2012) by 
calculating a z-statistic from the ordinary least squares regression equation used to predict self-
forgiveness from intervention condition as well as from the logistic regression equation to 
predict likelihood of offering an apology from self-forgiveness and the other mediators after 
controlling for intervention condition, z = 1.43, p = .15. Thus, changes in self-forgiveness did not 
mediate the link between apology versus control and likelihood of offering an apology within the 
one-year timeframe. 
Moreover, the total effect of intervention condition on likelihood apologizing was also 
moderated by the timeframe of the offense. Specifically, the effect of apologizing compared to 
rumination and control depended on whether the offense had happened within the past three 
months or longer than a year ago (B Apology versus Rumination = 1.95, χ2 (1) = 9.67, p = .002, exp(B) = 
7.00, 95% CI exp(B) [2.06, 23.84]; B Apology versus Control = 1.52, χ2 (1) = 6.93, p = .01, exp(B) = 
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4.58, 95% CI exp(B) [1.48, 14.22]). For offenses that had happened within the past three months, 
the apology condition led to a marginally higher likelihood of offering an apology compared to 
rumination (B = 1.36, χ2 (1) = 3.82, p = .05, exp(B) = 3.90, 95% CI exp(B) [1.00, 15.28]) and to 
four times the likelihood of offering an apology compared to the control condition (B = 1.53, χ2 
(1) = 5.20, p = .02, exp(B) = 4.62, 95% CI exp(B) [1.24, 17.23]). For offenses that happened 
longer than a year ago, the apology condition led to a marginally higher likelihood of offering an 
apology compared to rumination (B = .88, χ2 (1) = 2.96, p = .09, exp(B) = 2.40, 95% CI exp(B) 
[.89, 6.51]), but not the control condition (B = .62, χ2 (1) = 1.63, p = .20, exp(B) = 1.86, 95% CI 
exp(B) [.72, 4.83]). 
B.4 MODERATION BY SOCIAL NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
Finally, I tested participants’ social network characteristics (specifically, their social network 
size and diversity) and their feelings of loneliness as potential moderators for the effect of 
intervention condition on perceived social support in each of the three models reported in the 
main text (i.e., with intended health behaviors, actual health behaviors, and real-world apologies 
as outcomes). I did this because engaging in a prosocial behavior such as apologizing might be 
especially effective for increasing perceived social support to the extent that one is currently 
feeling lonely or less integrated. Neither of these three variables moderated the effect of 
intervention condition on perceived social support.  
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APPENDIX C 
PILOT STUDY TO ESTABLISH ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR STUDY 3 
The goal of the pilot study was to establish an important eligibility criterion for the laboratory 
study, so that data collection for the laboratory study could proceed as efficiently as possible. 
Specifically, I wanted to identify a specific timeframe in which participants must have 
committed an offense to be eligible for the laboratory study. Participants were therefore 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions, in which they either indicated whether they had 
committed an interpersonal offense within the past 7, 14, or 30 days. I chose these relatively 
recent timeframes, because I reasoned that participants may not have been as likely to have 
offered an apology to their victim compared to offenses that had happened longer ago. If 
participants had committed an offense, they answered a number of follow-up questions, 
including whether they had apologized to the person they hurt. By comparing among 
participants’ responses on these questions as predicted by the indicated timeframe, my goal was 
to identify a population of offenders that was likely to (a) have committed an interpersonal 
offense, (b) have not apologized to their victim, (c) have low difficulty recalling the offense, (d) 
experience much regret for the offense, and (e) perceive their offense as severe. I chose the first 
three criteria to maximize the number of participants that would be eligible for the laboratory 
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study, while I chose the last two to maximize the relevance of the apology intervention. For 
example, offering an apology may lead to greater decreases in guilt and shame for participants 
who experience much rather than little regret for their actions. 
C.1 PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Three hundred participants (160 males; 139 females; 1 who identified with a different gender) 
from the United States completed our pilot study in exchange for $.25 through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk.  
Participants were between 19 and 75 years old with a mean age of 34.22 years (SD = 
10.32) and were from 43 states. Most participants were born in the United States (n = 290) or 
Canada (n = 2) and some were born in a different country (n = 8). The majority of the 
participants were Christian (n = 105), followed by agnostic (n = 88), atheist (n = 70), Buddhist (n 
= 3), Hindu (n = 3), Jewish (n = 2), Muslim (n = 1), or identified with a different religion (n = 
28). Finally, most participants were Caucasian (n = 246), followed by Asian (n = 27), African 
American (n = 23), American Indian or Alaskan Native (n = 2), and Native Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander (n = 2).  
C.2 MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES 
Three hundred participants (160 males; 139 females; 1 who identified with a different gender) 
from the United States completed our pilot study in exchange for $.25 through Amazon’s 
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Mechanical Turk.  
Participants were between 19 and 75 years old with a mean age of 34.22 years (SD = 
10.32) and were from 43 states. Most participants were born in the United States (n = 290) or 
Canada (n = 2) and some were born in a different country (n = 8). The majority of the 
participants were Christian (n = 105), followed by agnostic (n = 88), atheist (n = 70), Buddhist (n 
= 3), Hindu (n = 3), Jewish (n = 2), Muslim (n = 1), or identified with a different religion (n = 
28). Finally, most participants were Caucasian (n = 246), followed by Asian (n = 27), African 
American (n = 23), American Indian or Alaskan Native (n = 2), and Native Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander (n = 2).  
C.3 RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics for all analyzed variables are displayed in Table 15. First, I conducted a 
binary logistic regression to test whether the percentage of participants who had committed an 
interpersonal offense differed depending on whether the offense had happened within the past 7, 
14, or 30 days. Experimental condition was dummy coded into two variables, with the 14-day 
condition serving as the reference condition. The likelihood of having committed an offense was 
not significantly predicted by experimental condition (χ2 (2) = .86, p = .65, Negelkerke R2 = 
.004). No significant differences were found in the likelihood of having committed an offense 
within the past 7 versus 14 days (B = .07, χ2 (1) = .05, p = .82, exp(B) = 1.07, 95% CI exp(B) 
[.58; 1.99]) or within the past 30 versus 14 days (B = -.21, χ2 (1) = .47, p = .49, exp(B) = .81, 
95% CI exp(B) [.44; 1.49]). 
Next, I looked at participants who reported that they had committed an offense (28.00% 
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of the overall sample). Most offenses had happened against friends (27.4%) and family members 
(27.4%), followed by romantic partners (25%), work colleagues (10.7%), strangers (4.8%), 
acquaintances (2.4%), or someone else (2.4%). Regarding type of offense, most participants 
classified their offense as an insult (48.8%), fight or argument (34.5%), betrayal of trust (14.3%), 
rejection of exclusion (11.9%), an act of selfishness (7.1%), infidelity (2.4%), ending a 
relationship (3.6%), failing an obligation (1.2%), physical violence (1.2%), or something else 
(2.4%).  
I first tested whether the likelihood of having apologized differed based on experimental 
condition by conducting a binary logistic regression with apology (yes/no) as the outcome 
variable and experimental condition as the predictor. As in the analyses above, I dummy-coded 
experimental condition into two variables, with the 14-day condition as the reference condition. 
Likelihood of having apologized was marginally predicted by experimental condition (χ2 (2) = 
5.47, p = .07, Negelkerke R2 = .09). Participants in the 7-day versus 14-day condition marginally 
differed in their likelihood of having apologized, such that participants in the 7-day condition 
had been 60% more likely to apologize than in the 14-day condition (B = -.93, χ2 (1) = 2.59, p = 
.11, exp(B) = .40, 95% CI exp(B) [.13; 1.22]). Participants in the 30-day condition had been 72% 
more likely to apologize than in the 14-day condition (B = -1.28, χ2 (1) = 4.67, p = .03, exp(B) = 
.28, 95% CI exp(B) [.09; .89]). 
Finally, I tested for potential differences among difficulty of recalling the offense, 
perceived severity of the offense, and regret about the offense. I therefore conducted a one-way 
MANOVA with experimental condition serving as the independent variable and difficulty of 
recall, perceived severity, and regret as the dependent variables. I chose to conduct a MANOVA 
rather than univariate analyses because some, if not all, of these variables may be theoretically 
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related. For example, if a person perceives his or her offense to be severe, (s)he may feel more 
regret as a result and also be more likely to remember the offense. Analyses showed no 
significant multivariate differences based on participants’ experimental condition, Wilk’s λ = .95, 
F(6, 158) = .49, p = .64, η2p = .03. Indeed, univariate tests revealed no significant differences in 
difficulty of recall (F(2, 81) = .35, p = .70, η2p = .01), perceived severity (F(2, 81) = 1.15, p = 
.32, η2p = .03), and regret (F(2, 81) = .96, p = .39, η2p = .03) among the experimental conditions. 
Because neither the multivariate nor the subsequent univariate tests were significant, I did not 
conduct any follow-up tests (e.g., simple contrasts).  
 Based on the results of the pilot study, I decided that people would be eligible to 
participate in the laboratory study if they had committed an offense within the past 14 days. This 
decision was based on the finding that this group of participants was the least likely to have 
offered an apology, suggesting that this timeframe may yield a relatively large pool of 
participants to recruit from for the laboratory study. Since I found no evidence to suggest that the 
likelihood of having committed an offense differed based on when the offense was committed (7, 
14, or 30 days ago), nor that important offense characteristics, such as feelings of regret, differed 
based on when the offense was committed, these variables did not influence my decision to 
select the 14-day timeframe as the eligibility criterion for the laboratory study. 
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APPENDIX D 
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES STUDY 3 
D.1 MODERATION BY OFFENSE SEVERITY 
I separately tested whether self-rated offense severity moderated any of the pathways between 
intervention condition and intended health behaviors. However, no pathways were moderated by 
offense severity. 
D.2 MODERATION BY GENDER 
I also tested whether participants’ gender moderated any of the pathways between intervention 
condition and intended health behaviors. Three pathways were moderated: the pathways between 
perceived victim forgiveness and shame (B = -.21, z = -2.10, p = .04), between guilt and self-
punishment (B = -.23, z = -3.02, p = .03), and between shame and intended health behaviors (B = 
.50, z = 3.43, p < .001). For men, perceived victim forgiveness was associated with marginally 
decreased shame (B = -.13, z = -1.92, p = .06); for women, perceived victim forgiveness was 
associated with decreased shame (B = -.21, z = -4.12, p < .001). For both men (B = .47, z = 4.47, 
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p < .001) and women (B = .28, z = 2.52, p = .01), guilt was associated with increased self-
punishment. However, shame was associated with worse intended health behaviors for men (B = 
-.62, z = -2.45, p = .01), but not women (B = -.01, z = -.05, p = .96). 
D.3 ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN APOLOGY QUALITY AND INTENDED HEALTH 
BEHAVIORS 
As in Study 1, I asked participants in the apology condition to rate their apology’s 
comprehensiveness (Cronbach’s α = .50) and defensiveness (Cronbach’s α = .72). I further 
examined the low reliability of the comprehensiveness items and it appears that one item in 
particular had inconsistent correlations with other items (“I explained my behavior without 
attributing it to external factors”), with inter-item correlations between this and other items 
ranging between -.23 and .45. Even if this item were to be deleted, the scale’s reliability would 
still be below what is considered acceptable, with Cronbach’s alpha increasing to .58. I therefore 
only focused on apology defensiveness in my analyses and used defensiveness to predict 
intended health behaviors through the same sequence of mediators examined in my main 
analyses (see Figure 5).   
Apology defensiveness had a marginally significant total effect on intended health 
behaviors, with defensiveness being associated with marginally worse intended health behaviors 
(B = -.14, z = -1.72, p = .09). Apology defensiveness was not associated with guilt (B = -.07, z = 
-.78, p = .44), shame (B = -.07, z = -.80, p = .43), or perceived victim forgiveness (B = -.25, z = -
1.15, p = .25). Perceived victim forgiveness, however, was associated with decreased guilt (B = -
.37, z = -5.50, p < .001) and shame (B = -.33, z = -5.04, p < .001). Guilt, further, was associated 
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with marginally greater self-punishment (B = .50, z = 1.91, p = .06), while shame was associated 
with greater self-punishment (B = .57, z = 2.10, p = .04). Apology defensiveness (B = -.04, z = -
.37, p = .71) and perceived victim forgiveness (B = -.06, z = -.57, p = .57) did not have 
independent associations with self-punishment. Self-punishment, in turn, was not associated with 
intended health behaviors (B = .07, z = .46, p = .65). Shame, however, was independently and 
negatively associated with intended health behaviors (B = -.47, z = -1.98, p = .05), while guilt (B 
= .34 z = 1.50, p = .13) and perceived victim forgiveness (B = -.03, z = -.38, p = .70) were not. 
Based on these results, there was no evidence for any indirect associations between apology 
defensiveness and intended health behaviors. Moreover, after taking into all mediators, apology 
defensiveness was not associated with intended health behaviors (B = -.08, z = -1.60, p = .11).  
D.4 THE EFFECT OF INTERVENTION CONDITION ON CARDIOVASCULAR 
RECOVERY THROUGH GUILT, SHAME, AND PERCEIVED VICTIM 
FORGIVENESS 
Next, I conducted a set of exploratory analyses on the effect of intervention condition on 
cardiovascular recovery. In the Introduction, I reasoned that apologizing might improve 
cardiovascular recovery by reducing offenders’ negative emotions either directly or indirectly by 
increasing perceived forgiveness from their victim. Even though I measured offenders’ negative 
emotions and perceived victim forgiveness after assessing cardiovascular recovery to obtain a 
more accurate estimate of cardiovascular recovery, testing a model with negative emotions and 
perceived forgiveness as mediators might be informative by showing the potential associations 
between these variables and cardiovascular recovery after controlling for intervention condition. 
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I therefore explored this possibility by testing a similar, fully saturated path model as in my main 
analyses in which intervention condition predicted guilt and shame directly and indirectly 
through perceived victim forgiveness. Guilt, shame, and perceived victim forgiveness, in turn, 
predicted cardiovascular recovery. In this model, I controlled for participants’ age, gender, BMI, 
race, time of day that the laboratory visit took place, trait anger, and trait hostility. In this model, 
I did not include self-punishment as a potential mediator, because no obvious reason exists to 
expect a tendency toward self-punishment to affect cardiovascular function. I allowed the 
residuals of guilt and shame to covary, as well as the residuals of HR, SBP, and DBP.  
The normalized estimate of Mardia’s coefficient indicated deviations from multivariate 
normality (z = 7.23, p < .001) and I therefore used scaled maximum likelihood estimators 
corrected for non-normality to interpret all results (Satorra & Bentler, 1988). Apologizing had a 
total effect on HR recovery compared to rumination (B = .66, z = 2.94, p = .003), with 
apologizing leading to better HR recovery than rumination, but not self-distraction (B = -.09, z = 
-.39, p = .70). Apologizing did not have a total effect on SBP recovery compared to rumination 
(B = -.26, z = -1.13, p = .26), but led to marginally worse SBP recovery compared to self-
distraction (B = -.38, z = -1.65, p = .10). Apologizing did not have a total effect on DBP recovery 
compared to rumination (B = -.32, z = -1.38, p = .17), but led to worse DBP recovery compared 
to self-distraction (B = -.49, z = -2.09, p = .04). 
Apologizing did not influence guilt (B Apology vs. Rumination = .27, z = .71, p = .48; B Apology vs. 
Self-Distraction = .59, z = 1.59, p = .11) or shame (B Apology vs. Rumination = .06, z = .38, p = .70; B Apology 
vs. Self-Distraction = -.14, z = -.90, p = .37). Apologizing also did not influence perceived victim 
forgiveness compared to rumination (B = -.17, z = -1.59, p = .11), but led to marginally greater 
perceived forgiveness compared to self-distraction (B = -.18, z = -1.64, p = .10). Perceived victim 
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forgiveness was not associated with guilt (B = .17, z = .50, p = .62) or shame (B = .16, z = 1.12, p 
= .26). After controlling for intervention condition, guilt was not associated with HR recovery (B 
= -.01, z = -.23, p = .82), but was associated with worse SBP recovery (B = .12, z = 2.03, p = .04) 
and worse DBP recovery (B = .19, z = 3.20, p = .001). Shame was not associated with HR 
recovery (B = -.02, z = -.13, p = .90), SBP recovery (B = .004, z = .03, p = .98), or DBP recovery 
(B = -.01, z = -.09, p = .93). Perceived victim forgiveness, moreover, was not independently 
associated with HR recovery (B = .06, z = .29, p = .77), SBP recovery (B = -.02, z = -.08, p = 
.94), or DBP recovery (B = .12, z = .61, p = .54). 
Based on these findings, there was no evidence for any indirect effects of intervention 
condition on HR recovery, SBP recovery, or DBP recovery. Further, after controlling for all 
mediators, apologizing still led to better HR recovery compared to rumination (B = .68, z = 2.96, 
p = .003), but not self-distraction (B = -.07, z = -.31, p = .76). Apologizing also still did not 
influence SBP recovery compared to rumination (B = -.29, z = -1.27, p = .20), but led to 
marginally worse SBP recovery compared to self-distraction (B = -.45, z = -1.94, p = .05). 
Finally, apologizing still did not influence DBP recovery compared to rumination (B = -.35, z = -
1.53, p = .13), but led to worse DBP recovery compared to self-distraction (B = -.58, z = -2.52, p 
= .01). 
D.5 MODERATION BY TRAIT WILLINGNESS TO APOLOGIZE, TRAIT SELF-
FORGIVENESS, TRAIT RELATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE, TRAIT GUILT-
PRONENESS, AND TRAIT SHAME-PRONENESS  
I finally tested whether certain personality variables moderated any of the tested effects in the 
  106 
main text regarding the effects of intervention condition on intended health behaviors, likelihood 
of offering a real-world apology, and cardiovascular reactivity and recovery. I specifically tested 
trait willingness to apologize, trait self-forgiveness, trait relational interdependence (i.e., the 
extent to which a person defines themselves based on their close relationships with other people), 
and guilt and shame proneness (measured, respectively, as the tendency to negatively evaluate 
one’s behavior in response to private offenses only known to oneself and the tendency to 
negatively evaluate oneself in response to public offenses known by others; Cohen et al., 2011). 
These variables might be plausible moderators for several reasons. For instance, the 
apology intervention might be most powerful in reducing negative emotions, increasing victim 
forgiveness, and increasing real-world apologies for people with a low (vs. high) tendency to 
apologize for their mistakes, low (vs. high) trait self-forgiveness, high (vs. low) relational 
interdependence, and high (vs. low) in guilt and shame proneness.  For instance, people with a 
low tendency to apologize for their mistakes might not be accustomed to experiencing the 
positive consequences of offering an apologize, including a repaired self-concept (Fisher & 
Exline, 2010), and asking them to complete the apology intervention might therefore be 
especially beneficial for them. People with low trait self-forgiveness, moreover, should not be 
quick to unconditionally forgive their mistakes and may need to engage in reparative action 
before they can experience a reduction in their negative emotions and an increase in perceived 
forgiveness, including offering an apology. People high in relational interdependence, further, 
should place much value in maintaining and repairing their social relationships and engaging in 
an act of relationship repair by offering an apology may therefore be especially likely to decrease 
negative emotions and increase perceived forgiveness for these people. Finally, people high in 
guilt and shame proneness may experience a greater reduction in negative emotions and an 
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increase in perceived forgiveness because they may be more likely to experience guilt and shame 
in response to their offense in their first place. Because these personality variables might further 
augment the emotional consequences of offering an apology, they might also have consequences 
for people’s cardiovascular function.  
Against expectations, I found no evidence to suggest that any of these variables 
moderated any of the pathways in the model testing the effect of intervention condition on 
intended health behaviors (Figure 5). Moreover, I found no evidence to suggest that any of these 
variables moderated the effect of intervention condition on likelihood of offering a real-world 
apology. Finally, relational interdependence moderated the effects of apology versus self-
distraction on HR reactivity (B = .46, t(92) = 2.10, p = .04, 95% CI [.03, .90]) or SBP recovery 
(B = .46, t(92) = 2.15, p = .03, 95% CI [.04, .89]).  
At high levels of relational interdependence, apologizing led to marginally lower HR 
reactivity compared to self-distraction (B = .62, t(92) = 1.74, p = .09, 95% CI [-.09, 1.33]), but 
did not influence SBP recovery compared to self-distraction (B = .11, t(92) = .30, p = .76, 95% 
CI [-.59, .80]). At average levels of relational interdependence, apologizing did not lead to 
differences in HR reactivity (B = .16, t(92) = .62, p = .54, 95% CI [-.35, .68]) or SBP recovery (B 
= -.36, t(92) = -1.41, p = .16, 95% CI [-.86, .15]) compared to self-distraction. At low levels of 
relational interdependence, apologizing did not influence HR reactivity compared to self-
distraction (B = -.30, t(92) = -.94, p = .35, 95% CI [-.94, .34]), but led to worse SBP recovery 
compared to self-distraction (B = -.82, t(92) = -2.61, p = .01, 95% CI [-1.44, -.20]). Thus, there 
was some evidence to suggest that apologizing was more beneficial for offenders’ cardiovascular 
function to the extent that were high (vs. low) in relational interdependence. 
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APPENDIX E 
TABLES 
Table 1E 
Correlations and descriptive statistics of all variables at pre-intervention (Study 1). 
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Table 2E 
Correlations and descriptive statistics of all variables at post-intervention (Study 1). 
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Table 3E 
Descriptive statistics of all variables, per intervention condition (Study 1). 
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Table 4E 
Sample variance-covariance matrix (Study 1). 
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Table 5E 
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Table 6E 
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Table 7E 
Sample variance-covariance matrix used to test the effect of intervention condition on intended 
health behaviors (Study 2).   
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Table 8E 
Sample variance-covariance matrix used to test the effect of intervention condition on actual 
health behaviors (Study 2).   
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Table 9E 
Correlations and descriptive statistics of all self-reported continuous variables (Study 3). 
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Table 10E 
Descriptive statistics of all variables per intervention condition (Study 3). 
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Table 11E 
Sample variance-covariance matrix used to test the effects of intervention condition on intended 
health behaviors (Study 3). 
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Table 12E 
Correlations between all cardiovascular variables (Study 3).  
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Table 13E 
Descriptive statistics of all cardiovascular variables, per intervention condition (Study 3).  
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Table 14E 
Unstandardized coefficients from regression models predicting cardiovascular reactivity and 
recovery (Study 3). 
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Table 15E 
Descriptive statistics of each outcome variable based on experimental condition (Pilot study, 
Appendix C). 
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APPENDIX F 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1F. Proposed theoretical model through which apologies were expected to influence 
health behaviors and cardiovascular function. 
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Figure 2F. Path model tested in Study 1. The dashed line represents an unanticipated pathway 
that mediated the effect between intervention condition and intended health behaviors. †p <.10; 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.    
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Figure 3F. Structural equation model tested in Study 2 on the effect of intervention condition on 
intended health behaviors. †p <.10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.    
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Figure 4F. Structural equation model tested in Study 2 on the effect of intervention condition on 
health behaviors. †p <.10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.    
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Figure 5F. Path model tested in Study 3 on the effect of intervention condition on intended 
health behaviors. †p <.10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.    
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Figure 6F. SBP reactivity in units of mmHg change from baseline, displayed by intervention 
condition. Standard errors are represented by the error bars. 
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Figure 7F. HR recovery in units of beats per minute change from baseline, displayed by 
intervention condition. Standard errors are represented by the error bars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  130 
 
Figure 8F. SBP recovery in units of mmHg change from baseline, displayed by intervention 
condition. Standard errors are represented by the error bars. 
  131 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adriaanse, M. A., Vinkers, C. D., De Ridder, D. T., Hox, J. J., & De Wit, J. B. (2011). Do 
implementation intentions help to eat a healthy diet? A systematic review and meta-
analysis of the empirical evidence. Appetite, 56(1), 183-193. 
Anderson, J. C., Linden, W., & Habra, M. E. (2006). Influence of apologies and trait hostility on 
recovery from anger. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 29(4), 347-358. 
Angerer, P., Siebert, U., Kothny, W., Mühlbauer, D., Mudra, H., & von Schacky, C. (2000). 
Impact of social support, cynical hostility and anger expression on progression of 
coronary atherosclerosis. Journal of the American College of Cardiology, 36(6), 1781-
1788. 
Ayas, N. T., White, D. P., Manson, J. E., Stampfer, M. J., Speizer, F. E., Malhotra, A., & Hu, F. 
B. (2003). A prospective study of sleep duration and coronary heart disease in 
women. Archives of internal medicine, 163(2), 205-209. 
Baer, R. A., Fischer, S., & Huss, D. B. (2005). Mindfulness and acceptance in the treatment of 
disordered eating. Journal of rational-emotive and cognitive-behavior therapy, 23(4), 
281-300. 
Baikie, K. A., & Wilhelm, K. (2005). Emotional and physical health benefits of expressive 
writing. Advances in psychiatric treatment, 11(5), 338-346. 
Barber, L., Maltby, J., & Macaskill, A. (2005). Angry memories and thoughts of revenge: The 
relationship between forgiveness and anger rumination. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 39(2), 253-262. 
Barkan, E., & Karn, A. (2006). Taking wrongs seriously: apologies and reconciliation. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 
Barkat, J. (2002). The effect of unilateral conciliatory initiatives on negotiation ripeness in 
seemingly intractable conflicts. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). Losing control: How and why people 
fail at self-regulation. California, CA: Academic press. 
  132 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: an interpersonal 
approach. Psychological bulletin, 115(2), 243-267. 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1995). Personal narratives about guilt: 
Role in action control and interpersonal relationships. Basic and applied social 
psychology, 17(1-2), 173-198. 
Bentler, P.M. (2006). EQS 6 Structural Equations Program Manual. Encino, CA: Multivariate 
Software, Inc.  
Berkman, L. F., Glass, T., Brissette, I., & Seeman, T. E. (2000). From social integration to 
health: Durkheim in the new millennium. Social science & medicine, 51(6), 843-857. 
Berkman, L. F., Leo-Summers, L., & Horwitz, R. I. (1992). Emotional support and survival after 
myocardial infarction. Annals of Internal Medicine, 117(12), 1003-1009. 
Berkman, L. F., & Syme, S. L. (1979). Social networks, host resistance, and mortality: a nine-
year follow-up study of Alameda County residents. American journal of 
Epidemiology, 109(2), 186-204. 
Bernard, H. R., Killworth, P., Kronenfeld, D., & Sailer, L. (1984). The problem of informant 
accuracy: The validity of retrospective data. Annual review of anthropology, 13(1), 495-
517. 
Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J. T., & Quigley, K. S. (1993). Cardiac psychophysiology and 
autonomic space in humans: empirical perspectives and conceptual 
implications. Psychological bulletin, 114(2), 296-322. 
Bland, S. H., Krogh, V., Winkelstein, W., & Trevisan, M. (1991). Social network and blood 
pressure: a population study. Psychosomatic medicine, 53(6), 598-607. 
Bottom, W. P., Gibson, K., Daniels, S. E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). When talk is not cheap: 
Substantive penance and expressions of intent in rebuilding cooperation. Organization 
Science, 13(5), 497-513. 
Brindle, R. C., Ginty, A. T., Jones, A., Phillips, A. C., Roseboom, T. J., Carroll, D., ... & de 
Rooij, S. R. (2016). Cardiovascular reactivity patterns and pathways to hypertension: a 
multivariate cluster analysis. Journal of human hypertension, 30(12), 755-760. 
Brondolo, E., Karlin, W., Alexander, K., Bobrow, A., & Schwartz, J. (1999). Workday 
communication and ambulatory blood pressure: Implications for the reactivity 
hypothesis. Psychophysiology, 36(1), 86-94. 
Brondolo, E., Rieppi, R., Erickson, S. A., Bagiella, E., Shapiro, P. A., McKinley, P., & Sloan, R. 
P. (2003). Hostility, interpersonal interactions, and ambulatory blood 
pressure. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65(6), 1003-1011. 
  133 
Brown, G. W., Andrews, B., Harris, T., Adler, Z., & Bridge, L. (1986). Social support, self-
esteem and depression. Psychological medicine, 16(4), 813-831. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new source 
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on psychological science, 6(1), 3-5. 
Buss, A. H., & Perry, M. (1992). The aggression questionnaire. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 63(3), 452-459. 
Bybee, J., Zigler, E., Berliner, D., & Merisca, R. (1996). Guilt, guilt-evoking events, depression, 
and eating disorders. Current Psychology, 15(2), 113-127. 
Byrne, A., Barling, J., & Dupré, K. E. (2014). Leader apologies and employee and leader well-
being. Journal of business ethics, 121(1), 91-106. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Hawkley, L. C., Crawford, L. E., Ernst, J. M., Burleson, M. H., Kowalewski, R. 
B., ... & Berntson, G. G. (2002). Loneliness and health: Potential 
mechanisms. Psychosomatic Medicine, 64(3), 407-417. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Tassinary, L. G., & Berntson, G. (Eds.). (2007). Handbook of psychophysiology. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Carpenter, T. P., Carlisle, R. D., & Tsang, J. A. (2014). Tipping the scales: Conciliatory behavior 
and the morality of self-forgiveness. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 9(5), 389-401. 
Casler, K., Bickel, L., & Hackett, E. (2013). Separate but equal? A comparison of participants 
and data gathered via Amazon’s MTurk, social media, and face-to-face behavioral 
testing. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(6), 2156-2160. 
Cavalera, C., & Pepe, A. (2014). Social emotions and cognition: shame, guilt and working 
memory. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 112, 457-464. 
Chambless, L. E., Heiss, G., Folsom, A. R., Rosamond, W., Szklo, M., Sharrett, A. R., & Clegg, 
L. X. (1997). Association of coronary heart disease incidence with carotid arterial wall 
thickness and major risk factors: the Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities (ARIC) Study, 
1987–1993. American journal of epidemiology, 146(6), 483-494. 
Chida, Y., & Steptoe, A. (2010). Greater cardiovascular responses to laboratory mental stress are 
associated with poor subsequent cardiovascular risk status a meta-analysis of prospective 
evidence. Hypertension, 55(4), 1026-1032. 
Cohen, S. (1988). Psychosocial models of the role of social support in the etiology of physical 
disease. Health psychology, 7(3), 269-297. 
Cohen, S. (2004). Social relationships and health. American psychologist, 59(8), 676-684. 
Cohen, S., Gottlieb, B. H., & Underwood, L. G. (2001). Social relations and health: Challenges 
for measurement and intervention. Advances in Mind-Body Medicine, 17, 129-141. 
  134 
Cohen, S., Hamrick, N. M., Rodriguez, M. S., Feldman, P. J., Rabin, B. S., & Manuck, S. B. 
(2000). The stability of and intercorrelations among cardiovascular, immune, endocrine, 
and psychological reactivity. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 22(3), 171-179. 
Cohen, S., & Lemay, E. P. (2007). Why would social networks be linked to affect and health 
practices?. Health Psychology, 26(4), 410-417. 
Cohen, S., Doyle, W. J., Skoner, D. P., Rabin, B. S., & Gwaltney, J. M. Jr. (1997). Social ties 
and susceptibility to the common cold. Journal of the American Medical Association, 
277, 1940- 1944. 
Combs, D. J. Y., Campbell, G., Jackson, M., & Smith, R. H. (2010). Exploring the consequences 
of humiliating a moral transgressor. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 32(2), 128- 
143. 
Cottington, E. M., Brock, B. M., House, J. S., & Hawthorne, V. M. (1985). Psychosocial factors 
and blood pressure in the Michigan statewide blood pressure survey. American Journal of 
Epidemiology, 121(4), 515-529. 
D’Agostino, R. B., Vasan, R. S., Pencina, M. J., Wolf, P. A., Cobain, M., Massaro, J. M., & 
Kannel, W. B. (2008). General cardiovascular risk profile for use in primary care the 
Framingham Heart Study. Circulation, 117(6), 743-753. 
Darby, B. W., & Schlenker, B. R. (1982). Children's reactions to apologies. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 43(4), 742-753. 
Da Silva, S. P., Witvliet, C., & Riek, B. (2016). Self-forgiveness and forgiveness-seeking in 
response to rumination: Cardiac and emotional responses of transgressors. The Journal of 
Positive Psychology, 1-11. 
Davidson, K. W., Mostofsky, E., & Whang, W. (2010). Don't worry, be happy: positive affect 
and reduced 10-year incident coronary heart disease: the Canadian Nova Scotia Health 
Survey. European Heart Journal, 31(9), 1065-1070. 
Davis, D. E., Ho, M. Y., Griffin, B. J., Bell, C., Hook, J. N., Van Tongeren, D. R., & Westbrook, 
C. J. (2015). Forgiving the self and physical and mental health correlates: A meta-
analytic review. Journal of counseling psychology, 62(2), 329-335. 
Dearing, R. L., Stuewig, J., & Tangney, J. P. (2005). On the importance of distinguishing shame 
from guilt: Relations to problematic alcohol and drug use. Addictive behaviors, 30(7), 
1392-1404. 
De Hooge, I. E., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2007). Moral sentiments and 
cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt. Cognition and emotion, 21(5), 
1025-1042. 
Demer, L. L., & Tintut, Y. (2008). Vascular calcification pathobiology of a multifaceted disease. 
Circulation, 117(22), 2938-2948. 
  135 
DeSteno D., Gross J.J., & Kubzansky L. (2013). Affective science and health: The importance of 
emotion and emotion regulation. Health Psychology, 32, 474-486. 
Dillon, R. S. (2001). Self-forgiveness and self-respect. Ethics, 112(1), 53-83. 
DiMatteo, M. R. (2004). Social support and patient adherence to medical treatment: a meta-
analysis. Health Psychology, 23(2), 207-218. 
Dixon, L. J., Earl, K. A., Lutz-Zois, C. J., Goodnight, J. A., & Peatee, J. J. (2014). Explaining the 
Link between Perfectionism and Self-Forgiveness: The Mediating Roles of 
Unconditional Self-Acceptance and Rumination. Individual Differences Research, 12(3), 
101-111. 
Dobash, R. E., & Dobash, R. P. (1984). The nature and antecedents of violent events. British 
journal of Criminology, 24(3), 269-288. 
Ellis, T. E., & Trumpower, D. (2008). Health‐Risk Behaviors and Suicidal Ideation: A 
Preliminary Study of Cognitive and Developmental Factors. Suicide and Life-
Threatening Behavior, 38(3), 251-259. 
Enright, R. D. (1996). Counseling within the forgiveness triad: On forgiving, receiving 
forgiveness, and self‐forgiveness. Counseling and values, 40(2), 107-126. 
Eyler, A. A., & Vest, J. R. (2002). Environmental and policy factors related to physical activity 
in rural white women. Women & Health, 36(2), 109-119. 
Exline, J. J., Deshea, L., & Holeman, V. T. (2007). Is apology worth the risk? Predictors, 
outcomes, and ways to avoid regret. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 26(4), 
479-504. 
Exline, J. J., Root, B. L., Yadavalli, S., Martin, A. M., & Fisher, M. L. (2011). Reparative 
behaviors and self-forgiveness: Effects of a laboratory-based exercise. Self and 
Identity, 10(1), 101-126. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G* Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
research methods, 39(2), 175-191. 
Fehr, R., Gelfand, M. J., & Nag, M. (2010). The road to forgiveness: a meta-analytic synthesis of 
its situational and dispositional correlates. Psychological bulletin, 136(5), 894-914. 
Feldman, P. J., Cohen, S., Lepore, S. J., Matthews, K. A., Kamarck, T. W., & Marsland, A. L. 
(1999). Negative emotions and acute physiological responses to stress. Annals of 
Behavioral Medicine, 21(3), 216-222. 
Fisher, M. L., & Exline, J. J. (2006). Self-forgiveness versus excusing: The roles of remorse, 
effort, and acceptance of responsibility. Self and Identity, 5(02), 127-146. 
  136 
Fisher, M. L., & Exline, J. J. (2010). Moving toward self‐forgiveness: Removing barriers related 
to shame, guilt, and regret. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(8), 548-558. 
Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). Accessibility from active and fulfilled 
goals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41(3), 220-239. 
Fox, H. C., Axelrod, S. R., Paliwal, P., Sleeper, J., & Sinha, R. (2007). Difficulties in emotion 
regulation and impulse control during cocaine abstinence. Drug and alcohol 
dependence, 89(2), 298-301. 
Frantz, C. M., & Bennigson, C. (2005). Better late than early: The influence of timing on 
apology effectiveness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41(2), 201-207. 
Friedberg, J. P., Suchday, S., & Shelov, D. V. (2007). The impact of forgiveness on 
cardiovascular reactivity and recovery. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 65(2), 
87-94. 
Friedberg, J. P., Suchday, S., & Srinivas, V. S. (2009). Relationship between forgiveness and 
psychological and physiological indices in cardiac patients. International Journal of 
Behavioral Medicine, 16(3), 205-211. 
Frisina, P. G., Borod, J. C. & Lepore, S. J. (2004) A metaanalysis of the effects of written 
emotional disclosure on the health outcomes of clinical populations. Journal of Nervous 
and Mental Disease, 192, 629–634. 
Gambaro, S., & Rabin, A. I. (1969). Diastolic blood pressure responses following direct and 
displaced aggression after anger arousal in high- and low-guilt subjects. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 12(1), 87-94.  
Gianaros, P.J. & Sheu, L.K. (2009). A review of neuroimaging studies of stressor-evoked blood 
pressure reactivity: Emerging evidence for a brain-body pathway to coronary heart 
disease risk. Neuroimage, 47, 922-936. 
Gill, K. (2000, January). The moral functions of an apology. In The Philosophical Forum (Vol. 
31, No. 1, pp. 11-27). Blackwell Publishers. 
Glynn, L. M., Christenfeld, N., & Gerin, W. (2002). The role of rumination in recovery from 
reactivity: cardiovascular consequences of emotional states. Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 64(5), 714-726. 
Gottman, J. M., & Krokoff, L. J. (1989). Marital interaction and satisfaction: a longitudinal 
view. Journal of consulting and clinical psychology, 57(1), 47-52. 
Gottman, J. M., & Levenson, R. W. (1992). Marital processes predictive of later dissolution: 
behavior, physiology, and health. Journal of personality and social psychology, 63(2), 
221-233. 
  137 
Gottman, J.M. & Silver, N. (1999). The seven principles for making marriage work. New York, 
NY: Crown Publishers, Inc. 
Gratz, K. L., & Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation and 
dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the difficulties in 
emotion regulation scale. Journal of psychopathology and behavioral assessment, 26(1), 
41-54. 
Grewen, K. M., Girdler, S. S., Amico, J., & Light, K. C. (2005). Effects of partner support on 
resting oxytocin, cortisol, norepinephrine, and blood pressure before and after warm 
partner contact. Psychosomatic medicine, 67(4), 531-538. 
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: 
implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 85(2), 348-362. 
Gross, J. J., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). Emotion regulation: Conceptual foundations. In J. J. 
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (pp. 3-24). New York, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
Haines A.P., Imeson J.D., & Meade T.W. (1987). Phobic anxiety and ischaemic heart disease. 
British Medical Journal, 295(6593), 297-299. 
Hall, J. H., & Fincham, F. D. (2005). Self–forgiveness: The stepchild of forgiveness 
research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 24(5), 621-637. 
Hall, J. H., & Fincham, F. D. (2008). The temporal course of self-forgiveness. Journal of social 
and clinical psychology, 27(2), 174-202. 
Hareli, S., & Eisikovits, Z. (2006). The role of communicating social emotions accompanying 
apologies in forgiveness. Motivation and Emotion, 30(3), 189-197. 
Harvey, I. S., & Alexander, K. (2012). Perceived social support and preventive health behavioral 
outcomes among older women. Journal of cross-cultural gerontology, 27(3), 275-290. 
Hauser, D. J., & Schwarz, N. (2016). Attentive Turkers: MTurk participants perform better on 
online attention checks than do subject pool participants. Behavior research 
methods, 48(1), 400-407. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
regression-based approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Herrald, M. M., & Tomaka, J. (2002). Patterns of emotion-specific appraisal, coping, and 
cardiovascular reactivity during an ongoing emotional episode. Journal of personality 
and social psychology, 83(2), 434-450. 
  138 
Hemingway, H., & Marmot, M. (1999). Psychosocial factors in the aetiology and prognosis of 
coronary heart disease: systematic review of prospective cohort studies. BMJ: British 
Medical Journal, 318(7196), 1460-1467. 
Ho, B. (2012). Apologies as signals: with evidence from a trust game. Management 
Science, 58(1), 141-158. 
Hodgins, H. S., & Liebeskind, E. (2003). Apology versus defense: Antecedents and 
consequences. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(4), 297-316. 
Holmes, J. G., & Murray, S. L. (1996). Conflict in close relationships. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. 
Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (622-654). New 
York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Holmgren, M. R. (1998). Self-forgiveness and responsible moral agency. The Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 32(1), 75-91. 
Holt-Lunstad, J., Birmingham, W. A., & Light, K. C. (2008). Influence of a “warm touch” 
support enhancement intervention among married couples on ambulatory blood pressure, 
oxytocin, alpha amylase, and cortisol. Psychosomatic medicine, 70(9), 976-985. 
Holt-Lunstad, J., Uchino, B. N., Smith, T. W., Olson-Cerny, C., & Nealy-Moore, J. B. (2003). 
Social relationships and ambulatory blood pressure: Structural and qualitative predictors 
of cardiovascular function during everyday social interactions. Health Psychology, 22, 
388-397. 
House, J. S. (1981). Work stress and social support. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Howell, A. J., Turowski, J. B., & Buro, K. (2012). Guilt, empathy, and apology. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 53(7), 917-922. 
Iacobucci, D. (2012). Mediation analysis and categorical variables: The final frontier. Journal of 
Consumer Psychology 22, 582–594. 
Ianni, P. A., Hart, K. E., Hibbard, S., & Carroll, M. (2010). The association between self-
forgiveness and alcohol misuse depends on the severity of drinker's shame: Toward a 
buffering model. Addictive Disorders & Their Treatment, 9(3), 106-111. 
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Gilovich, T., & Ariely, D. (2013). Moral masochism: On the 
connection between guilt and self-punishment. Emotion, 13(1), 14-18. 
Jacobson, N. S., & Margolin, G. (1979). Marital therapy: Strategies based on social learning 
and behavior exchange principles. New York, NY: Brunner/Mazel.  
Jennings, J.R., Kamarck, T.W., Everson-Roose, S., Kaplan, G.A., Manuck, S.B. & Salonen, J.T. 
(2004). Exaggerated blood pressure responses during mental stress are prospectively 
related to enhanced carotid atherosclerosis in middle-aged Finnish men. Circulation, 110, 
2198-2203. 
  139 
Johnson, A. J., Wittenberg, E., Haigh, M., Wigley, S., Becker, J., Brown, K., & Craig, E. (2004). 
The process of relationship development and deterioration: Turning points in friendships 
that have terminated. Communication Quarterly, 52(1), 54-67. 
Kamarck, T. W., Jennings, J. R., Pogue-Geile, M., & Manuck, S. B. (1994). A multidimensional 
measurement model for cardiovascular reactivity: stability and cross-validation in two 
adult samples. Health Psychology, 13(6), 471-478. 
Kamarck, T.W. & Lovallo, W. (2003). Cardiovascular reactivity to psychological challenge: 
Conceptual and measurement considerations. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65, 9-21. 
Kaplan, D. (2009). Structural equation modeling: Foundations and extensions. Los Angeles, LA: 
Sage Publications. 
Karremans, J. C., & Van Lange, P. A. (2004). Back to caring after being hurt: The role of 
forgiveness. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34(2), 207-227. 
Kassel, J. D., Stroud, L. R., & Paronis, C. A. (2003). Smoking, stress, and negative affect: 
correlation, causation, and context across stages of smoking. Psychological 
bulletin, 129(2), 270-304. 
Kaye, K. (1991). Penetrating the cycle of sustained conflict. Family Business Review, 4(1), 21-
44. 
Kawachi, I., Colditz, G. A., Ascherio, A., Rimm, E. B., Giovannucci, E., Stampfer, M. J., & 
Willett, W. C. (1996). A prospective study of social networks in relation to total mortality 
and cardiovascular disease in men in the USA. Journal of epidemiology and community 
health, 50(3), 245-251. 
Kawachi, I., Sparrow, D., Vokonas, P. S., & Weiss, S. T. (1994). Symptoms of anxiety and risk 
of coronary heart disease. The Normative Aging Study. Circulation, 90(5), 2225-2229. 
Ketelaar, T., & Tung Au, W. (2003). The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of 
uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information 
interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. Cognition & Emotion, 17(3), 
429-453. 
Khantzian, E. J. (1997). The self-medication hypothesis of substance use disorders: a 
reconsideration and recent applications. Harvard review of psychiatry, 4(5), 231-244. 
Kinnier, R. T., & Metha, A. T. (1989). Regrets and priorities at three stages of life. Counseling 
and Values, 33(3), 182-193. 
Kirchhoff, J., Wagner, U., & Strack, M. (2012). Apologies: Words of magic? The role of verbal 
components, anger reduction, and offence severity. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace 
Psychology, 18(2), 109-130. 
  140 
Kline, R.B. (2005). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. New York, NY: 
The Guilford Press. 
Klop, B., do Rego, A. T., & Cabezas, M. C. (2013). Alcohol and plasma triglycerides. Current 
opinion in lipidology, 24(4), 321-326. 
Knox, S. S., Adelman, A., Ellison, R. C., Arnett, D. K., Siegmund, K., Weidner, G., & Province, 
M. A. (2000). Hostility, social support, and carotid artery atherosclerosis in the National 
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Family Heart Study. The American journal of 
cardiology, 86(10), 1086-1089. 
Kop, W. J., Berman, D. S., Gransar, H., Wong, N. D., Miranda-Peats, R., White, M. D., ... & 
Rozanski, A. (2005). Social network and coronary artery calcification in asymptomatic 
individuals. Psychosomatic Medicine, 67(3), 343-352. 
Krantz, D. S., & McCeney, M. K. (2002). Effects of psychological and social factors on organic 
disease: A Critical Assessment of Research on Coronary Heart Disease. Annual review of 
psychology, 53(1), 341-369. 
Kreibig, S. D. (2010). Autonomic nervous system activity in emotion: A review. Biological 
psychology, 84(3), 394-421. 
Kreibig, S. D., Whooley, M. A., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Social integration and mortality in patients 
with coronary heart disease: findings from the Heart and Soul Study. Psychosomatic 
medicine, 76(8), 659-668. 
Kronmal, R. A., McClelland, R. L., Detrano, R., Shea, S., Lima, J. A., Cushman, M., ... & Burke, 
G. L. (2007). Risk factors for the progression of coronary artery calcification in 
asymptomatic subjects results from the Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis (MESA). 
Circulation, 115(21), 2722-2730. 
Lakey, B., & Scoboria, A. (2005). The Relative Contribution of Trait and Social Influences to 
the Links Among Perceived Social Support, Affect, and Self‐Esteem. Journal of 
Personality, 73(2), 361-388. 
Larsen, B. A., Darby, R. S., Harris, C. R., Nelkin, D. K., Milam, P. E., & Christenfeld, N. J. 
(2012). The immediate and delayed cardiovascular benefits of forgiving. Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 74(7), 745-750. 
Lawler, K. A., Younger, J. W., Piferi, R. L., Billington, E., Jobe, R., Edmondson, K., & Jones, 
W. H. (2003). A change of heart: Cardiovascular correlates of forgiveness in response to 
interpersonal conflict. Journal of behavioral medicine, 26(5), 373-393. 
Leach, C. W., & Cidam, A. (2015). When is shame linked to constructive approach orientation? 
A meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(6), 983-1002. 
  141 
Ledgerwood, A., & Shrout, P. E. (2011). The trade-off between accuracy and precision in latent 
variable models of mediation processes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 101(6), 1174-1188. 
Lee, R. E., & Cubbin, C. (2002). Neighborhood context and youth cardiovascular health 
behaviors. American Journal of Public Health, 92(3), 428-436. 
Leith, K. P., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of interpersonal 
conflicts: guilt‐prone people are better at perspective taking. Journal of 
personality, 66(1), 1-37. 
Lepore, S. J. (1997) Expressive writing moderates the relation between intrusive thoughts and 
depressive symptoms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 1030–1037 
Leunissen, J. M., De Cremer, D., van Dijke, M., & Folmer, C. P. R. (2014). Forecasting errors in 
the averseness of apologizing. Social Justice Research, 27(3), 322-339. 
Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International Universities Press. 
Lewis, M. A., & Rook, K. S. (1999). Social control in personal relationships: impact on health 
behaviors and psychological distress. Health psychology, 18(1), 63-71. 
Liberman, N., Förster, J., & Higgins, E. T. (2007). Completed vs. interrupted priming: Reduced 
accessibility from post-fulfillment inhibition. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 43(2), 258-264. 
Libby, P. (2001). Current concepts of the pathogenesis of the acute coronary syndromes. 
Circulation, 104(3), 365-372. 
Libby, P. (2002). Inflammation in atherosclerosis. Nature, 420(6917), 868-874. 
Libby P. (2015). The Pathogenesis, Prevention, and Treatment of Atherosclerosis. In Kasper D, 
Fauci A, Hauser S, Longo D, Jameson J, Loscalzo J (Eds), Harrison's Principles of 
Internal Medicine, 19e. 
MacKinnon, D. P., Krull, J. L., & Lockwood, C. M. (2000). Equivalence of the mediation, 
confounding and suppression effect. Prevention science, 1(4), 173-181. 
Manuck, S. B., Kaplan, J. R., & Clarkson, T. B. (1983). Behaviorally induced heart rate 
reactivity and atherosclerosis in cynomolgus monkeys. Psychosomatic Medicine, 45(2), 
95-108. 
Manuck, S. B., Kaplan, J. R., Muldoon, M. F., Adams, M. R., & Clarkson, T. B. (1991). The 
behavioral exacerbation of atherosclerosis and its inhibition by propranolol. Stress, 
coping and disease, 15, 51-72. 
Marschall, D., Sanftner, J., & Tangney, J. P. (1994). The state shame and guilt scale. Fairfax, 
VA: George Mason University. 
  142 
Matthews, K. A. (2005) Psychological perspectives on the development of coronary heart 
disease. American Psychologist, 60(8), 783-796. 
Matthews, K. A., Zhu, S., Tucker, D. C., & Whooley, M. A. (2006). Blood pressure reactivity to 
psychological stress and coronary calcification in the Coronary Artery Risk Development 
in Young Adults Study. Hypertension, 47(3), 391-395. 
Mauger, P. A., Perry, J. E., Freeman, T., & Grove, D. C. (1992). The measurement of 
forgiveness: Preliminary research. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 11(2), 170-
180. 
May, R. W., Sanchez-Gonzalez, M. A., Hawkins, K. A., Batchelor, W. B., & Fincham, F. D. 
(2014). Effect of anger and trait forgiveness on cardiovascular risk in young adult 
females. The American journal of cardiology, 114(1), 47-52. 
McCullough, M. (2008). Beyond revenge: The evolution of the forgiveness instinct. San 
Fransisco, California: John Wiley & Sons. 
McCullough, M. E., Rachal, K. C., Sandage, S. J., Worthington Jr, E. L., Brown, S. W., & Hight, 
T. L. (1998). Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships: II. Theoretical elaboration 
and measurement. Journal of personality and social psychology, 75(6), 1586-1603. 
McCullough, M. E., Root, L. M., & Cohen, A. D. (2006). Writing about the benefits of an 
interpersonal transgression facilitates forgiveness. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 74(5), 887-897. 
McCullough, M. E., Worthington Jr, E. L., & Rachal, K. C. (1997). Interpersonal forgiving in 
close relationships. Journal of personality and social psychology, 73(2), 321-336. 
McGee, R. O. B., & Williams, S. (2000). Does low self-esteem predict health compromising 
behaviours among adolescents? Journal of adolescence, 23(5), 569-582. 
McGraw, K. M. (1987). Guilt following transgression: an attribution of responsibility 
approach. Journal of personality and social psychology, 53(2), 247-256. 
Meek, K. R., Albright, J. S., & McMinn, M. R. (1995). Religious orientation, guilt, confession, 
and forgiveness. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 23(3), 190-197. 
Millar-Craig, M., Bishop, C., & Raftery, E. B. (1978). Circadian variation of blood-pressure. The 
Lancet, 311(8068), 795-797. 
Miller, S. B., & Ditto, B. (1989). Individual differences in heart rate and peripheral vascular 
responses to an extended aversive task. Psychophysiology, 26(5), 506-513. 
Mohrman, D. E. & Heller, L. J. (2010). Cardiovascular physiology. United States: McGraw-Hill 
Companies. 
  143 
Mor, N., & Winquist, J. (2002). Self-focused attention and negative affect: a meta-
analysis. Psychological bulletin, 128(4), 638-662. 
Mosher, D. L., O’Grady, K. E., & Katz, H. A. (1980). Hostility-guilt, guilt over aggression, and 
self-punishment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 44, 34–40. 
Nagra, G. S., Lin, A., & Upthegrove, R. (2016). What bridges the gap between self-harm and 
suicidality? The role of forgiveness, resilience and attachment. Psychiatry research, 241, 
78-82. 
Nealey-Moore, J. B., Smith, T. W., Uchino, B. N., Hawkins, M. W., & Olson-Cerny, C. (2007). 
Cardiovascular reactivity during positive and negative marital interactions. Journal of 
behavioral medicine, 30(6), 505-519. 
Nelissen, R. M. (2012). Guilt-induced self-punishment as a sign of remorse.Social Psychological 
and Personality Science, 3(2), 139-144. 
Nelissen, R. M. A., Dijker, A. J., & De Vries, N. K. (2007). Emotions and goals: Assessing 
relations between values and emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 21(4), 902-911. 
Nelissen, R., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009). When guilt evokes self-punishment: evidence for the 
existence of a Dobby Effect. Emotion, 9(1), 118-122. 
Newall, N. E., Chipperfield, J. G., Daniels, L. M., Hladkyj, S., & Perry, R. P. (2009). Regret in 
later life: Exploring relationships between regret frequency, secondary interpretive 
control beliefs, and health in older individuals. The International Journal of Aging and 
Human Development, 68(4), 261-288. 
Newsom, J. T. (2015). Longitudinal Structural Equation Modeling. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Ohbuchi, K., Kameda, M., & Agarie, N. (1989). Apology as aggression control: Its role in 
mediating appraisal of and response to harm. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 56(2), 219-227. 
Ohtsubo, Y., & Watanabe, E. (2009). Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly 
signaling model of apology. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30(2), 114-123. 
Ohtsubo, Y., Watanabe, E., Kim, J., Kulas, J. T., Muluk, H., Nazar, G., ... & Zhang, J. (2012). 
Are costly apologies universally perceived as being sincere? A test of the costly apology-
perceived sincerity relationship in seven countries. Journal of Evolutionary 
Psychology, 10(4), 187-204. 
Okimoto, T. G., Wenzel, M., & Hedrick, K. (2013). Refusing to apologize can have 
psychological benefits (and we issue no mea culpa for this research finding). European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 43(1), 22-31. 
  144 
Orth-Gomér, K., Rosengren, A., & Wilhelmsen, L. (1993). Lack of social support and incidence 
of coronary heart disease in middle-aged Swedish men. Psychosomatic medicine, 55(1), 
37-43. 
Pearson, T. A., Blair, S. N., Daniels, S. R., Eckel, R. H., Fair, J. M., Fortmann, S. P., Franklin, B. 
A., Goldstein, L. B., Greenland, P., Grundy, S. M., Hong, Y., Miller, N. H., Lauer, R. M., 
Ockene, I. S., Sacco, R. L., Sallis, J. F., Smith, S. C., Stone, N. J., Taubert, K. A. (2002). 
AHA Guidelines for Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease and Stroke: 2002 
Update: Consensus Panel Guide to Comprehensive Risk Reduction for Adult Patients 
Without Coronary or Other Atherosclerotic Vascular Diseases. American Heart 
Association Science Advisory and Coordinating Committee. Circulation, 106(3), 388-
391. 
Pennebaker, J. W. (1993). Putting stress into words: Health, linguistic, and therapeutic 
implications. Behaviour research and therapy, 31(6), 539-548. 
Pennebaker, J. W. (1997). Writing about emotional experiences as a therapeutic 
process. Psychological science, 8(3), 162-166. 
Pennebaker, J. W. (2012). Opening up: The healing power of expressing emotions. New York, 
NY: Guilford Press. 
Peplau, L. A., & Cutrona, C. E. (1980). The revised UCLA Loneliness Scale: Concurrent and 
discriminant validity evidence. Journal of personality and social psychology, 39(3), 472-
480. 
Peterson, S. J., Van Tongeren, D. R., Womack, S. D., Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., & Griffin, B. J. 
(2016). The benefits of self-forgiveness on mental health: Evidence from correlational 
and experimental research. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1-10. 
Quiles, Z. N., Kinnunen, T., & Bybee, J. (2002). Aspects of guilt and self-reported substance use 
in adolescence. Journal of drug education, 32(4), 343-362. 
Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale: A self-report depression scale for research in the general 
population. Applied psychological measurement, 1(3), 385-401. 
Ratnasingam, P., & Bishop, G. D. (2007). Social support schemas, trait anger, and cardiovascular 
responses. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 63(3), 308-316. 
Reblin, M., & Uchino, B. N. (2008). Social and emotional support and its implication for 
health. Current opinion in psychiatry, 21(2), 201-205. 
Reed, D., McGee, D., Yano, K., & Feinleib, M. (1983). Social networks and coronary heart 
disease among Japanese men in Hawaii. American Journal of Epidemiology, 117(4), 384-
396. 
  145 
Rehm, J., Rehm, J., Taylor, B., Rehm, J., Taylor, B., Room, R., ... & Room, R. (2006). Global 
burden of disease from alcohol, illicit drugs and tobacco. Drug and alcohol review, 25(6), 
503-513. 
Risen, J. L., & Gilovich, T. (2007). Target and observer differences in the acceptance of 
questionable apologies. Journal of personality and social psychology, 92(3), 418-433. 
Robles, T. F., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. (2003). The physiology of marriage: Pathways to 
health. Physiology & behavior, 79(3), 409-416. 
Ross, R. (1995). Cell biology of atherosclerosis. Annual Review of Physiology, 57(1), 791-804. 
Rusting, C. L., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). Regulating responses to anger: effects of 
rumination and distraction on angry mood. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 74(3), 790-803. 
Rutledge, T., Linden, W., & Paul, D. (2000). Cardiovascular recovery from acute laboratory 
stress: reliability and concurrent validity. Psychosomatic Medicine, 62(5), 648-654. 
Sabag-Cohen, S. (2009). Implicit shame and the emotional stroop task: Regulation of shame in 
relation to attachment style and interpersonal rejection. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation. 
Sanftner, J. L., Barlow, D. H., Marschall, D. E., & Tangney, J. P. (1995). The relation of shame 
and guilt to eating disorder symptomatology. Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 14(4), 315-324. 
Satorra, A., & Bentler, P. M. (1988). Scaling corrections for chi-square statistics in covariance 
structure analysis. In Proceedings of the American Statistical Association (Vol. 1, pp. 
308-313).  
Scher, S. J., & Darley, J. M. (1997). How effective are the things people say to apologize? 
Effects of the realization of the apology speech act. Journal of Psycholinguistic 
Research, 26(1), 127-140. 
Scherer, M., Worthington, E. L., Hook, J. N., & Campana, K. L. (2011). Forgiveness and the 
bottle: Promoting self-forgiveness in individuals who abuse alcohol. Journal of Addictive 
Diseases, 30, 382–395. 
Schill, T. R. (1972). Aggression and blood pressure responses of high- and low-guilt subjects 
following frustration. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 38(3), 461. 
Schmidt, R. E., & Van der Linden, M. (2009). The aftermath of rash action: Sleep-interfering 
counterfactual thoughts and emotions. Emotion, 9(4), 549-553. 
Schmitt, M., Gollwitzer, M., Förster, N., & Montada, L. (2004). Effects of objective and 
subjective account components on forgiving. The Journal of social psychology, 144(5), 
465-486. 
  146 
Schoenthaler, A. M., Schwartz, J., Cassells, A., Tobin, J. N., & Brondolo, E. (2010). Daily 
interpersonal conflict predicts masked hypertension in an urban sample. American 
journal of hypertension, 23(10), 1082-1088. 
Schumann, K. (2012). Does love mean never having to say you’re sorry? Associations between 
relationship satisfaction, perceived apology sincerity, and forgiveness. Journal of Social 
and Personal Relationships, 29(7), 997-1010. 
Schumann, K. (2014). An affirmed self and a better apology: The effect of self-affirmation on 
transgressors' responses to victims. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 89-
96. 
Schumann, K., & Dweck, C. S. (2014). Who accepts responsibility for their transgressions? 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(12), 1598-1610. 
Schumann, K., & Ross, M. (2010). Why Women Apologize More Than Men Gender Differences 
in Thresholds for Perceiving Offensive Behavior. Psychological Science, 21(11), 1649-
1655. 
Seeman, T. E., & Syme, S. L. (1987). Social networks and coronary artery disease: a comparison 
of the structure and function of social relations as predictors of disease. Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 49(4), 341-354. 
Shnabel, N., & Nadler, A. (2008). A needs-based model for reconciliation: Satisfying the 
differential emotional needs of the victim and perpetrator as a key to promoting 
reconciliation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(1), 116–132.  
Shnabel, N., Nadler, A., Ullrich, J., Dovidio, J. F., & Carmi, D. (2009). Promoting reconciliation 
through the satisfaction of the emotional needs of victimized and perpetrating group 
members: The needs-based model of reconciliation. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 35(8), 1021-1030. 
Sias, P. M., Heath, R. G., Perry, T., Silva, D., & Fix, B. (2004). Narratives of workplace 
friendship deterioration. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 21(3), 321-340. 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2017). False-Positive Citations. Perspectives of 
Psychological Science. Forthcoming.  
Skarlicki, D. P., Folger, R., & Gee, J. (2004). When Social Accounts Backfire: The Exacerbating 
Effects of a Polite Message or an Apology on Reactions to an Unfair Outcome1. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 34(2), 322-341. 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 48(4), 813-838. 
Smith, T. W., Uchino, B. N., Berg, C. A., Florsheim, P., Pearce, G., Hawkins, M., ... & Olsen-
Cerny, C. (2009). Conflict and collaboration in middle-aged and older couples: II. 
  147 
Cardiovascular reactivity during marital interaction. Psychology and aging, 24(2), 274-
286. 
Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrott, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. (2002). The role of public exposure 
in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 83(1), 138-159. 
Smyth, J. M. (1998) Written emotional expression. Effect sizes, outcome types, and moderating 
variables. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 66, 174–184 
Sneed, R. S., & Cohen, S. (2014). Negative social interactions and incident hypertension among 
older adults. Health psychology, 33(6), 554-565. 
Steptoe, A., Wardle, J., & Marmot, M. (2005). Positive affect and health-related neuroendocrine, 
cardiovascular, and inflammatory processes. Proceedings of the National academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 102(18), 6508-6512. 
Stewart, J. C., Janicki, D. L., & Kamarck, T. W. (2006). Cardiovascular reactivity to and 
recovery from psychological challenge as predictors of 3-year change in blood 
pressure. Health Psychology, 25(1), 111-118. 
Stillwell, A. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1997). The construction of victim and perpetrator 
memories: Accuracy and distortion in role-based accounts. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 23(11), 1157-1172. 
Stöber, J. (2001). The Social Desirability Scale-17 (SDS-17): Convergent validity, discriminant 
validity, and relationship with age. European Journal of Psychological 
Assessment, 17(3), 222-232. 
Strelan, P. (2007). Who forgives others, themselves, and situations? The roles of narcissism, 
guilt, self-esteem, and agreeableness. Personality and Individual Differences, 42(2), 259-
269. 
Sukhdial, A., & Boush, D. M. (2004). Eating guilt: Measurement and relevance to consumer 
behavior. In B. E. Kahn & M. F. Luce (Eds.), Advances in Consumer Research (pp. 575-
576). Valdosta, GA: Association for Consumer Research 
Suls, J., & Wan, C. K. (1993). The relationship between trait hostility and cardiovascular 
reactivity: A quantitative review and analysis. Psychophysiology, 30(6), 615-626. 
Takaku, S. (2001). The effects of apology and perspective taking on interpersonal forgiveness: A 
dissonance-attribution model of interpersonal forgiveness. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 141(4), 494-508. 
Takaku, S., Weiner, B., & Ohbuchi, K. I. (2001). A cross-cultural examination of the effects of 
apology and perspective taking on forgiveness. Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology, 20(1-2), 144-166. 
  148 
Tanaka, H., Yagi, A., Komiya, A., Mifune, N., & Ohtsubo, Y. (2015). Shame-prone people are 
more likely to punish themselves: A test of the reputation-maintenance explanation for 
self-punishment. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, 9(1), 1-7. 
Tangney, J. P. (1995). Shame and guilt in interpersonal relationships. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. 
Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, 
and pride (pp. 114-139). New York: Guilford. 
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self‐control predicts good 
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of 
personality, 72(2), 271-324. 
Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2003). Shame and guilt. Guilford Press.  
Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment distinct emotions? Journal of personality and social psychology, 70(6), 
1256. 
Tangney, J. P. & Tracy, J. (2011). Self-conscious emotions. In Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. 
(Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 446-478). Guilford Press. 
Terzino, K. A. (2010). Self-forgiveness for interpersonal and intrapersonal transgressions 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
Thompson, L. Y., Snyder, C. R., Hoffman, L., Michael, S. T., Rasmussen, H. N., Billings, L. S., 
... & Roberts, D. E. (2005). Dispositional forgiveness of self, others, and 
situations. Journal of personality, 73(2), 313-360. 
Tomlinson, E. C., Dineen, B. R., & Lewicki, R. J. (2004). The road to reconciliation: 
Antecedents of victim willingness to reconcile following a broken promise. Journal of 
Management, 30(2), 165-187. 
Treiber, F. A., Kamarck, T., Schneiderman, N., Sheffield, D., Kapuku, G., & Taylor, T. (2003). 
Cardiovascular reactivity and development of preclinical and clinical disease 
states. Psychosomatic medicine, 65(1), 46-62. 
Tsang, J. A., McCullough, M. E., & Fincham, F. D. (2006). The longitudinal association between 
forgiveness and relationship closeness and commitment. Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 25(4), 448-472. 
Tucker, S., Turner, N., Barling, J., Reid, E. M., & Elving, C. (2006). Apologies and 
transformational leadership. Journal of Business Ethics, 63(2), 195-207. 
Uchino, B. N. (2006). Social support and health: a review of physiological processes potentially 
underlying links to disease outcomes. Journal of behavioral medicine, 29(4), 377-387. 
  149 
Uchino, B. N., Cacioppo, J. T., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. (1996). The relationship between social 
support and physiological processes: a review with emphasis on underlying mechanisms 
and implications for health. Psychological bulletin, 119(3), 488-531. 
Uchino, B. N., Holt-Lunstad, J., Uno, D., & Flinders, J. B. (2001). Heterogeneity in the social 
networks of young and older adults: Prediction of mental health and cardiovascular 
reactivity during acute stress. Journal of behavioral medicine, 24(4), 361-382. 
Umberson, D. (1987). Family status and health behaviors: Social control as a dimension of social 
integration. Journal of health and social behavior, 306-319. 
Vella, E. J., & Friedman, B. H. (2009). Hostility and anger in: cardiovascular reactivity and 
recovery to mental arithmetic stress. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 72(3), 
253-259. 
Walen, H. R., & Lachman, M. E. (2000). Social support and strain from partner, family, and 
friends: Costs and benefits for men and women in adulthood. Journal of Social and 
Personal Relationships, 17(1), 5-30. 
Wang, H. X., Mittleman, M. A., & Orth-Gomer, K. (2005). Influence of social support on 
progression of coronary artery disease in women. Social science & medicine, 60(3), 599-
607. 
Watson, M. J., Lydecker, J. A., Jobe, R. L., Enright, R. D., Gartner, A., Mazzeo, S. E., & 
Worthington Jr, E. L. (2012). Self-forgiveness in anorexia nervosa and bulimia 
nervosa. Eating disorders, 20(1), 31-41. 
Webb, J. R., Hirsch, J. K., Visser, P. L., & Brewer, K. G. (2013). Forgiveness and health: 
Assessing the mediating effect of health behavior, social support, and interpersonal 
functioning. Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 147(5), 391-414. 
Webb, T. L., Miles, E., & Sheeran, P. (2012). Dealing with feeling: a meta-analysis of the 
effectiveness of strategies derived from the process model of emotion 
regulation. Psychological bulletin, 138(4), 775-808. 
Webb, J. R., Robinson, E. A., Brower, K. J., & Zucker, R. A. (2006). Forgiveness and alcohol 
problems among people entering substance abuse treatment. Journal of Addictive 
Diseases, 25(3), 55-67. 
Weiner, B., Graham, S., Peter, O., & Zmuidinas, M. (1991). Public confession and 
forgiveness. Journal of Personality, 59(2), 281-312. 
Wenzel, M., Woodyatt, L., & Hedrick, K. (2012). No genuine self‐forgiveness without accepting 
responsibility: Value reaffirmation as a key to maintaining positive self‐regard. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 42(5), 617-627. 
  150 
Westers, N. J., Rehfuss, M., Olson, L., & Biron, D. (2012). The role of forgiveness in 
adolescents who engage in nonsuicidal self-injury. The Journal of nervous and mental 
disease, 200(6), 535-541. 
Whited, M. C., Wheat, A. L., & Larkin, K. T. (2010). The influence of forgiveness and apology 
on cardiovascular reactivity and recovery in response to mental stress. Journal of 
behavioral medicine, 33(4), 293-304. 
Wills, T. A., & Cleary, S. D. (1996). How are social support effects mediated? A test with 
parental support and adolescent substance use. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 71(5), 937-952. 
Witvliet, C., Hinman, N. G., Exline, J. J., & Brandt, T. (2011). Responding to our own 
transgressions: An experimental writing study of repentance, offense rumination, self-
justification, and distraction. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 30(3), 223-238. 
Witvliet, C., Ludwig, T., & Bauer, D. J. (2002). Please forgive me: Transgressors’ emotions and 
physiology during imagery of seeking forgiveness and victim responses. Journal of 
Psychology and Christianity, 21, 219-233. 
Wohl, M. J., DeShea, L., & Wahkinney, R. L. (2008). Looking within: Measuring state self-
forgiveness and its relationship to psychological well-being. Canadian Journal of 
Behavioural Science, 40(1), 1-10. 
Wolf, S. T., Cohen, T. R., Panter, A. T., & Insko, C. A. (2010). Shame proneness and guilt 
proneness: Toward the further understanding of reactions to public and private 
transgressions Self & Identity, 9, 337-362. 
Woodyatt, L., & Wenzel, M. (2013a). Self-Forgiveness and Restoration of an Offender 
Following an Interpersonal Transgression. Journal of Social & Clinical 
Psychology, 32(2), 225-259.  
Woodyatt, L., & Wenzel, M. (2013b). The psychological immune response in the face of 
transgressions: Pseudo self-forgiveness and threat to belonging. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 49(6), 951-958. 
Woodyatt, L., & Wenzel, M. (2014). A needs-based perspective on self-forgiveness: Addressing 
threat to moral identity as a means of encouraging interpersonal and intrapersonal 
restoration. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 125-135. 
Zechmeister, J. S., Garcia, S., Romero, C., & Vas, S. N. (2004). Don't apologize unless you 
mean it: A laboratory investigation of forgiveness and retaliation. Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 23(4), 532-564. 
Zechmeister, J. S., & Romero, C. (2002). Victim and offender accounts of interpersonal conflict: 
autobiographical narratives of forgiveness and unforgiveness. Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 82(4), 675-686. 
  151 
Zeigarnik, B. (1927). On the retention of completed and uncompleted activities. Psychologische 
Forschung, 9, 1-85. 
 
